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Abstract
This dissertation examines the relationships of established and young startup firms in environments
characterized by rapid technological change in which exploration, i.e., moving away from current
organizational routines and knowledge bases, is crucial for success.
In the first essay, I combine perspectives on organizational myopia and organizational learning to
examine how prior successes and prior failures solving R&D problems shape whether established firms
go beyond "local search" in partnerships formations with startup firms. In line with the myopia
perspective, I find that established firms tend to "overlook" partnering opportunities with novel elements
of knowledge as well as opportunities that do not promise payoffs in the immediate future. The study
further reveals that prior successes and failures very differently shape these myopic tendencies. While
prior failures lead firms to pursue partnerships with novel elements of knowledge, prior successes make
firms more receptive to partnerships with payoffs in the distant future.
In the second essay, I draw on the literature on organizational learning and inter-organizational partnering
to examine the relationship between startup innovation and startup market valuations. I find that startups
pursuing innovations that substantially differ from the solutions pursued by established firms may face
severe market value penalties as they lack both legitimacy and access to vital complementary assets.
This penalty, however, is attenuated if startups commercialize their innovations through partnerships or if
they pursue innovations in areas where established firms have failed in their own internal R&D attempts.
The final essay draws on the literature on inter-organizational learning to more closely examine the ways
in which established firms leverage the knowledge accessed from startup firms. I focus on loosely
coupled partnerships that involve established firms paying a research partner for access to specific
knowledge. While prior research has questioned the ability of firms to devise new and innovative solutions
based on such partnerships, I find that innovation benefits from loosely coupled partnerships do not
necessarily stem from the sourcing relationship per se but instead are contingent on the established
firm's experimental orientation to pursuing risky projects and its availability of financial and managerial
resources.
Overall, my dissertation enriches our understanding of the unique interdependencies between established
and startup firms in environments characterized by rapid technological change.
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ABSTRACT

SEARCHING FOR NEEDLES IN A HAYSTACK:
THREE ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF R&D PARTNERSHIPS
IN THE BIO-PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Thomas Klueter
Raphael Amit

This dissertation examines the relationships of established and young startup
firms in environments characterized by rapid technological change in which exploration,
i.e., moving away from current organizational routines and knowledge bases, is crucial
for success.
In the first essay, I combine perspectives on organizational myopia and
organizational learning to examine how prior successes and prior failures solving R&D
problems shape whether established firms go beyond “local search” in partnerships
formations with startup firms. In line with the myopia perspective, I find that established
firms tend to “overlook” partnering opportunities with novel elements of knowledge as
well as opportunities that do not promise payoffs in the immediate future. The study
further reveals that prior successes and failures very differently shape these myopic
tendencies. While prior failures lead firms to pursue partnerships with novel elements of
knowledge, prior successes make firms more receptive to partnerships with payoffs in the
distant future.
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In the second essay, I draw on the literature on organizational learning and interorganizational partnering to examine the relationship between startup innovation and
startup market valuations. I find that startups pursuing innovations that substantially
differ from the solutions pursued by established firms may face severe market value
penalties as they lack both legitimacy and access to vital complementary assets. This
penalty, however, is attenuated if startups commercialize their innovations through
partnerships or if they pursue innovations in areas where established firms have failed in
their own internal R&D attempts.
The final essay draws on the literature on inter-organizational learning to more
closely examine the ways in which established firms leverage the knowledge accessed
from startup firms. I focus on loosely coupled partnerships that involve established firms
paying a research partner for access to specific knowledge. While prior research has
questioned the ability of firms to devise new and innovative solutions based on such
partnerships, I find that innovation benefits from loosely coupled partnerships do not
necessarily stem from the sourcing relationship per se but instead are contingent on the
established firm’s experimental orientation to pursuing risky projects and its availability
of financial and managerial resources.
Overall,

my

dissertation

enriches

our

understanding

of

the

unique

interdependencies between established and startup firms in environments characterized
by rapid technological change.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1:

Introduction..................................................................................................1

Chapter 2:

Opening Up But Staying Local - Insights from Partnership Formations
between Established and Startup Firms..………………………...............21

Chapter 3:

Swimming Against the Current - Examining the Relationship Between
Radical Innovation and Startup Firm Market............................................70

Chapter 4:

No Strings Attached: Examining the Relationship between Loosely
Coupled Research Partnerships and Innovative Performance.................111

Chapter 5:

Conclusion...............................................................................................148

Appendices

.................................................................................................................160

Bibliography .................................................................................................................164

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry – Data Sources ..................................................... 17
Table 2: Partnerships used in dissertation chapters .......................................................... 19
Table 3: Chapter 2 - Summary Statistics and Correlation Table ...................................... 51
Table 4: Chapter 2 - Results – Logit - Full and Choice Based Sample ............................ 53
Table 5: Chapter 2 - Results – Logit - Full and Choice Based Sample – Continued........ 56
Table 6: Chapter 2 - Marginal effects: .............................................................................. 60
Table 7: Chapter 2 - Robustness Tests – Logit - DV Partnership Formation ................... 63
Table 8: Chapter 3 - Summary Statistics & Correlation Table ......................................... 93
Table 9: Chapter 3 - Results – OLS - DV Market Value (Log) ........................................ 94
Table 10: Chapter 3 - Robustness Tests – OLS - DV Market Value (Log) ...................... 99
Table 11: Chapter 3 - Robustness Tests 2 – OLS - DV Market Value (Log) ................. 103
Table 12: Chapter 4 - Correlation & Summary Statistics ............................................... 135
Table 13: Chapter 4 – Results - Negative Binomial - DV: New product development.. 136
Table 14: Chapter 4 – Marginal Effects .......................................................................... 140
Table 15: Chapter 4 - Robustness Tests - Negative Binomial FE ................................. 142
Table 16: Summary of hypotheses and empirical results ............................................... 149
Table 17: Dissertation Highlights ................................................................................... 153

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Output Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry in the US 1991-2010 ............................... 6
Figure 2: Originators & Commercializers of US Approved Drugs ................................... 6
Figure 3: Adaptive Responses by Established Pharmaceutical Firms (Source Recap) .... 10
Figure 4: The Drug Development Process in the Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry............... 16
Figure 5: Chapter 2 – Conceptual Hypothesis 3a ............................................................ 36
Figure 6: Chapter 2 - Conceptual Hypothesis 3b ............................................................. 36
Figure 7: Chapter 2 - Conceptual Hypothesis 4a ............................................................. 39
Figure 8: Chapter 2 - Conceptual Hypothesis 4b ............................................................. 39
Figure 9: Chapter 2 - Moderation Novelty and Prior Failures .......................................... 55
Figure 10: Chapter 2 - Moderation Distance to Commercialization and Prior Failures ... 58
Figure 11: Chapter 2 - Moderation Distance to Commercialization and Prior Successes 59
Figure 12: Chapter 3 - Moderation Radical Innovation and Commercialization
Partnerships ....................................................................................................................... 97
Figure 13: Chapter 3 - Moderation Radical Innovation and Failure Established Firms ... 98
Figure 14: Chapter 4 – Baseline Model (H1) and Empirical Context ............................ 130
Figure 15: Chapter 4 - Moderation Loosely Coupled Partnersh. and Experiment.
Orientation ...................................................................................................................... 138
Figure 16: Chapter 4 - Moderation Loosely Coupled Partnerships and Managerial
Resources ........................................................................................................................ 139
Figure 17: Chapter 4 - Moderation Loosely Coupled Partnerships and Financial Slack 140

ix

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“Now big companies, and not just Big Pharma, big companies I believe, are not any
good at doing innovation. There has to be some element of disruptive thinking to have
innovation and I can tell you that big companies do everything to avoid any disruptive
thinking in their companies. So, you want to work with companies that are a little bit
more disruptive in thinking, but bring those competencies together.”(Chris Viehbacher,
CEO, Sanofi, 2012)

Overview
In rapidly changing technological environments, exploitation, i.e., the refinement
of current organizational routines and knowledge bases, does not necessarily lead to
success, as existing ways of solving problems become obsolete quickly (March, 1991;
Steensma & Corley, 2000). Instead, researchers have stressed that firms in such
environments require elements of exploration, i.e., a conscious effort to move away from
current organizational routines and knowledge bases (Katila & Ahuja, 2002:1184;
March, 1991).
Extant research indicates that startup firms, unencumbered by aging and
embedded competencies, have advantages in exploration over established industry
players1 (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986;
Henderson, 1993; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001). At the same time, established firms are
not necessarily replaced by the emerging startups as they may retain possession of
specialized complementary assets (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Rothaermel, 2001; Taylor &
Helfat, 2009; Teece, 1986), which results in unique interdependencies between

1

Established firms in this dissertation are incumbent and mostly older firms, with substantial commercial
success in their respective industries with respect to revenue and profits. Conversely, startup firms tend to
be much younger and smaller as they have not attained substantial commercial success and, in the context
of this dissertation, have not yet commercialized products on the market.
1

established and emerging startup firms (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Hagedoorn, 2002;
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Steensma & Corley, 2000).
This dissertation takes an in-depth view of the relationships of established and
young startup firms in environments that are characterized by both strong demands for
exploration and the retention of specialized complementary assets by established firms.
Examples of such industries include the pharmaceutical industry, with the emerging
technologies’ solutions from biotechnology or the telecommunication industry,
confronted with the emergence of wireless telephony (Rothaermel & Hill, 2005).
In three distinct dissertation essays, I examine the relationships of established
firms and startups to explicate antecedents and outcomes of their innovation activities.
Each of the three essays is a separate piece of research but all are connected, drawing on
organizational learning as an important lens to study innovation, clarifying the unique
role of partnerships between established and startup firms for innovation, and using the
bio-pharmaceutical industry as a common research setting.
I begin each essay by identifying a challenge in established and startup firms’
innovation activities, which closely resonates with March’s seminal idea that exploration
(1991:71), i.e., variation, risk taking and experimentation, may be difficult to achieve.
For all papers, in a second step, I consider under which conditions firms more readily
pursue exploration or under which conditions challenges associated with exploration may
be attenuated.
I will next draw on some of the fundamental theoretical lenses to illuminate the
theoretical gaps that motivate my dissertation agenda. At the same time, I will explain
why all three essays also have managerial relevance in the bio-pharmaceutical industry.
2

Relevance – Theory & Practice
Starting with the original work of March and Simon (1958) and the behavioral
theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), organizational search processes are considered
an important lens through which to study technological innovations and interorganizational partnerships. Subsequent work on evolutionary economics (Nelson &
Winter, 1982) and organizational learning (Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988; March,
1991) have substantially expanded our understanding of organizations’ search and
innovation activities, while remaining close to the original tenets of the behavioral theory
of the firm.
Central to my dissertation is March’s (1991) seminal work in distinguishing
exploration from exploitation as a unique lens to study innovations activities by
established and startup firms. Exploration includes elements of variation and
experimentation while exploitation emphasizes efficiency and refinements (March,
1991). The exploration-exploitation framework has been applied to a wide range of
innovation activities.2 For example, in the domain of technological search, exploitation
refers to the usage of solutions which utilize familiar (or local) elements of knowledge,
while exploration utilizes knowledge which is different from what the firms already know
(e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Stuart
& Podolny, 1996).3 Researchers have also applied the exploration-exploitation
framework to the actual locus of innovation activities in the value chain (upstream and
downstream) (e.g. Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), reflecting
2

Not discussed in this dissertation is the geographic dimension (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000b) and the
familiarity with partners (Li & Rowley, 2002).
3
Exploration and exploitation are commonly operationalized through patent data. Distant technologies are
those not previously cited by the focal firms, whereas similar technologies have build on patents previously
cited by the focal firms (e.g., Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001)
3

firms’ preferences to exploit payoffs in the immediate future (Levinthal & March, 1993;
March, 1991).
Following these perspectives, exploration in general is often associated with
lower returns than exploitation, because exploration is non-routine and hence riskier
(March, 1991; Rosenkopf & McGrath, 2011). At the same time, exploration can lead to
substantial benefits, in particular in environments in which old competences quickly
become obsolete (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Extant research
indicates that new startup firms may have advantages in exploration and have taken an
important role in the generation of new ideas and in pushing an industry’s technological
change forward (Foster, 1986; Rothaermel, 2001; Tushman & Anderson, 1986).
Established firms respond by opening up to external ideas and crossing organizational
boundaries to access new and potentially disruptive technological opportunities, as
exemplified by the formation of partnerships (Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002; Rothaermel &
Deeds, 2004). Value creation by established and startup firms hence stems from
combining relevant resources and knowledge bases in innovation (Rothaermel & Boeker,
2008; Teece, 1986).
Despite the increased use of partnerships between established and startup firms
(Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), important challenges to
exploration remain and are the focus of this dissertation. I begin my dissertation focusing
on established firms that are exposed to a wide range of emerging technological
opportunities and examining the partnerships that established firms ultimately pursue.
Exploration in forming partnerships may be challenging as the interpretation of external
information is guided by firms’ histories of knowledge, prior experiences and
4

organizational routines (Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt &
March, 1988). Hence, even when established firms go beyond their boundaries to access
external knowledge (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003), they may have myopic tendencies as
they “overlook” partnering opportunities with novel elements of knowledge and
partnering opportunities that do not promise payoffs in the immediate future.
It is important to note that all experience is not created equal. The recognition and
interpretation of external opportunities in partnerships formation may also be influenced
by prior successes and failures in solving R&D problems, which are known to shape
search intensity and organizational learning (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Kim, Kim, &
Miner, 2009; Madsen & Desai, 2010). Following all arguments, I examine in essay 1
(chapter 2) how myopia and prior successes and failures may shape partnership
formations by established firms by examining the following research question:
Do firms follow myopic tendencies in their choices of startup partners and how
are these tendencies shaped by prior failures and successes in R&D?
This question is highly relevant for established firms in the bio-pharmaceutical
industry which, in the last decades, has observed an overall decline in R&D productivity
(DiMasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 2003; Scannell, Blanckley, Boldon, & Warrington,
2012; Taylor, 2003). This is demonstrated in Figure 1 (Sources: FDA; PhRMA) as the
newly approved molecular entities in the US (drugs approved by the Food and Drug
Administration – FDA) relative to R&D spending have declined. At the same time, the
proportion of drugs originating in new startup firms or universities has increased
substantially (Figure 2 – dashed line, Sources: FDA, Recap).

5

Figure 1: Output Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry
in the US 1991-2010

Figure 2: Originators & Commercializers of
US Approved Drugs

6

Combining Figure 1 and Figure 2 reveals substantial challenges to established
firms in discovering new innovative solutions. As a result, understanding how established
firms search for and recognize emerging partnering opportunities has become
increasingly important for established firms (Tyler & Steensma, 1995).
The second essay (chapter 3) examines exploration from the perspective of the
startup firms. Following the idea of evolutionary economics and technological change
(Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tripsas, 1997), exploration is
captured by examining how innovations pursued by startup firms differ from the
solutions pursued by established industry players (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005; Govindarajan
& Kopalle, 2006). I distinguish startups pursuing innovations incremental (local to the
established firms) versus startups pursuing more exploratory innovations using
knowledge and technologies different from the established firms innovation, which I
label radical innovations (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003).
Startups pursuing such radical innovations face an important quandary. On one
hand, they have the unique ability to explore and push technological change forward,
which may allow them to gain the “attacker’s advantage” (Christensen & Rosenbloom,
1995; Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986). On the other hand, pursuing radical
innovations may adversely affect the legitimacy associated with new startups and
constrain them from accessing important complementary resources to develop and
commercialize their technological solutions. Using market valuations as an important
lens to view how a startup is perceived by external actors (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009;

7

DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999; Zott & Amit, 2008), I
examine the following research question in essay 2 (chapter 3):
What is the relationship between innovation radicalness and startup market
valuation and what are the conditions under which startups pursuing radical
innovations have higher market valuations?
The question is highly relevant to the bio-pharmaceutical industry for the
following reasons. First, we observe that in the last 20 years, established firms were not
replaced by emerging startup firms, which has been ascribed to their retention of
specialized downstream complementary assets (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Teece, 1986).
This is reflected in Figure 2 (solid line) – the percentage of drugs which were ultimately
marketed solely by startup firms has risen much less steeply compared to the number of
drugs which were originated by those startup firms. Hence, understanding performance
consequences for startups pursuing radical innovative solutions is very important.
In a final dissertation essay, I revert to the perspective of the established firms and
examine value creation through research partnerships with startup firms. The intent
behind these exploration types of partnerships (Koza & Lewin, 1998) is to accelerate the
yield from research assets by reducing innovation cycle times and gaining access to
valuable new elements of knowledge (Laursen, Leone, & Torrisi, 2010; Leone &
Reichstein, 2012; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003) .
While prior studies have outlined the benefits accrued by firms that engage in
tightly coupled partnerships in the form of joint ventures or alliances (Dyer & Singh,
1998; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Rothaermel, 2001), loosely coupled
partnerships, which involve one firm paying to add or have access to specific knowledge
from another firm and to reuse such knowledge created by the research partner (e.g., a
8

research contract or in-licensing deal), have received limited attention and quite often are
not thought to allow firms to reap substantial innovation benefits (Fey & Birkinshaw,
2005; Keil, Maula, Schildt, & Zahra, 2008; Luo, 2008; Mowery et al., 1996). Yet,
established firms use the latter type of partnerships intensively (Arora, Fosfuri, &
Gambardella, 2001; Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Laursen et al., 2010; Leone &
Reichstein, 2012), leading to research question 3:
Is a firm’s innovative performance influenced by loosely coupled research
partnerships, and what are the conditions under which such partnerships increase
an established firm’s innovative performance?
I have already highlighted the difficulties of established firms in the recent
decades to conceive of innovative new solutions in the form of marketable products
(Figure 1 and Figure 2). Hence, understanding how firms may accrue innovation benefit
from accessing knowledge from external partners is crucial. We observe that over the last
decades, established firms have substantially increased their partnering with startup
firms4 (Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002), which is shown in Figure 3.
The figure indicates that loosely coupled partnerships (licensing and research
contracts) have increased and remain quite prevalent in the industry. It is hence important
to understand the benefits that established firms may accrue when engaging in such
partnerships.
Next, I provide a more detailed outline for each chapter of the dissertation.

4

The figure also includes partnerships with universities.
9

Figure 3: Adaptive Responses by Established Pharmaceutical Firms (Source Recap)
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Dissertation Outline
The dissertation comprises three papers probing into innovation and partnering by
established and startup firms in environments characterized by rapid technological
change.

Chapter 2:

Opening Up But Staying Local - Insights from Partnership
Formations between Established and Startup Firms

In chapter 2, I begin my investigation of how established firms make sense of
emerging external technological opportunities by startups. I take into consideration
research on organizational myopia (Levinthal & March, 1993), which suggests that, even
when opening up to external opportunities, established firms tend to search “locally”
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) as they overlook distant “places,”
i.e., opportunities that contain novel elements of knowledge and as well as distant
“times,” i.e., opportunities that are distant from commercialization and immediate
payoffs. While this perspective provides important insights into the challenges faced by
firms searching for new technologies, it is not explicit when firms would go beyond local
search. At the same time, research on organizational learning suggests that organizational
actions and search are influenced by events of successes and failures (Argote & Greve,
2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010).5 This perspective proposes that prior successes and
failures may affect search intensity and learning but is imprecise or ambiguous about the
type of search (local or distant) in which successes and failures ultimately result (Audia et
al., 2000; Greve, 2011; Laursen, 2012; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).
5

Failure and success in this study relate to events in R&D which are rare and substantially shape the
organizational context as they lead to situations of crisis (failure) or long term commercial success
(Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009; Rerup, 2009).
11

In chapter 2, I combine both perspectives and investigate how successes and
failures shape the reaction of established firms to external partnering opportunities which
differ in their degree of technological novelty and distance to commercialization. In a
first step, I investigate the “myopia” perspective to verify if established firms indeed tend
to “search locally,” i.e., overlook solutions with novel elements of knowledge and that
are distant from commercialization. More importantly, in a second step, I examine how
prior successes and failures in solving R&D problems may determine whether firms go
beyond “local search” and pursue partnerships with novel elements of knowledge and
opportunities that only promise payoffs in the distant future. I argue that both failures and
successes shape a firm’s receptivity for distinct external partnering opportunities in very
different ways.
I test my predictions by examining partnership formations between the Top 40
established bio-pharmaceutical firms between 1998 and 2007. With this study, I intend to
provide insights into how established firms notice, interpret, and respond to emerging
exploratory partnering opportunities and explicate the role of prior failures and successes
in affecting myopic tendencies in organizational search.

Chapter 3:

Swimming Against the Current - Examining the Relationship Between
Radical Innovation and Startup Firm Market Value

In the next chapter (chapter 3), I examine how innovations by startup firms differ
from those pursued by established industry players. On one hand, startups pursuing
radical product innovations, i.e., innovations that “involve methods and materials that
are novel to incumbents” (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003), are at the heart of Schumpeter’s
(1942) theory of creative destruction, which suggests that startup firms nimbly push
12

technological change forward and gain the “attacker’s” advantages (Christensen &
Rosenbloom, 1995; Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986; Henderson, 1993; Li &
Atuahene-Gima, 2001). At the same time, however, established firms often retain
possession of specialized downstream complementary assets (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003;
Rothaermel, 2001; Taylor & Helfat, 2009), which leads to challenges for startup firms
pursuing innovations different from the existing industry conventions and recipes
(Spender, 1989).
In this dissertation chapter, I first examine if pursuing radical product innovations
generates higher or lower market valuations, a key performance measure for startup firms
(DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Stuart et al., 1999; Zott & Amit, 2008). Next, I take into
account the unique dependencies between startups and established firms and then, in a
third step, examine under which conditions pursuing radical product innovation may be
associated with higher market valuations for startups.
Drawing on the literature on technological change and inter-organizational
partnering (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000a; Stinchcombe, 1965; Stuart et al.,
1999; Tushman & Anderson, 1986), I argue that pursuing radical ways of solving
problems compounds legitimacy issues and resource constraints, leading to lower market
valuations for startups. Considering the unique interdependencies between startups and
established firms, however, suggests that under distinct conditions, startups pursuing
radical innovations may mitigate these constraints. In particular, I examine the formation
of commercialization partnerships (Baum et al., 2000a; Stuart et al., 1999) and the
maturity of technologies in development (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008) by the startup, as
well as failure in R&D efforts by established firms (Cyert & March, 1963; Madsen &
13

Desai, 2010) as important conditions mitigating legitimacy and resource constraints for
startups pursuing radical innovations.
I test my predictions in a sample of 144 US startups active in drug development
with an IPO 1991 and 1999. With this study, I aim to further our understanding of how
radical innovations influence startup performance and the unique role played by
established firms in shaping this relationship.

Chapter 4:

No Strings Attached: Examining the Relationship between Loosely
Coupled Research Partnerships and Innovative Performance

In the final essay chapter (chapter 4), I turn to how established firms and startup
firms exchange knowledge and technologies to generate new innovative solutions. I focus
on loosely coupled partnerships (Orton & Weick, 1990; Steensma & Corley, 2000;
Thompson, 1967), which involve one firm paying to have access to specific knowledge
from another firm and to reuse such knowledge created by the research partner, as in a
research contract or in-licensing deal (Murray & O’Mahony, 2007)6.
Previous studies have consistently shown that the benefits of tightly coupled
partnerships are based on the fact that more often than not, innovation requires a
reciprocal exchange and recombination of knowledge from the cooperating parts (Dyer &
Singh, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996). In a related vein, it has also been suggested that
simply “handing off” research from one partner to another (as in loosely coupled
partnerships) may not be enough to allow the in-sourcing firm to innovate (Eisenhardt &

6

Conversely, tightly coupled partnerships (Steensma & Corley, 2000) are characterized by the reciprocal
exchange of knowledge (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), high levels of commitment among the partners
and the generation of partnership-specific assets (e.g., joint product development agreements or equity joint
ventures) (Sampson, 2007).
14

Schoonhoven, 1996). It is striking, then, that loosely coupled partnerships are
increasingly prevalent in many industries, as exemplified by the widespread use and rapid
growth of research contracts and licensing deals in very early stages of the innovation
cycle (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007). Intrigued by the
mismatch between previous findings pointing to the limited potential of loosely coupled
partnerships to generate innovations on the one hand, and their prevalence in many
industries on the other, I examine in this chapter whether, why and when loosely coupled
research partnerships may increase a firm’s innovative performance.
I argue that innovation benefits from loosely coupled partnerships not only stem
from the sourcing relationship per se, but are also closely linked to the in-sourcing firm’s
experimental orientation to pursue risky projects and its availability of financial slack and
managerial resources. I test these hypotheses in the global pharmaceutical industry, using
a panel dataset covering the world’s Top 50 global pharmaceutical firms between 1998
and 2007. The goal of this study is to demonstrate that, under certain circumstances,
loosely coupled research partnerships may provide benefits similar to those attributed
only to tightly coupled partnerships.

Chapter 5:

Conclusion and Outlook

In the final chapter of this dissertation, I provide a summary of the most important
insights gained through this dissertation and integrate their findings. I also provide a
road-map for future research opportunities arising from the dissertation.
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Details of Empirical Context
The empirical context for all my dissertation essays is the bio-pharmaceutical
industry which, in the 1990s and 2000s, was characterized by a high degree of knowledge
intensity, innovation and partnering (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). From the
1980s to 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry also witnessed the emergence of
revolutionary therapeutic approaches based on genetic engineering – including but not
limited to recombinant proteins, monoclonal antibodies and gene therapy (Sosa, 2011).
Hundreds of new Biotechnology firms (NBFs) entrants (labeled startups in this
dissertation) pursued these emerging technologies in the hope of dramatically altering the
industry landscape (Schweizer, 2005).
Throughout my dissertation, I exploit the unique empirical advantages offered by
the bio-pharmaceutical industry, which has clear steps in research and product
development (Figure 4).
Figure 4: The Drug Development Process in the Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry

The research stage usually ends with the generation of a molecule or biologic
solution, at which time firms tend to file patents for their new innovations. In the
development stage, the industry is fairly regulated and includes preclinical trials (clinical
development candidate selection and investigation of a new drug preparation), Phase 1
trials (evaluation of drug stability, side effects and dosage), Phase 2 trials (drug’s
efficacy) and Phase 3 trials (large scale clinical testing). Innovation concludes with the
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commercialization of the drug into the market, which starts product life cycle
management.
Focusing on innovation associated with compounds in development in all of the
essays allows me to capture information in the innovation process, which cannot be
derived from patent-based studies. For example, I am able to unambiguously identify if a
technology (i.e., a compound) was or was not available for partnering, while, for patents,
it is often not clear which patents are already licensed to other parties and hence not
available. Patents also do not allow us to identify how far in the development process the
technologies are, which is possible through observing the stages of development of
compounds. Finally, compounds are at the nexus of research and commercialization and
hence represent an important area where managerial decisions (e.g., the allocation of
resources) are made. The resources required and committed to products in development
far exceed the resources necessary for patenting and in some cases (e.g., in Phase III) can
reach 100s of millions of dollars. I note, however, that a downside of focusing on
products in development is that the study is harder to replicate in other industries, which
do not have product development information as readily available. Table 1 gives an
overview of the data sources used in the dissertation, which apply to all dissertation
chapters.
Table 1: Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry – Data Sources

Internal
R&D
External
R&D

Activity

Data Source

Volume

Patenting

Derwent Innovation Index

Millions of patents

Drug Development

Pharmaprojects
Adis
Recombinant Capital
Pharmaprojects

>51000 drug profiles (PP)
>26000 drug profiles (Adis)
>35000 announcements

Partnering, Acquisitions
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Partnerships in the Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry
In this dissertation, partnering between established and startup firms is defined in
a broad way as it considers all purposive relationships between two or more independent
firms that involves the exchange, sharing, or joint development of technological
resources or capabilities (Gulati, 1995; Kale & Singh, 2009). Firms can choose among a
range of modes to organize such partnerships, from in-licensing of a technology to the
joint collaboration in research or development between the partners. While in chapter 2
and chapter 3, I consider partnering per se and am agnostic as to their how these
partnerships are organized, I take the mode of partnering more closely into account in
chapter 4 by differentiating partnerships emphasizing joint development (labeled tightly
coupled partnerships) partnerships without strong reciprocity between the partners
(labeled loosely coupled partnerships). Appendix 1 provides some examples of the
different types of partnerships which are used in this dissertation.
Within this dissertation, I also consider partnerships between startups and
established firms that span different parts of the value chain. Referring back to Figure 4,
partnerships can be in the research stage with the intention of coming up with new
treatments to be put into development but also at later stages (preclinical and clinical
development) when partnerships are pursued for existing technological solutions.7 The
inclusion of distinct stages depends on the research question asked in each chapter. For
example, chapter 2 examines the reaction of established firms to emerging partnering
opportunities. Startup opportunities in the bio-pharmaceutical industry become highly

7

Given that startups in all essays are young and nascent firms, we very rarely observe them engaging in
partnerships to only market approved products, which is why in general we theorize about partnerships, in
which either new knowledge is generated or needs further development until it can be commercialized.
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visible once a compound is in development in preclinical or clinical trials. I hence focus
in chapter 2 on all partnerships formed in these stages (see Table 2 for an overview). To
that end, we carefully combine partnering (Recap) and product development
(Pharmaprojects) data to unambiguously identify if a partnerships was made for a specific
compound in development. Conversely, chapter 4 focuses on value creation from startups
and established firms’ research partnerships to generate new innovative ideas. It hence
centers on partnerships at an earlier stage (the research stage) between established and
startup firms.
Table 2: Partnerships used in dissertation chapters

Partnerships examined as
Value chain activities
observed in partnering
Distinguish Modes in
Analysis
Partnerships
Types of Partnerships
included:
Pure Licensing
Research Contracts
Joint R&D (Alliance)
Joint Venture
Pure Equity investments
Robustness test excludes
pure licensing

Chapter 2
Chapter 2 Chapter 3
Dependent Variable Moderator Independent Variable
Development Stage
All stages Early Stage (Research)
(Preclinical-Phase III)
No

No

Yes (Loosely Coupled)

451

1432

770

Yes
Yes
Yes
Out of scope
Out of scope

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Control

Yes
Yes
Control
Control
Control

Yes

Yes

Yes

In each paper, I acknowledge and discuss the limitations of focusing on specific
partnerships, which, at the same time, opens up avenues for future research. Generally
out of scope for all dissertation essays are pure equity investments, as in corporate
venture capital investments (without evidence that knowledge in the form of patents or
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compounds was actually transferred from one firm to the other). Along the same
argument, I do not consider option type deals as partnerships.
Scope and Limitations
Two important factors limit the scope of concepts and theory developed in this
dissertation. First, the dissertation was conducted in the context of a single industry and
the generalizability of the findings and their boundary conditions would require
validation through explorations in other empirical contexts.
Moreover, I predominantly focus on partnering as a way through which
established and startup firms exchange knowledge and technology. Subsequent studies
may take into account alternative modes of knowledge exchange, including acquisitions
or corporate venture investments.
Cognizant of these and other limitations, I conclude each essay chapter by
outlining the limitations of the specific study.
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CHAPTER 2: OPENING UP BUT STAYING LOCAL:
INSIGHTS FROM PARTNERSHIP FORMATIONS BETWEEN ESTABLISHED AND
STARTUP FIRMS
We are very picky and selective in our due diligence about which opportunities we select.
But, failure can come as a surprise and change our perspective of what ultimately works
to address a therapeutic need.
(Associate Director, Johnson & Johnson, Business Development, 2012).
An important line of inquiry within the innovation literature highlights that
established firms increasingly partner with young and nascent startup firms to gain access
to emerging and potentially disruptive technological solutions (e.g. Aldrich, 1999;
Anand, Oriani, & Vassolo, 2010; Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Hagedoorn, 2002; Jiang,
Tan, & Thursby, 2011; Rothaermel, 2001; Steensma & Corley, 2000). As a result,
understanding how established firms search for and recognize emerging partnering
opportunities has become increasingly important (Tyler & Steensma, 1995).
It is helpful to model established firms as interpretive systems (Daft & Weick,
1984) that need to recognize and understand the technological opportunities generated by
startups (Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006; Todorova & Durisin, 2007). Two important
streams of research may inform our understanding of how established firms make sense
of their environment and select emerging opportunities for partnering. The first
perspective focuses on the challenges of established firms managing technological
change (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003) as the very competencies
that established firms worked hard to attain may lead to myopia, i.e. favoring more
familiar approaches in solving problems (Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March,
1988). Applying this notion of myopia to emerging partnering opportunities suggests that
established firms tend to search “local” (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Rosenkopf & Nerkar,
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2001) as they have the tendency to overlook distant “places,” i.e., opportunities that
contain novel8 elements of knowledge and to overlook distant “times,” i.e., opportunities
that are temporally distant from commercialization and immediate payoffs (Levinthal &
March, 1993).9 While this perspective provides important insights into the challenges
faced by firms searching for new technologies, it is not explicit as to when firms would
go beyond local search and consider opportunities with novel elements of knowledge or
with distant payoffs.
A second perspective highlights that not all experiences are created equal and
demonstrates how prior successes and failures influence organizational actions and search
(Argote & Greve, 2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010).10 This perspective outlines that
successes and failures may affect search intensity and organizational learning but is
imprecise or ambiguous about the type of search (local or distant) successes and failures
ultimately result in (Audia et al., 2000; Greve, 2011; Laursen, 2012; Staw et al., 1981).
Applying these ideas to emerging partnering opportunities suggests that prior successes
and failures in solving R&D problems may inherently influence how firms notice,
interpret, and respond to emerging partnering opportunities.
In this paper, we combine both perspectives and investigate how successes and
failures shape the reactions of established firms to external partnering opportunities

8

Novelty can have many dimensions (Rosenkopf & McGrath, 2011). In this paper it refers to the
technological means through which firms attempt to solve organizational problems. A technology is novel
if it represents a solution with elements of knowledge that are new to the firm. Greater novelty indicates
more elements of knowledge not previously used to solve a distinct problem.
9
Accordingly, the two forms of myopia haven been labeled “spatial” and “temporal” myopia (Levinthal &
March, 1993)
10
Failure and success in this study relate to events in R&D which are rare and substantially shape the
organizational context as they lead to situations of crisis (failure) or long term commercial success (Lampel
et al., 2009; Rerup, 2009).
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which differ in their degree of technological novelty and distance to commercialization.
In a first step, we investigate the “myopia” perspective and determine if established firms
have the tendency to search “locally,” i.e., overlook those opportunities with novel
elements of knowledge and which are distant from commercialization. In a second step,
we examine how prior successes and prior failures solving R&D problems may shape
whether firms go beyond “local search” in partnership formations pursue partnerships
with novel elements of knowledge and opportunities that only promise payoffs in the
distant future.
Doing so allows us to integrate views on both myopia and the role of failures and
successes to advance our understanding of organizational search (Greve, 2011; Nelson &
Winter, 1982). We argue that firms overlook partnering opportunities with novel
elements of knowledge, as they narrow the range of technological alternatives considered
feasible for partnering to those in the neighbourhood of already pursued technological
solutions.11 To recognize partnering opportunities with novel elements of knowledge,
established firms need to consider a broader range of possible technological alternatives
(Gavetti, 2012), which we argue is contingent on experiencing prior successes and
failures. While prior failures challenge the established firm’s conventional ways of
problem solving and allow them to pursue novel elements of knowledge (Cyert & March,
1963; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005; Madsen & Desai, 2010), prior
successes may reinforce existing representations of how problems should be solved and
guide firms to pursue partnering opportunities in the neighbourhood of previous attempts
(Audia et al., 2000; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992).
11

Greve (2011) terms this type of myopia ”positional rigidity.”
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Firms overlook opportunities distant from commercialization as they build
commercialization routines leading to preferences for those opportunities with immediate
payoffs (March, 1991). To recognize partnering opportunities that are more distant from
commercialization, established firms must be willing to forgo short term for potential
long term gains, which we again suggest is shaped by the firm’s prior failures and
successes in solving R&D problems. Namely, prior successes may generate an
organizational context in which established firms more readily consider a long term
perspective, allowing them to pursue partnering opportunities with more distant payoff
time horizons. Conversely, prior failures may lead firms to fail to consider opportunities
which are distant from commercialization as feasible alternatives to solve their problems
(Cyert & March, 1963). Altogether, our arguments suggest that failures and successes
very differently shape a firm’s receptivity towards solutions containing novel elements of
knowledge and solutions with payoffs in the distant future.
The context for the study is the global pharmaceutical industry during the period
from 1997 to 2006. We assemble a unique dataset that includes information on
established firms’ internal R&D and external partnering in product development. We
examine partnership formations between established firms and new biotechnology firms
(henceforth, startups). Within this industry, established firms increasingly rely on startups
to generate new technological solutions and then form partnerships with them to develop
new products (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a). We identify 852 unique startup partnering
opportunities between 1997 and 2006 that could have been pursued by established firms
and then examine the partnerships which were ultimately concluded. Our analysis is
conducted on the dyadic level between the established firm experiencing failures and
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successes solving a range of therapeutic problems (e.g., cancer, neurology) and startups
offering new technological solutions in these therapeutic areas.
Consistent with our arguments, we find that, given a range of partnering
opportunities, established firms tend to search locally, as they overlook distant “places”
(novel technological solutions) and distant “times” (early stage technological solutions).
However, once we take into account the firms’ prior successes and prior failures, the
tendency to search locally does not always hold. In line with our predictions, we find that
prior failures increase the likelihood of pursuing novel solutions and prior successes
allow firms to tap into solutions which are more distant from commercialization. We also
find partial evidence that prior failures may lead firms to prefer partnering opportunities
which are close to commercialization (in line with problemistic type search (Cyert &
March, 1963)). We do not, however, find any evidence that a prior successes lead
established firms to overlook novel technological partnering opportunities (Audia et al.,
2000). These results account for unobserved differences across firms and changes over
time, and are robust to a number of alternative econometric specifications and
operationalization of key variables.
This study is a first attempt to systematically identify the reaction of established
firms to emerging technological opportunities by explicitly taking into account forces of
myopia as well as successes and failures. While scholars have identified the tendency of
firms to remain local in their selection of partnering opportunities (Rothaermel & Boeker,
2008), at most, they have focused on search for novel elements of knowledge but did not
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explicitly consider the time dimension (in the form of distance to commercialization)12
and have only started to explicate the roles of success and failure as important boundary
conditions (Greve, 2011).
We demonstrate that when opening up to external startups, established firms
follow local patterns. Hence, merely opening up to new external solutions may not be a
panacea, as firms may still not add knowledge that substantially differs from what they
already know and do not pursue technological opportunities at an early stage of
development. At the same time, we explicate the role of prior failures and successes to
clarify when firms are more likely to pursue “non-local” partnering opportunities. We
hence contribute to research which has attempted to identify the organizational
antecedents necessary to overcome myopic challenges in recognizing and seizing
knowledge located outside the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Danneels & Sethi, 2011;
Jansen et al., 2005).
The findings from the study also inform the literature on the role of learning from
failures and the related idea of problemistic search (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2011;
Madsen & Desai, 2010). We illuminate that failures play an important role in shaping
search direction but have a different effect on the two types of myopia. This helps to
resolve conflicting arguments that failures lead to both local (Cyert & March, 1963) or
distant search in form of “experimentation, change, and innovation” (Levinthal & March,
1993:105). In a similar vein, the study contributes to our understanding of how prior
successes influence firm behaviour. While some researchers have suggested that
successes may lead to strategic persistence and can actually ‘trap’ firms from changing
12

A notable exception is Monteiro (2011), who examines the concept of market “proofness” in the context
of seeking external knowledge.
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(Audia et al., 2000), we do not find this perspective in the domain of partnership
formations to be supported. Conversely, the paper reveals that prior successes may enable
firms to consider partnering opportunities with technologies more distant from
commercialization.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Recognizing Partnering Opportunities & Local Search
Established firms increasingly cross organizational boundaries and access new
and potentially disruptive technological opportunities by forming partnerships
(Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Startups, i.e., young and nascent
firms, have taken an important role in the generation of new ideas and are believed to
substantially push technological change forward (Foster, 1986; Rothaermel, 2001). The
result is that in some industries, a division of innovative labor has emerged in which
startups initiate new innovative solutions and then partner with established firms that
possess the complementary assets to develop and commercialize the startups’
technologies (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).
Before established firms can pursue any partnerships with startup firms, they, in a
first step, need to recognize and understand the startup’s potentially valuable external
technological opportunities (Arora & Gambardella, 1994b; Lane et al., 2006; Todorova &
Durisin, 2007). This, however, may be challenging as the interpretation of external
information may be subject to organizational myopia, which inhibits firms from pursuing
distinct types of technological solutions. Two salient forms of myopia (Levinthal &
March, 1993) are reflected in firms’ tendencies to a) overlook distant “places”, i.e.,
opportunities that contain novel elements of knowledge and b) distant “times,” i.e.,
27

opportunities which are distant from commercialization in the formation of partnerships
by established firms.13 Next, we explore each form of myopia in the context of
partnership formations.
Overlooking novel partnering opportunities: It is well-known that firms’ internal
R&D attempts tend to be in the neighborhood and are local to what they already know
(Katz & Allen, 1982; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Nelson & Winter,
1982). In a similar vein, firms may not consider technological solutions that are distant to
their prior ways of solving problems when evaluating a range of partnering opportunities.
Over time, organizations build distinct competencies, which shape their
fundamental cause-and-effect representations of how problems and solutions are
interrelated (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Itami & Roehl, 1991; Lei, Hitt, & Bettis, 1996).
While this facilitates the recognition of partnering opportunities close to prior
technological solutions, it, at the same time, makes it challenging to identify “distant”
ones i.e., partnering opportunities with elements of knowledge novel to the established
firms (Levinthal & March, 1993; Todorova & Durisin, 2007). First, partnering
opportunities that attempt to solve problems in different ways may not be recognized by
established firms as they do not conform to the current logics of problem-solving
(Danneels, 2007; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Winter, 2000). Firms often define ex ante
what technological solutions are considered feasible, which is guided by their internal
preferences in solving problems (Dijksterhuis, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 1999). Once
firms direct their attention and position their “radars” (e.g., those employees responsible
for providing information about new technologies to the firm) towards a subset of
13

Other myopic tendencies, unrelated to the technological solutions of potential partners are related to the
choice of geographic location (Baum et al., 2000b) or the choice of partners (Li & Rowley, 2002).
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solutions in the external environment, they are constrained from considering
technological solutions that depart from the agreed subset of possible alternatives (Jansen
et al., 2005; Monteiro, 2011).14
Second, firms consist of coalitions with divergent interests that compete for power
and control over scarce resources (Bower, 1970; Cyert & March, 1963; Pfeffer, 1992;
Reitzig & Sorenson, 2012). This may lead firms to not consider partnering opportunities
which do not support and reinforce previous internal R&D attempts (Jansen et al., 2005;
Todorova & Durisin, 2007). In the extreme case, organizational coalitions may actively
resist novel technological solutions, especially if they are perceived to render internal
competencies obsolete (Gilbert, 2005; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003) or if they violate
industry recipes (Spender, 1989) that represent legitimate solutions within the industry.
Combining those arguments, we expect myopia to be salient in partnership formations as
firms overlook those opportunities with novel elements of knowledge.
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of an established firm forming a partnership with a
new startup decreases with the novelty of the startup’s technological solutions to the
established firm.
Overlooking opportunities distant from commercialization: A general tendency of
firms is to prefer short term over future gains (March, 1991). Applying the idea to the
recognition of emerging technological opportunities suggests that firms may prefer
opportunities closer to commercialization, while overlooking opportunities which are at
an early stage of development.
14

As an example, Henderson and Clark (1990) demonstrate how external new ways of problem solving in
the photolithographic alignment equipment industry were screened out by established firms. In a similar
vein, Rothaermel and Boeker (2008) found strong support for the idea that technological similarities drive
partnership formation between established firms and startups.
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Over time, established firms invest substantially in complementary assets and
build competences and routines to develop and commercialize new products (Nelson &
Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986). Simultaneously, aging and larger firms gradually shift their
emphasis from future- (exploration) to short term-oriented gains (exploitation) as the
existence of complementary assets (e.g., substantial experience in product development, a
large sales force) allows established firms to effectively create immediate value (March,
1991). Accordingly, researchers have suggested that as a general industry pattern,
partnerships with more immediate payoffs will be more prevalent than those that require
more time to generate value (Koza & Lewin, 1998). A technology at an early stage of
development is associated with high uncertainties that stem from doubts about the
technology per se and its applicability to commercial domains (Ahuja & Morris Lampert,
2001; van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009). Moreover, early stage
technologies have not yet revealed how well they will fit existing commercialization
routines, which increases potential adaptation costs for established firms. Given the
distinguished competencies and routines of established firms in commercializing new
products (Gilbert, 2005), established firms may prefer those partnering opportunities
which can be readily converted into immediate returns. At the same time, internal
coalitions may prefer immediate payoffs and lower risks to maintain and strengthen their
positions of power, as evidenced by top management preferences of short over long term
gains (Sanchez, 1995; Tyler & Steensma, 1995).
Combining all arguments, established firms exposed to a range of external
partnering opportunities may overlook those which are distant from commercialization.
While extant research has not tested this relationship explicitly, there is evidence that
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established firms at least pay more attention to solutions which are already
commercialized and have a proven track records (Monteiro, 2011). We follow this
argument and suggest that firms may shy away from partnering opportunities with
outcomes distant in “time.”
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of an established firm forming a partnership with a
new startup decreases the more distant the startup’s technological solutions are from
commercialization.
Firms that overlook novel technological solutions may be confined to pursuing
technological solutions similar to their own internal problem-solving attempts but miss
technological solutions that can be disruptive and render the firm’s existing competences
obsolete (Gavetti, 2012; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). In a similar vein, recognizing
technological opportunities at an early stage allows firms to have first mover advantages
and avoid substantial premiums paid at a later stage of development due to the increased
bargaining power of the technology supplier (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; Rothaermel &
Boeker, 2008). It is hence important to understand when firms pursue partnering
opportunities with novel and early stage technologies. To that end, we suggest
considering a firm’s prior successes and failures as possible contingencies which are
known to influence intensity and direction of organizational search and shape
organizational learning in general (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Greve, 2011; Madsen
& Desai, 2010). Hence, we next explore prior successes and failures as important
boundary conditions for the types of solutions established firms ultimately pursue in
partnering activities.
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Failure, Success and Local Search
Extant research highlights the role of experiencing failure and success as
important drivers affecting organizational change (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Cyert
& March, 1963; Greve, 2003b). In a similar vein, prior failures and successes may
influence how firms interpret and make sense of emerging external partnering
opportunities.
Motivated by the behavioral theory of the firm, researchers have shown that
organizational actions may be differently affected by events of failures and successes
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010). In the R&D context, firms make
substantial financial and organizational investments and develop expectations about the
likelihood that their R&D initiatives will succeed. Ultimately, this leads to events of
failures and successes as R&D initiatives to which the firms have committed substantial
resources either fail or lead to to new marketable products. We argue that distinguishing
events of successes and failures helps us understand a firm’s tendency to overlook distant
“places” and “times” when it chooses among a range of partnering opportunities. The
idea follows previous research which identified that prior successes and failures affect
organizational learning (Madsen & Desai, 2010; Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011),
R&D search intensity (Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003b) and organizational risktaking (Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 2011). We extend this perspective in the direction
of technological search and highlight that a firm’s prior failures and successes
differentially shape the likelihood of partnership formations for opportunities with novel
elements of knowledge and opportunities which are distant from commercialization.
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Failure & Novelty: Organizational knowledge is not static; firms continuously
rely on prior experiences to draw new inferences from previous problem-solving attempts
(Cyert & March, 1963; Huber, 1991). Experiencing failures may influence a firm’s
willingness to pursue partnering opportunities with novel technological solutions.
Researchers have long argued that a firm’s perception of the external environment
may be shaped by events that force it to react to given stimuli (Zahra & George, 2002).
In particular, experiencing failure in problem-solving attempts may serve as such a
stimulus and most likely broadens the range of alternative solutions that established firms
will consider feasible when searching among partnering opportunities. First, prior failures
serve as an impetus for established firms to re-evaluate their conventional technological
solutions and challenges their current logic as to how problems and solutions are
interrelated (Greve, 1998; Jansen et al., 2005; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Lampel et al.,
2009). Prior failures hence increase the range of possible alternatives considered to solve
R&D problems (Cyert & March, 1963; Madsen & Desai, 2010), which in turn increases
the likelihood that firms will form partnerships for more technologically distant startup
opportunities. At the same time, startups developing solutions that are similar to those of
the established firm may become less attractive, as established firms may not wish to
pursue solutions that are close to those that have previously failed.
Second, prior failures alter the power structure within the firm and the units
making decisions about which partnering opportunity to pursue. Extant research has
shown that failure puts substantial pressure on the firm from external stakeholders
(Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Girotra, Terwiesch, & Ulrich, 2010; Salancik & Pfeffer,
1978). Applied to the R&D context, failure compels internal coalitions to change
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direction in the types of solutions used to solve problems. It is also more likely that
failure alters a firm’s internal power structure, which directly affects the resource
allocation process in such a way that internal coalitions cannot use external initiatives as
a mere extension of internal R&D activities. This increases the likelihood that
partnerships are formed with startups pursuing technological solutions novel to the firm.
Taken together, our arguments suggest that when exposed to a range of possible
partnering opportunities, established firms are more likely to seek technological solutions
with novel elements of knowledge if the firm has experienced failures in the past.
Hypothesis 3a: An established firm’s prior failures solving R&D problems
positively moderate the relationship between the novelty of the startup’s technological
solutions and the likelihood of forming a partnership with the startup.
Success & Novelty: In a similar vein, prior successes in R&D may also influence a
firm’s willingness to pursue partnering opportunities with novel technological solutions.
It is well known that prior success leads to confidence in firms about their existing
routines and ways of solving problems and helps firms specialize in problem-solving
(Audia et al., 2000). As such, prior successes may reinforce existing representations of
cause and effect and further guide firms towards partnering opportunities enhancing the
firm’s specialized knowledge. Increasing specialization, however, may further lead firms
onto paths of local search (Levinthal & March, 1993) and exacerbate their tendency of
“overlooking” novel partnering opportunities. This is supported by prior research, which
indicates that successes indeed cause firms to not challenge existing assumptions and can
limit the variety of information processed (Lant & Montgomery, 1987; Sitkin & Pablo,
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1992). The result is that successes may “trap” firms (Audia et al., 2000; Leonard-Barton,
1992) into specialized knowledge paths.
Prior successes also strengthen the power structure of units within the firm
(Levinthal & March, 1993), increasing their discretion to allocate resources. Given that
there is no external pressure to change direction, it is likely that coalitions tend to use
their discretion to further specialize and reinforce existing R&D paths. Hence, firms with
prior successes most likely will not pursue novel solutions which, in the extreme case,
challenge their existing (and successful) ways of solving problems.
Combined, our arguments imply that when exposed to a range of possible
partnering opportunities, established firms that have experienced successes in R&D
adhere to existing problem-solving routines, exacerbating their tendencies to search
locally and “overlook” partnering opportunities with novel elements of knowledge.
Hypothesis 3b: An established firm’s prior successes solving R&D problems
negatively moderate the relationship between the novelty of the startup’s technological
solutions and the likelihood of forming a partnership with the startup.
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The proposed effect of hypotheses 3a and 3b are shown in Figure 5 and 6.
Figure 5: Chapter 2 –
Conceptual Hypothesis 3a

Figure 6: Chapter 2 Conceptual Hypothesis 3b

Basically, we expect that prior failures will flatten and potentially reverse
(hypothesis 3a) a firm’s tendencies to search locally, i.e., overlooking novel technological
solutions (Figure 5). Conversely, Figure 6 shows the expected reinforcing effect of prior
successes on local search, which is reflected by a steepening of the local search curve.
In a comparable vein, prior failures and successes may very differently affect the
established firm’s receptivity towards partnering opportunities that are distant from
commercialization, i.e., at an early stage of development. We explore this next.
Failure & Distance to Commercialization: We identified that prior failures induce
established firms to change direction by pursuing partnering opportunities with novel
elements of knowledge. At the same time, however, several explanations indicate that
prior failures may intensify myopic tendencies towards solutions at an early stage of
development. First, failures may create a sense of urgency when evaluating partnering
opportunities. Extant research has suggested that firms facing crises and situations of
36

failures try to avoid the repetition of this experience in subsequent attempts (Madsen &
Desai, 2010). While this implies the pursuit of novel ways of solving problems, it, at the
same time, suggests that firms with a history of failures pursue partnering opportunities
with a higher likelihood of success as exemplified by technologies closer to
commercialization. The idea resonates with the observation that when experiencing a
crisis, firms sometimes limit the range of information processed towards those that have
immediate performance outcomes (Staw et al., 1981) and that firms confronted with
problems search “problemistically,” i.e., are motivated towards specific solutions (Cyert
& March, 1992:170). Given the long time lags in innovation, partnering opportunities
that are distant from commercialization may not be considered as feasible alternatives the
more firms have experienced prior failures, as such opportunities do not promise
immediate payoffs.
Similarly, coalitions with prior failures may be dominated by efficiency concerns
(Staw et al., 1981) to seek technological opportunities which can be easily integrated,
provide immediate results and have a lower risk of further undermining the coalition’s
power. The result is that the more coalitions have experienced failures, the more actively
they avoid opportunities distant from commercialization because they do not want to be
accountable for decisions that will not have an immediate impact on the firm’s top and
bottom lines and that potentially, may lead to another failure. In summary, both
arguments suggest that partnering opportunities with technologies distant from
commercialization may not be perceived as feasible solutions for firms which have
experienced large number of failures.
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Hypothesis 4a: An established firm’s prior failures solving R&D problems
negatively moderate the relationship between the distance from commercialization of the
startup’s technological solutions and the likelihood of forming a partnership with the
startup.
Success & Distance to Commercialization: Prior successes may quite differently
shape a firm’s willingness to take a long-term approach when considering a range of
possible partnering opportunities (Levinthal & March, 1981). The aforementioned
tendency to further specialize after experiencing success may allow firms to more clearly
understand specific problems (Kim et al., 2009) and apply their knowledge towards
partnering opportunities which are more uncertain to commercialize, as with
opportunities distant from commercialization. Moreover, prior successes allow firms to
attend to a broader time horizon in general as they face less urgency to address specific
problems. This may mean that firms can stick to existing plans, which usually combine
both short term and long term considerations. The result is that prior successes allow
firms to more readily enrich their partnering decisions with partnering opportunities more
distant from commercialization.
Firm coalitions that have experienced prior successes may also find it easier to
take accountability for decisions which will not have immediate performance outcomes
as they are less pressured towards efficiency (Staw et al., 1981). This resonates with
Cyert and March’s (1992:189) suggestion that “success tends to breed slack” that acts as
a buffer for “risky” decisions, ultimately allowing firms to be more lenient in allocating
resources to early stage partnering opportunities. Taking all of these arguments together,
we posit that successes have the opposite effect from failures in influencing the
relationship of early partnering opportunities (i.e., distant from commercialization) and
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the likelihood that established firms will pursue these opportunities through partnership
formations.
Hypothesis 4b: An established firm’s prior successes in solving R&D problems
positively moderate the relationship between the distance from commercialization of the
startup’s technological solutions and the likelihood of forming a partnership with the
startup.
The proposed effect of hypotheses 4a and 4b are shown in Figure 7 and 8.
Basically, we expect that prior failures reinforce local search tendencies, i.e., overlooking
technological solutions distant from commercialization, which is reflected by a
steepening of the local search curve in Figure 7 (Hypothesis 4a). Conversely, Figure 8
shows reverse effect as we expect prior successes to flatten and potentially reverse
(Hypothesis 4b) firms’ tendencies to search locally

Figure 7: Chapter 2 Conceptual Hypothesis 4a

Figure 8: Chapter 2 Conceptual Hypothesis 4b
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METHODS
Background - Partnerships in the Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry
To test our hypotheses, it was mandatory to identify a range of partnering
opportunities that established firms could pursue as well as capture those partnerships
which were ultimately formed. Both types are observable in the bio-pharmaceutical
industry in the form of compounds that represent technological solutions. The biopharmceutical industry is also characterized by very frequent partnership formations
(Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Our data come from various
sources, including Recombinant Capital (ReCap), Pharmaprojects and Adis R&D
Insights.15

Sample
Our sample included the top 40 publicly traded pharmaceutical firms (by sales in
1997)16 which were actively pursuing new drug development17 and that are actively
searching for new technologies through partnerships.18 Limiting the sample to the leading
firms ensured that we observed a large portion of partnerships in the industry and at the
same time, facilitated the data collection process across multiple databases. This
15

ReCap is a database tracking partnerships in the life science industry (Schilling, 2009). Pharmaprojects
and Adis R&D Insights are databases tracking new drug development in the pharmaceutical industry
(Girotra et al., 2010; Hess & Rothaermel, 2011). Additional databases used for control variables are
Compustat and the Derwent Innovation Index.
16
We limited ourselves to the Top 40 firms to strike a balance between the number of firms included and
the number of total observations based on a risk-set approach. Firms beyond the Top 40 contribute an equal
number of observations, but tend to have fewer realized partnerships, substantially increasing the sample
without adding new information. Results are very similar using the Top 50 firms.
17
Active drug development was measured as new compounds in development in Pharmaprojects in 1997.
This way, we excluded firms only pursuing generic drugs, formulation technology or diagnostics. Sample
firms had to be actively developing novel therapeutics as evidence in their activity in Pharmaprojects pre
1997. The majority of the firms in our sample are incorporated in the US (45%), followed by Europe (35%)
and Japan (20%).
18
Evidenced by any partnering activity between 1997 and 2006, which we extract from Recap
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approach is consistent with prior research examining established firms’ management of
technological change (Anand et al., 2010; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Rothaermel, 2001).
They include established pharmaceutical firms (e.g., Merck & Co. and Pfizer) as well as
three biotechnology firms with established product portfolios (Amgen, Genentech and
Chiron).19 The focal firms are among the largest and most active publicly listed
companies in drug development and, based on the global revenue figures from 1997,
account for approximately 70% of all worldwide sales of globally listed pharmaceutical
firms. The average revenue for all firms in the sample is $13.6BN.
We identified opportunities for partnering by observing partnerships with startups
in preclinical trials (clinical development candidate selection and investigation of a new
drug preparation), Phase 1 trials (evaluation of drug stability, side effects and dosage),
Phase 2 trials (drug’s efficacy) and Phase 3 trials (large scale clinical testing) between
established and new startup firms.20 We limited ourselves to these stages as startups have
usually filed patents and signalled their intent to further develop their technologies
through partnering. Put differently, at those stages, partnering opportunities are clearly
visible to established firms.
Using Recap, we identified 311 startup partners trading (preclinical-Phase III)
with the Top 40 established firms between 1997 and 2006, which we used as a basis to
generate a set of partnering opportunities for each established firm in a given years. We

19

While we treated Amgen and Genentech as established firms in 1997, we excluded them in robustness
tests completed to verify our results to limit the sample to established firms that started in the chemicalbased drug development paradigm.
20
We defined startups as those firms founded in or after 1985 (during the biotechnology revolution) which
did not yet have a commercialized product on the market in 1997 (examples include 3-Dimensional
Pharmaceuticals, Actelion or Nektar Therapeutics). We took such a long time window because reaching
Phase III trials involves a very long time period (12 years and more).
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first considered that partnering opportunity were available in the year before an actual
partnership was concluded. Based on this analysis, we identified 429 years in which
startup firms had technology available for partnering.21 To complement these partnering
opportunities, we examined in which other years, between and inclusive of 1996 to 2005,
the 311 startups had technologies (i.e., compounds) available for partnering. By tracking
the pipelines of the small startups and determining if any compounds of the firms were
flagged as a “Licensing Opportunity” in Pharmaprojects,22 we identified an additional
423 partnering opportunities by startups, which represented years in which a compound
became available by the startup. We combined the 429 observations (based on
partnering) and 423 observations (based on technology availability) into one risk set for
years in which startups had technologies available for partnering. We then made the
assumption that each established firm could observe and evaluate all 852 possible
partnering opportunities, leading to 34,080 possible combinations between startups with
partnering opportunities and established firms between 1997 and 2006.23

21

These 429 opportunities lead to 451 partnerships ultimately formed, as we observed 20 cases in which a
startup partnered with more than one established firm in a given year. We also found 5 cases in which a
startup and an established firm formed 2 or 3 partnerships in a given year. Due to the small number, we
opted to keep our analysis to a simple analysis of partnership formed or not formed (and not an intensity
measure).
22
Pharmaprojects report a licensing opportunity if Pharmaprojects has received information from the
pharmaceutical company concerned that the product is available for licensing. This information can come
in the form of a press release, annual report, information reported at conference or from a direct
communication with the company (taken from Pharmaprojects online manual)
23
Established firms merge (e.g., Aventis and Sanofi-Synthelabo; Bayer and Schering AG) so that not all 40
initial firms are active in all years, reducing the sample. Further, the construction of the independent
variables and missing data reduce the final sample. In robustness tests, we demonstrated that results hold,
with a larger sample.
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Measures
Dependent Variable:
Partnership Formed – We coded the dependent variable as a binary variable
taking the value of 1 if an established firm did form a partnership with a new startup firm,
which had partnering opportunities (preclinical-Phase 3) available in the prior year and 0
otherwise. In total, we observe 451 formed partnerships.
Independent Variables:
Novelty of partnering opportunity: To arrive at a measure for Novelty, we
compared partnering opportunities available from new startups to the recent and ongoing
drug development of the established pharmaceutical firms. We took into consideration
fine-grained product development data using Pharmaprojects and observed the
compounds at risk of being partnered from the startups and compared them to the drug
development of established firms.
It is important to understand that biotechnology as a term is often associated with
all new firms that were founded after the biotechnology revolution in the early 1980s.
Biotechnology in a narrow sense means the development of large protein-based
molecules as therapeutic solutions (e.g., recombinant proteins or monoclonal antibodies).
However, most of therapeutic solutions, even those developed by small biotechnology
firms, are still chemical-based small molecules. In our sample, the underlying compounds
associated with the partnering opportunities can be divided into 38% biologics (large
molecules), 58% chemicals (small molecule), with the remainder derived from natural
plants.
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Not all chemistry-based solutions are similar as they differ as to which
mechanisms in the human bodies they address, a critical element of scientific and
technological knowledge incorporated in therapeutic solutions (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998).
To identify novelty, we hence incorporated the underlying material of the solution
(biologics, chemicals and natural products) and the mechanism of action.24 While, in
principle, the origin of material gives a distinction between chemistry and the various
derivatives of biotechnology, the mechanism of action classifies the pharmacological
effect through which the drug may have an effect in the human body.25
In addition to all other experience-based independent variables, we chose a
window of 4 years in drug development initiatives by established firms to examine how
the partnering oportunites relate to the drug development experience (the origin of
material and mechanism of action) by the established firms. Appendix 2 shows the way
in which the variable Novelty is constructed for a specific startup-established firm
combination. Novelty takes scores between 0 and 2, with 0 indicating that the established
firm has used the same mechanism and origin of material in the broad therapeutic domain
and a value of 2 if the startup’s technological opportunity uses a mechanism and origin of
24

We further inferred the relevance of the mechanism of action and the origin of material by reviewing the
literature on drug discovery (e.g. Swinney & Anthony, 2011). Also, we examined the search guidelines
outlined by pharmaceutical firms, which explicitly take into account the mechanism of action of potential
drugs and the distinction between chemistry and biologics. An example can be found at
http://www.merck.com/licensing/areas_of_interest.pdf.
25
For example, Cox-2 inhibitors (one of our mechanism of action categories) prevent the production of
PHG (prostaglandin) from arachidonic acid, which causes inflammation. Pharmaprojects contains
thousands of mechanisms, and we employed a consulting firm to assess which mechanisms could be
aggregated to reflect an important category of knowledge associated with the drug in development. A
pharmacology expert with 26 years in drug development and a biotechnology graduate student did the
classification separately (resulting in 310 unique pharmacology codes in our sample). We report our results
based on the classification by the consulting firm after clarifying where some of the mismatches between
the student and the PhD expert originated (overall agreement between the two classifications was 93%).
Using the original code from Pharmaprojects leads to very similar results to the ones reported. The
conversion table from the pharmaceutical consultant can be downloaded under : http://bit.ly/12SHdto
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material previously not used by the established firm in a therapeutic area. 26 For example,
if the opportunity is in the therapeutic domain of cancer, we examined if the mechanism
of action and origin of material was used by the established firm in previous problem
solving attempts in treating cancer. Examining technological opportunities at the
therapeutic level is consistent with research that has examined partnership formations
between established and startup firms (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012).
We argue that higher scores of novelty signal a strong departure from prior
problem solving attempts as firms need to incorporate new knowledge in both the origin
of material and mechanism of action. Whenever we identified more than one compound
available for partnering by a startup in a given year, we averaged the novelty score as
illustrated in the example in Appendix 2.
Distance of partnering opportunity to Commercialization: We captured the
Distance to Commercialization by determining in which stage of the bio-pharmaceutical
drug approval process the compound was at the time it became available for partnering.
We distinguished the stages as being Preclinical (0), Phase I (1), Phase II (2) and Phase
III (3). For a startup having more than one compound available for partnering, we
selected the latest stage of all available compounds.27 The variable Distance to
Commercialization is reverse coded, so that Phase III opportunities receive as less distant
from commercialization receives a score of (0) and preclinical opportunities, the most
distant category from commercialization in our sample receive the highest scores (3).

26

Throughout the analysis, we excluded partnering opportunities if the established firms had no experience
whatsoever in a broad therapeutic areas as it is unlikely that established firms actively search for new
partnering opportunities in such areas (see robustness tests).
27
Results are robust using the average stage.
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Moderators:
Prior Failures and Successes: Using the history of drug development for each
established firm, we determined if firms had experienced successes or failures in the
therapeutic area of the technological opportunity (see Appendix 3). Successes are rare in
the bio-pharmaceutical industry, with less than 30 total new drugs approved in many after
1996. We measured Prior Successes as the number of successful drugs launched in the
last 4 years in the therapeutic area addressed by the startup’s technological solutions
(Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012) (see Appendix 3).28 We only considered successes when
we had evidence of regulatory approval in either the US, Europe or Japan.
Given that most attempts in R&D are ultimately abandoned, we did not consider it
realistic to call an early stage departure from drug development a failure. We adopted the
perspective that failures can be defined as alternative outcomes to successes, which
means that firms discontinued product development attempts to which they had
committed substantial resources and time (Girotra et al., 2010). These commitments are
particularly large once bio-pharmaceutical firms start efficacy and large scale clinical
testing, which is at Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the drug development process. At these stages,
firms develop expectations of success that, if not met, result in experiences of failure
(DiMasi et al., 2003; Shepherd et al., 2011). Similar to Prior Successes, we used a
window of four years (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012) and counted the number of Phase 2
and Phase 3 failures within the broad therapeutic area of the partnering opportunity to
generate the variable Prior Failures.29
28

As a result, failure and success are rather rare events even for large bio-pharmaceutical firms (Lampel et
al., 2009).
29
At Phase II, firms are expected to have passed the proof of concept stage.
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When a startup had technological opportunities spanning more than one broad
therapeutic area, we averaged the number of failures and successes per compound to
calculate an overall score indicating the average Prior Successes and Prior Failures by
the established firms in the therapeutic domains addressed by the startup.

Controls:
We controlled for various factors that could drive partnering formation. First, we
took into account that startups with a larger number of available compounds (Compounds
Available ) in a given year may be more attractive for partnering. Moreover, we
controlled for the main therapeutic area in which the startup is active. We also generated
several dyadic measures between established firm and startup which could drive
partnership formation. We used ReCap to capture partnerships within the same research
community, which we defined by the broad therapeutic areas (e.g., cancer) of the startup
firm. Prior research indicates that being part of a network and research community may
affect subsequent partnering behavior (Gulati, 1999). ReCap indicates the therapeutic
area in the “disease” field, by which we could classify them to one of the broad 13
therapeutic areas.30 Partnerships is a count of all agreements in the past four years by the
established firms in the same therapeutic area of the partnering opportunity. While the
startups are all young firms and do not have a large history of partnering with established
firms, we still controlled through an indicator variable if the established firm and the
startup had a previous partnership (Prior Partnership), which is well-known to drive
subsequent partnership formations (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Given that it may be
30

We matched the therapeutic area in Recap to the therapeutic area from Pharmaprojects using a
conversion table, which can be downloaded under: http://bit.ly/ZIoSdJ
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difficult to spot opportunities outside the firm’s geographic boundaries (Rosenkopf &
Almeida, 2003), we also captured geographic differences between startups and
established firms by adding the indicator variable Same Country, which is 1 if firms have
their HQ in the same country. Finally, we also examined the overlap of knowledge on the
technical level between the startup and the established firm. Following prior research, we
proxied this overlap between the established firm and the startup’s overall knowledge
basis (independent from the available opportunities in a given year) through their overlap
in patenting activity (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Jaffe, 1986). We used the method
suggested by Sampson (2007) to calculate the technological proximity based on patents
between two firms (i and j). The distribution of knowledge is captured by a
multidimensional vector

(

), where

represents the number of patents

assigned to firm i in patent class s.31 Knowledge overlap between established firm i and
startup j is defined as:

√(

)(

)

The variable is 1 when firms are identical in their patenting (strong overlap) and 0
if they are completely orthogonal (no overlap).
We also controlled for the overall activity of an established firm in the therapeutic
domains addressed by the technological opportunities of the startup. First, we controlled
for the established firm’s total number of projects (preclinical to Phase 3) in the
therapeutic domains of the partnering opportunity (Project Pipeline), as established firms

31

We used a four year window and consider all 4digit IPCs associated with a patent family in Derwent,
which more thoroughly captures the firms’ underlying knowledge bases (Benner & Waldfogel, 2008).
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may tend to partner in areas in which they are most active. We also considered if the
established firm has a history of addressing the same indication in the broad therapeutic
area (e.g., Alzheimer’s as subcategory within neurogenerative diseases). The variable
Prior Indication is 1 if the firm has already had projects addressing this indication in the
prior four years and 0 if not.32 We controlled for the historic tendency to explore new
elements of knowledge in a therapeutic area Exploration Orientation as a ratio of projects
in which firms deviated (in the mechanism of action or origin of material) from what they
already knew internally versus all projects initiated in a given therapeutic area (i.e., the
variable New Projects) in a 4 year timeframe. Exploration Orientation is a ratio which is
bounded between 0 and 1. A higher score reveals a greater tendency of firms to explore
new knowledge. We also proxied for the availability of complementary assets by
determining if the established firm had any Top selling drug (Top 100 Drug)33 in the
therapeutic areas addressed by the startup (indicator variable).
Additionally, we added various financial controls of the established firms and
available resources, as they may affect partnership formation. We used the Current Ratio
to proxy “financial slack” by the firm in a given year, which is the ratio of its current
assets divided by its current liabilities (Greve, 2003b). We also included Total Assets
(logged) as a proxy for the firm’s size and performance in the form of Return on Assets
(RoA), which is known to affect firm search (Chen & Miller, 2007).

32

The information about indication is from Pharmaprojects. In general, this information is not always
complete as many drugs are categorized into an “Other” category, in particular, those designated for the
treatment of cancer.
33
We obtained the Top 100 selling drugs from drugs.com and Verispan and linked them to the therapeutic
area through Pharmaprojects.
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Empirical specification
We examined the full risk set as well as a choice-based sample with 4 control
cases (unrealized in the same year) per realized partnership 34 (a similar approach has
been used for example by Hansen & Løvås, 2004). Throughout our analysis, we added
firm fixed effects using logistic regression analysis wherein the ﬁxed effect is speciﬁed
for the established firm. This means that the variation explained will be within (and not
across) firms. We note that the full risk set approach has been criticized as the total
number of realized deals is low (around 1.32%) compared to the unrealized ones, which
may affect standard errors (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). We mitigated these concerns by
additionally examining a choice-based sampling approach. Following the guidelines set
by King and Zeng (2001), we included all partnering opportunities realized plus a small
number (4) of partnering opportunities for which partnerships did not occur; recently,
similar techniques have been used to study dyadic partnership formations (Mitsuhashi &
Greve, 2009) or in the evaluation of partnering opportunities (Tyler & Steensma, 1995).35
We employed logistic regression with clustered standard errors. We verified that choicebased results are robust using the rare logit modification suggested by King and Zeng
(2001) as, for each realized partnership. we added 4 control cases. All independent
variables are constructed with a lag structure so that we observed all independent
variables in t-1, when we defined a partnering opportunity as available and then observed
partnering formation in the next year.

34

The sample is reduce to 2255 (451 partnerships + 4*451 control cases)
The paper outlines various partnering scenarios, which are evaluated by all managers participating in the
study.
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Table 3: Chapter 2 - Summary Statistics and Correlation Table
:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1 Partnership Formation

1.00

2 Startup Age

0.01 1.00

3 Compounds Available

0.02 0.01 1.00

4 Partnerships (TA)

0.06 0.03 -0.03 1.00

5 Prior Tie

0.06 0.13 0.03 0.09

1.00

6 Same Country

0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.03

0.06 1.00

7 Overlap Knowledge

0.03 0.12 0.03 0.16

0.09 0.07 1.00

8 New Projects (TA)

0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.66

0.09 0.00 0.15 1.00

9 Exploration (TA)

0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.01

-0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.10 1.00

10 Prior Indication

0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.25

0.05 -0.03 0.13 0.27 0.00

1.00

11 Top 100 Drug (TA)

0.04 0.03 0.09 0.26

0.07 0.01 0.12 0.34 -0.03

0.17 1.00

12 Total Assets

0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.28

0.09 -0.05 -0.10 0.39 -0.04

0.24 0.35 1.00

13 Return on Assets

0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.11

0.03 0.08 0.01 0.20 -0.05

0.07 0.18 0.24 1.00

14 Financial Slack

14

15

16

17

18

-0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.10

-0.04 0.05 0.16 -0.17 0.01

15 Prior Failures (TA)

0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.30

0.04 -0.08 0.11 0.44 -0.08

0.19 0.25 0.24 0.08 -0.09 1.00

16 Success (TA)

0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.43

0.06 0.00 0.13 0.44 -0.09

0.18 0.33 0.22 0.12 -0.06 0.21 1.00

-0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.29

-0.07 0.01 -0.11 -0.30 -0.01

-0.02 -0.11 0.13 0.02

0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00

0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 1.00

mean

0.02 7.75 1.58 2.33

0.06 0.35 0.67 5.00 0.51

0.79 0.32 9.20 0.12 2.51 0.83 0.70 0.96 2.17

sd

0.13 5.36 1.06 2.67

0.23 0.48 0.15 4.77 0.32

0.38 0.47 1.28 0.12 2.33 1.13 0.86 0.67 1.02

min

0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00

0.00 0.00 0.07 0.75 0.00

0.00 0.00 4.40 -0.16 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

max
1.00 19.00 10.00 18.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 34.00 1.00
n=27697 (based on Full Sample), TA – based on therapeutic area of partnering opportunity

1.00 1.00 11.73 0.38 18.39 9.00 6.00 2.00 3.00

17 Novelty
Distance
18 Commercialization
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-0.07 -0.05 -0.44 -0.14 1.00

-0.27 -0.15 -0.26 -0.06 0.11 -0.18 -0.19 1.00

RESULTS
Table 3 shows the summary statistics and correlation table. Examining the
correlations, we do not find evidence that multicollinearity might be a cause of concern.
The mean VIF for the full models is below 3.34 and individual VIFs for the independent
variables and moderators are below 2.33.
We next examine both the entire sample and the choice-based sample (1 realized
partnering opportunity 4 unrealized) in parallel to test our hypotheses (Table 4). Model
1a/1b show the effect of the control variables on the likelihood of partnership formation.
Consistent with prior research, we find that geographic proximity (Same Country) and
Prior Partnering have a positive direct effect on the likelihood of forming a partnerships
with a startup. Moreover, we find that established firms pursue partnerships in problem
areas where they were successful in launching new drugs (Success), already having
experience in the therapeutic indication (Prior Indication). The number of Compounds
Available by startups is also an important factor influencing partnership formation. In the
full sample, we find evidence that Knowledge Overlap affects partnership formation but
the result does not hold in the choice-based model. Surprisingly, we do not find evidence
suggesting that the overall activity in a therapeutic area (New Projects) drives partnership
formation and also find no direct effect of Failure.
Model 2a/2b add the Novelty and Distance to Commercialization measures of the
partnering opportunity to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. We expected the two forms
of myopia to have a negative effect on partnership formation. As can be seen in both
models, Novelty has a strong negative effect on the likelihood of partnership formation.
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Table 4: Chapter 2 - Results – Logit - Full and Choice Based Sample
DV Partnership Formation

(1a)
Full
Sample

(1b)
Choice
Based

(2a)
Full
Sample

(2b)
Choice
Based

Firm Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
0.002
(0.013)
0.115**
(0.041)
0.030
(0.035)
0.768***
(0.135)
0.421**
(0.140)
0.987*
(0.384)
0.018
(0.022)
0.250
(0.175)
0.605***
(0.191)
0.357+
(0.184)
0.295
(0.247)
1.141
(0.909)
-0.094
(0.085)
0.025
(0.051)
0.138*
(0.068)

Y
0.006
(0.014)
0.129**
(0.041)
0.031
(0.027)
0.871***
(0.138)
0.437**
(0.157)
0.811
(0.512)
0.003
(0.016)
0.301
(0.195)
0.601***
(0.191)
0.349*
(0.152)
0.047
(0.059)
-0.102
(0.293)
-0.034
(0.026)
0.058
(0.047)
0.151*
(0.066)

Y
-0.003
(0.013)
0.146***
(0.040)
0.027
(0.035)
0.770***
(0.136)
0.414**
(0.141)
0.958*
(0.382)
0.017
(0.022)
0.241
(0.173)
0.542**
(0.178)
0.347+
(0.182)
0.284
(0.250)
1.173
(0.918)
-0.094
(0.085)
0.021
(0.052)
0.135*
(0.067)
-0.221**
(0.075)
-0.190***
(0.052)

Y
-0.001
(0.013)
0.160***
(0.040)
0.026
(0.028)
0.901***
(0.138)
0.437**
(0.161)
0.830
(0.517)
-0.001
(0.016)
0.304
(0.190)
0.609**
(0.193)
0.339*
(0.156)
0.031
(0.051)
-0.147
(0.269)
-0.028
(0.024)
0.059
(0.049)
0.147*
(0.068)
-0.234**
(0.087)
-0.205***
(0.055)

-9.033***
(2.602)

-3.470***
(0.719)

-8.899***
(2.631)

-3.257***
(0.639)

Main Therapy Area Effect
Startup Age
Compounds Available
Partnerships (TA)
Prior Tie
Same Country
Overlap Knowledge
Project Pipeline (TA)
Exploration Orient. (TA)
Prior Indication
Top 100 Drug (TA)
Total Assets
Return on Assets
Financial Slack
Prior Failures (TA)
Prior Successes (TA)
Novelty
Distance Commercializat.
Novelty X Prior Failures
Novelty X Prior Successes
Constant
Log Likelihood

-2127.76
-1071.79
-2115.88
-1061.51
Observations
27697
2255
27697
2255
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (TA based on therapeutic area of opportunity)
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Table 4 (continued) : Chapter 2 - Results – Logit - Full and Choice Based Sample
DV Partnership Formation

(3a)
Full
Sample

(3b)
Choice
Based

(4a)
Full
Sample

(4b)
Choice
Based

Firm & Year Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
-0.003
(0.013)
0.149***
(0.040)
0.030
(0.034)
0.770***
(0.136)
0.413**
(0.141)
0.957*
(0.382)
0.017
(0.021)
0.224
(0.174)
0.514**
(0.179)
0.338+
(0.181)
0.283
(0.253)
1.170
(0.918)
-0.092
(0.085)
0.073
(0.052)
0.138*
(0.066)
-0.282***
(0.076)
-0.192***
(0.052)
0.140***
(0.040)

Y
-0.000
(0.014)
0.161***
(0.039)
0.031
(0.026)
0.914***
(0.138)
0.423**
(0.163)
0.851+
(0.509)
-0.002
(0.016)
0.284
(0.190)
0.584**
(0.196)
0.324*
(0.155)
0.022
(0.054)
-0.167
(0.276)
-0.028
(0.025)
0.087
(0.061)
0.153*
(0.066)
-0.318***
(0.090)
-0.205***
(0.055)
0.179***
(0.047)

Y
-0.003
(0.013)
0.147***
(0.039)
0.029
(0.035)
0.771***
(0.136)
0.415**
(0.141)
0.957*
(0.384)
0.018
(0.021)
0.233
(0.174)
0.526**
(0.180)
0.341+
(0.180)
0.284
(0.252)
1.165
(0.924)
-0.092
(0.085)
0.021
(0.052)
0.173*
(0.071)
-0.231**
(0.078)
-0.191***
(0.052)

Y
-0.000
(0.014)
0.160***
(0.039)
0.031
(0.026)
0.906***
(0.139)
0.438**
(0.159)
0.858+
(0.515)
-0.002
(0.016)
0.283
(0.191)
0.587**
(0.195)
0.323*
(0.153)
0.029
(0.057)
-0.149
(0.283)
-0.026
(0.025)
0.062
(0.050)
0.228**
(0.076)
-0.280**
(0.097)
-0.204***
(0.055)

0.082
(0.071)
-8.899***
(2.648)

0.123
(0.076)
-3.251***
(0.688)

Main Therapy Area Effect
Startup Age
Compounds Available
Partnerships (TA)
Prior Tie
Same Country
Overlap Knowledge
Project Pipeline (TA)
Exploration Orient. (TA)
Prior Indication
Top 100 Drug (TA)
Total Assets
Return on Assets
Financial Slack
Prior Failures (TA)
Prior Successes (TA)
Novelty
Distance Commercializat.
Novelty X Prior Failures
Novelty X Prior Successes
Constant

-8.876***
(2.660)

-3.131***
(0.653)

Log Likelihood

-2113.19
-1057.96
-2115.25
-1059.49
Observations
27697
2255
27697
2255
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (TA based on therapeutic area of opportunity)
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In a similar vein, the Distance to Commercialization of the partnering opportunity
significantly reduces the likelihood of subsequent partnership formation (the marginal
effects are equally significant at p<0.01 holding all other variables at their mean values).
To test Hypotheses 3a,b and 4a,b, we added interactions to the model. We started
in Model 3a/3b by interacting Novelty with Prior Failures. Supporting Hypothesis 3a, we
find a positive effect of the interaction, indicating that firms that have experienced failure
in solving therapeutic problems related to the partnering opportunity are more likely to
pursue partnerships with novel elements of knowledge. We demonstrate this effect
graphically in Figure 9, where we plot the moderation of Novelty at various levels of
Prior Failures.
Figure 9: Chapter 2 - Moderation Novelty and Prior Failures

Figure 9 indicates the persistent tendency of established firms to search for
partnering opportunities in the neighborhood of existing solutions. We see, however, that
this tendency is much less salient once firms have experienced failures and is reversed
when failures in the therapeutic areas addressed by the startup firm are at very high
levels. Overall, the results provide support for Hypothesis 3a.
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Table 5: Chapter 2 - Results – Logit - Full and Choice Based Sample – Continued
DV Partnership Formation
(5a)
(5b)
(6a)
(6b)
Full
Choice
Full
Choice
Sample
Based
Sample
Based
Firm Fixed and Year Effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Main Therapy Area Effect
Y
Y
Y
Y
Startup Age
-0.003
-0.000
-0.003
-0.001
(0.013)
(0.014)
(0.013)
(0.013)
Compounds Available
0.146***
0.159***
0.152***
0.160***
(0.040)
(0.040)
(0.039)
(0.039)
Partnerships (TA)
0.027
0.025
0.027
0.025
(0.035)
(0.028)
(0.035)
(0.026)
Prior Tie
0.775***
0.912***
0.760***
0.890***
(0.135)
(0.137)
(0.137)
(0.135)
Same Country
0.415**
0.447**
0.413**
0.443**
(0.140)
(0.159)
(0.142)
(0.162)
Overlap Knowledge
0.947*
0.781
0.944*
0.871+
(0.383)
(0.517)
(0.394)
(0.503)
Project Pipeline (TA)
0.018
-0.001
0.016
-0.001
(0.021)
(0.016)
(0.022)
(0.016)
Exploration Orient. (TA)
0.239
0.296
0.245
0.311
(0.173)
(0.189)
(0.173)
(0.191)
Prior Indication
0.542**
0.603**
0.550**
0.632***
(0.179)
(0.192)
(0.177)
(0.191)
Top 100 Drug (TA)
0.348+
0.337*
0.349+
0.343*
(0.182)
(0.154)
(0.182)
(0.158)
Total Assets
0.284
0.035
0.285
0.034
(0.250)
(0.053)
(0.247)
(0.056)
Return on Assets
1.174
-0.117
1.167
-0.168
(0.920)
(0.270)
(0.922)
(0.268)
Financial Slack
-0.094
-0.028
-0.093
-0.031
(0.085)
(0.024)
(0.085)
(0.024)
Prior Failures (TA)
0.014
0.057
0.022
0.050
(0.054)
(0.049)
(0.052)
(0.049)
Prior Successes (TA)
0.135*
0.156*
0.142*
0.153*
(0.067)
(0.067)
(0.063)
(0.063)
Novelty
-0.219**
-0.234**
-0.226**
-0.229**
(0.075)
(0.087)
(0.075)
(0.087)
Distance Commercialization
-0.171**
-0.171**
-0.249*** -0.260***
(0.053)
(0.064)
(0.057)
(0.064)
Novelty X Prior Failures
Novelty X Prior Successes
Distance Comm. x Failures

-0.051+
(0.029)

-0.069+
(0.039)

Distance Comm. x Successes
Constant
Log Likelihood

-8.897***
(2.636)
-2114.26

-3.261***
(0.640)
-1060.11

0.132**
(0.042)
-8.948***
(2.601)
-2111.20

0.145**
(0.054)
-3.334***
(0.678)
-1057.71

Observations
27697
2255
27697
2255
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, (TA based on therapeutic area of the opportunity)
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Table 5 (continued): Chapter 2 - Results – Logit - Full and Choice Based Sample – Continued
DV Partnership Formation
(7a)
(7b)
Full Sample
Choice Based
Firm and Year Fixed Effects
Y
Y
Main Therapy Area Effect
Y
Y
Startup Age
-0.003
-0.000
(0.013)
(0.014)
Compounds Available
0.156***
0.161***
(0.039)
(0.039)
Partnerships (TA)
0.031
0.031
(0.035)
(0.024)
Prior Tie
0.768***
0.916***
(0.137)
(0.135)
Same Country
0.411**
0.444**
(0.141)
(0.159)
Overlap Knowledge
0.935*
0.857+
(0.386)
(0.492)
Project Pipeline (TA)
0.016
-0.004
(0.021)
(0.016)
Exploration Orient. (TA)
0.223
0.267
(0.176)
(0.192)
Prior Indication
0.518**
0.590**
(0.178)
(0.193)
Top 100 Drug (TA)
0.339+
0.315*
(0.180)
(0.154)
Total Assets
0.283
0.030
(0.250)
(0.065)
Return on Assets
1.153
-0.154
(0.928)
(0.286)
Financial Slack
-0.090
-0.029
(0.085)
(0.027)
Prior Failures (TA)
0.060
0.085
(0.052)
(0.062)
Prior Successes (TA)
0.160*
0.224**
(0.067)
(0.071)
Novelty
-0.295***
-0.352***
(0.077)
(0.095)
Distance Commercialization
-0.223***
-0.222**
(0.057)
(0.071)
Novelty X Prior Failures
0.139**
0.166***
(0.044)
(0.045)
Novelty X Prior Successes
0.028
0.120
(0.074)
(0.074)
Distance Comm. x Failures
-0.076*
-0.087+
(0.032)
(0.045)
Distance Comm. x Successes 0.156***
0.157**
(0.045)
(0.054)
Constant
-8.909***
-3.232***
(2.633)
(0.727)
Log Likelihood
-2106.21
-1050.98
Observations
27697
2255
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, (TA based on therapeutic area of the opportunity)
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Hypothesis 3b predicted an opposite effect as a history of success would reinforce
local tendencies and lead firms to not consider opportunities with novel elements of
knowledge. When interacting Novelty and Prior Successes (Model 4a/4b respectively),
we do not find the predicted effect. Instead of the expected negative interaction, we find a
positive albeit insignificant effect. We hence do not find support for Hypothesis 3b,
which suggested that Prior Successes would lead firms to seek technological solutions
knowledge in the neighborhood of previous problem-solving attempts.
We next tested Hypotheses 4a. Models 5a/5b (Table 5) show the interaction of
Distance to Commercialization with Prior Failures. We do not observe overall strong
support for the theorized effect as we only find marginal significance for the moderation
of Prior Failures and Distance to Commercialization, which is low given the number of
observations. This effect is graphically explored in Figure 10. It gives at least partial
support for Hypothesis 4a, that at high levels of Prior Failures, established firms at least
marginally prefer partnering opportunities that are close to commercialization.
Figure 10: Chapter 2 - Moderation Distance to Commercialization and Prior Failures
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We observe the opposite effect in Models 6a/6b, which examine the interaction of
Distance to Commercialization and Prior Successes. Namely, the more Prior Successes,
the more firms tend to pursue partnering opportunities distant to commercialization. The
effect is demonstrated graphically in Figure 11 and supports Hypothesis 4b. Overall, the
findings for Hypothesis 4a and 4b indicate that failures and successes quite differently
shape the relationship of Distance to Commercialization and Partnership Formation but
the effect of Prior Failures is only marginally supported through our empirical results.
Figure 11: Chapter 2 - Moderation Distance to Commercialization and Prior Successes

Model 7a/7b demonstrate that all interactions that were supported individually
also hold in a full model. Interestingly, these models show that when considering both
interactions of Distance of Commercialization with Prior Successes and Prior Failures
simultaneously, we indeed find that they have the expected opposite effects on the
likelihood of partnerships formations (at least in the full model). While Prior Failures
lead firms to shy away from opportunities distant from commercialization (early stage),
Prior Successes have the opposite effect as firms more readily pursue early stage
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solutions. Both Prior Failures and Prior Successes are correlated at 0.21, which may
affect the result. However, their level of correlation does not cause concern in terms of
multicolinearity, lending some support for Hypothesis 4a, while 4b remains supported in
the full model.
Table 6 showcases the marginal effects of Novelty and Distance to
Commercialization at different levels of the moderators. We examined the 25th and 75th
percentile value of Prior Failures and Prior Successes, which again supports Hypotheses
3a, 4a (partially) and 4b.
Table 6: Chapter 2 - Marginal effects:

Marginal Effects of Novelty/Distance to Commercialization at different levels of
moderators:
STATA - Margins

Novelty

Distance to
Commercialization

When Prior Failures is at 25th percentile

-0.0611***
(0.0138)

-0.0182
(0.0116)

When Prior Failures is at 75th percentile

-0.0320*
(0.0149)

-0.0411***
(0.0090)

Changes in the marginal effect

0.0709**

0.0229+

When Prior Successes is at 25th percentile

not significant

When Prior Successes is at 75th percentile

not significant

Changes in the marginal effect

not significant

-0.0452***
(0.0108)
-0.0224*
(0.0092)
0.0228*

Robustness Tests: We conducted several additional checks to establish the
robustness of the findings (Table 7). First, we relaxed the assumption that all established
firms in the sample were at risk of establishing a partnership in a given year. Omitting
those years in which an established firm did not pursue a partnership equally supports our
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results (Model R1).36 In a similar vein, we show that results are robust when considering
a risk set which includes those partnering opportunities in which the established firms
had no prior experience in the broad therapeutic area (R2). We note that in this model, we
would have to assume that firms would search for technologies in therapeutic areas, in
which they are not currently active, which is very rarely observed in our data. In a final
check related to the sample, we also excluded firms which had substantial revenues but
were not founded in the chemistry-based drug development paradigm (Amgen,
Genentech and Chiron). Results remain robust when we only consider established firms
that traditionally focused on chemistry-based drug development.
We also operationalized our key variables in different ways. Namely, we used
indicator variables for Prior Failures and Prior Successes, in which failures and
successes are operationalized by binary variables (Models R3a and R3b). The results are
very similar to using the count variables in Tables 4 and 5. We alternatively deployed a
depreciated failure and success experience in which we considered the complete drug
development history (starting 1988) and a discount factor of 80% each year (Model R4a,
R4b). Again, results are in line with the main findings. However, it is interesting to note
that the significance for the Distance to Commercialization and Failure interaction in
models R4a and R4b is slightly lower than before.37 We conducted further robustness
tests, operationalizing Novelty and Distance to Commercialization differently. Namely,

36

The result of a two-stage Heckman (1977) estimation, including the inverse Mills ratio generated from a
ﬁrst stage (formed partnership in a given year), also provides support for our hypotheses even if we only
consider years in which firms formed a partnership (results available from the authors).
37
Both Prior Failures and Prior Successes hold when operationalized as cumulative counts of the prior 3
years only and Prior Failures holds when only capturing Phase III and not Phase II discontinuations.
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we individually examined if Novelty constructed using only the origin of material or only
the mechanism of action lead to similar results.38 This is shown in model R5a/b and
R6a/b, which support our main results but with slightly weaker significance. Namely, the
choice based model, in which we operationalize Novelty through the mechanism of action
only, leads to a marginally significant effect for the interaction with failure. Still, when
examining the moderations, we observe that both operationalization show quite similar
effects, further supporting our findings.

38

The two alternative variables are correlated at 0.16.
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Table 7: Chapter 2 - Robustness Tests – Logit - DV Partnership Formation
DV Partnership Formation

(R1)
Sample:
Only Years
in which
firms had at
least one
partnership

(R2)
(R3a)
Sample:
Full
All therapy Sample:
codes
Failure &
(including Success where firms indicators
not active)

(R3b)
(R4a)
(R4b)
Choice
Full
Choice
Based:
Sample:
Based:
Failure & Failure & Failure &
Success - Success - Success indicators depreciated depreciated
stock
stock

Firm Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Main Therapy Area E.

Y
0.052
(0.044)
Success (TA)
0.162**
(0.061)
Novelty
-0.311***
(0.079)
Distance Commercializ.
-0.221***
(0.057)
Novelty X Prior Failures 0.141***
(0.039)
Novelty X Success
0.033
(0.070)
Distance Com. x Failures -0.071*
(0.030)
Distance Com. x Successes 0.150***
(0.044)
Constant
-6.167***
(1.116)
Log Likelihood
-1953.56
Failure (TA)

Y
0.064
(0.052)
0.191**
(0.068)
-0.375***
(0.072)
-0.230***
(0.057)
0.162***
(0.045)
0.076
(0.069)
-0.074*
(0.031)
0.165***
(0.045)
-9.005***
(2.406)

Y
0.115
(0.124)
0.537***
(0.138)
-0.419***
(0.125)
-0.325**
(0.103)
0.342**
(0.119)
-0.009
(0.167)
-0.200+
(0.112)
0.400**
(0.124)
-9.230***
(2.590)

Y
0.087
(0.149)
0.649***
(0.142)
-0.469**
(0.150)
-0.318*
(0.139)
0.269+
(0.142)
0.125
(0.154)
-0.212+
(0.123)
0.392**
(0.149)
-3.426***
(0.838)

Y
0.001
(0.058)
0.212*
(0.087)
-0.274***
(0.075)
-0.212***
(0.053)
0.159**
(0.057)
0.062
(0.081)
-0.076+
(0.041)
0.132**
(0.050)
-9.023***
(2.629)

Y
0.066
(0.065)
0.297**
(0.098)
-0.331***
(0.094)
-0.219***
(0.062)
0.162**
(0.061)
0.128
(0.083)
-0.077+
(0.042)
0.152**
(0.053)
-3.112***
(0.694)

-2260.37

-2099.86

-1047.91

-2107.35

-1052.13

Observations

16683
33532
27697
2255
27697
2255
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; variables not shown but included in the models: Startup Age,
Compounds Available, Partnerships, Prior Tie, Same Country, Overlap Knowledge, New Projects,
Exploration Orientation (not in R2), Prior Indication, Top 100 Drug, Total Assets, Return on Assets,
Financial Slack
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Table 7 (continued): Chapter 2 - Robustness Tests – Logit - DV Partnership Formation
DV Partnership Formation

(R5a)
Full
Sample:
Novelty –
Origin of
Material

(R5b)
(R6a)
(R6b)
Choice
Full
Choice
Based:
Sample:
Based:
Novelty – Novelty – Novelty –
Origin of Mechanism Mechanism
Material of Action of Action

(R7a)
(R7b)
Full
Choice
Sample:
Based:
Distance Distance
Comm.
Comm.
indicator indicator

Firm Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y
0.042
(0.050)
0.330***
(0.083)
-0.359***
(0.096)
0.457**
(0.158)
0.175***
(0.044)
0.120
(0.074)
-0.231+
(0.123)
0.354**
(0.113)
-3.349***
(0.749)

Main Therapy Area E.

Y
-0.032
(0.063)
Success (TA)
0.141*
(0.062)
Novelty
-0.249*
(0.125)
Distance Commercializ.
-0.227***
(0.057)
Novelty X Prior Failures 0.190*
(0.095)
Novelty X Success
0.027
(0.119)
Distance Com. x Failures -0.078*
(0.032)
Distance Com. x Successes 0.156***
(0.045)
Constant
-8.907***
(2.629)
Log Likelihood
-2109.22
Failure (TA)

Y
0.008
(0.053)
0.138*
(0.065)
-0.303*
(0.142)
-0.227**
(0.069)
0.199*
(0.094)
0.171
(0.141)
-0.089*
(0.038)
0.158**
(0.054)
-3.128***
(0.772)

Y
-0.056
(0.071)
0.137
(0.075)
-0.236*
(0.099)
-0.222***
(0.057)
0.118+
(0.067)
0.039
(0.090)
-0.077*
(0.032)
0.153***
(0.045)
-8.937***
(2.595)

Y
-0.057
(0.061)
0.138+
(0.076)
-0.315**
(0.121)
-0.224**
(0.069)
0.196*
(0.076)
0.085
(0.099)
-0.089*
(0.039)
0.161**
(0.054)
-3.120***
(0.709)

Y
-0.001
(0.061)
0.272***
(0.078)
-0.298***
(0.077)
0.439***
(0.129)
0.140**
(0.044)
0.028
(0.074)
-0.1901+
(0.098)
0.380***
(0.093)
-8.996***
(2.638)

-1054.42

-2110.48

-1054.58

-2106.73 -1050.37

Observations

27697
2255
27697
2255
27697
2255
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; variables not shown but included in the models: Startup Age,
Compounds Available, Partnerships, Prior Tie, Same Country, Overlap Knowledge, New Projects,
Exploration Orientation (not in R2), Prior Indication, Top 100 Drug, Total Assets, Return on Assets,
Financial Slack

64

It is also interesting to note that while the Origin of Material strongly predicts
myopia (Hypothesis 1), we do not find this effect significant from the Mechanism of
Action (negative effect but significance at p<0.13). Finally, we operationalized Distance
to Commercialization through an indicator variable, in which we split opportunities if
they are before proof of concept (preclinical-Phase) or after (Phase II and Phase III). We
also ran additional graphical checks using the inteff command in STATA to understand
the interaction effects (Ai & Norton, 2003; Zelner, 2009). Graphical inspection is
recommended to investigate whether most observations have a Z-statistic above 2 (for
hypotheses 3a and 4b) and below 2 (for hypotheses 3b and 4a). Appendix 4 indeed
showcases that for all significant interactions, we find that the majority of observations
are above/below significant at p<0.05 further strengthening our results.
DISCUSSION
This paper examines how established firms react to emerging technological
opportunities from startup firms, which are considered an important generator of
innovative and often radical technological solutions. We take into account that the
interpretation, recognition and pursuit of partnering opportunities is influenced by
myopic tendencies, as firms tend to overlook technological solutions that are novel or that
will result in payoffs in the distant future. We hence demonstrate that merely opening up
to external startups does not necessarily alleviate the tendency of firms to search locally
with respect to novelty and distance to commercialization of partnering opportunities.
We further consider that the recognition of external opportunities may be shaped
by a firm’s prior successes and failures. We combine both perspectives and investigate
how successes and failures shape the reaction of established firms to external partnering
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opportunities that differ both in their degree of technological novelty to the established
firm and their distance to commercialization.
In doing so, we clarify how prior failures and prior successes differently shape the
two forms of myopia. While prior failures generate an organizational environment in
which firms become more open to novel ways of solving problems, they, at the same
time, may push firms to seek partnering opportunities which promise immediate payoffs.
Conversely, prior successes may enable firms to take the long term perspective of adding
partnering opportunities with more distant payoffs. The study hence argues for the value
of integrating perspectives on myopia and local search with studies examining events of
failures and successes (Greve, 2011; Laursen, 2012) to understand decisions made
concerning firm partnering.
While recent studies have examined if failures or successes have a stronger effect
on organizational learning (Madsen & Desai, 2010), the insight of our study is that prior
failures and prior successes cannot unambiguously be associated with a distinct search
directions as they influence the various forms of myopia in different ways. For example,
while failures challenge the firm’s current assumptions, they simultaneously generate
urgency, leading not only to pursuing opportunities with novel elements of knowledge
but also opportunities with immediate payoffs. At the same time, we do not find evidence
that prior successes “trap” organizations into local paths (Audia et al., 2000). Conversely,
in our setting, a history of successes may generate an organizational environment in
which firms consider partnering opportunities more distant from commercialization.
Hence, both failures and successes may play an important role in adding variety of
different forms to firms’ innovation pipelines.
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We also shed light on some underlying activities that may shape a firm’s ability to
recognize external partnering opportunities. While previous researchers have generally
emphasized the importance of internal R&D per se in sensing and seizing external
technological solutions (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), we provide a more nuanced view as
to how prior success and failure in R&D shape this ability. Given that firms today
continue to face scrutiny of their own internal investments in R&D and are heavily
penalized for failure, we argue that this study reveals that failure may actually have some
benefits as it opens the firms up towards new ways of problem-solving.
The study has a number of limitations, which should provide ample opportunities
for future research. First, it was conducted in the context of a single industry and the
generalizability of our findings and their boundary conditions would need to be validated
through explorations in other empirical contexts. The bio-pharmaceutical industry as a
research context, however, allows us to readily capture success and failure in R&D,
which is challenging in other industry settings. In addition, while, in pharmaceutical
partnering, opportunities can be readily identified, this may not be possible in other
industries. Relying on patents may not be the best strategy as it is unclear if patents are
actually available for partnering or licensing by the startup firm.
Second, and in a similar vein, the study currently only considers reactions to
emerging external technological opportunities through partnering. However, established
firms possess a broad variety of tools to tap into external knowledge, including
acquisitions or CVC investments (Keil et al., 2008; Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003). The
study hence only captures a subset of actions at the disposal of established firms.
Restricting our analysis to partnering, however, allows us to identify an unambiguous risk
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set of opportunities available for partnering. With an acquisition, firms gain access to the
full knowledge of a startup, including all patents and prior projects – it is hence more
difficult to define what really was at risk before the acquisition transaction took place.
Conversely, partnering is limited to specific products in development, which allows us to
more accurately identify technological opportunities versus those pursued. The expansion
of the study to include acquisitions, however, provides an interesting area for future
research as there may be differences in what type of opportunities firms partner for and
acquire.
Finally, the partnerships observed in this study only constitute a subset of all
partnerships in which established firms engage. In this study, we do not capture very
early stage discovery partnerships or commercialization partnerships that occur when
drugs are already approved. Future research may attempt to expand the study to a broader
set of value chain activities. Given that it is difficult to unambiguously identify the
partnering opportunities when no compound is yet available, we opted to exclude very
early stage research partnerships (at discovery stage). An important limitation hence is
that the startups we observe already have some history and products in development,
which in the bio-pharmaceutical industry can take already a decade of research. At the
same time, firms already having commercialized compounds available may behave very
differently in partnering as incentives and bargaining power change substantially
(Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011). Firms with such partnering opportunities may themselves
have already invested in complementary assets and started their transition to become
more like established industry players, which mostly likely changes the dynamics in
partnership formations.
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CONCLUSION
We combine perspectives on organizational myopia and organizational learning to
investigate how prior successes and failures shape the reaction of established firms to
external partnering opportunities. Comparing potential and realized partnerships between
established and startup firms, we illustrate that myopic tendencies are highly salient in the
partnering formation process between established and startup firms. However, we also
outline the role of prior failures and successes in illustrating when firms go beyond local
search in partnership formation. We find that while prior failures are important to firms’
consideration of novel technological solutions, prior successes can make them more
receptive to solutions at an earlier stage of development. Hence, both failures and
successes may make firms more receptive to different types of emerging partnering
opportunities.
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CHAPTER 3: SWIMMING AGAINST THE CURRENT:
EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RADICAL INNOVATION AND
STARTUP FIRM MARKET VALUE
An important line of inquiry within the technological change literature highlights
that in environments characterized by rapid technological change, new startup firms
frequently emerge that challenge the ways in which incumbent firms solve problems and
come up with radically new solutions and products (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995;
Foster, 1986; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Radical innovations, i.e., innovations that are
“based on a substantially new technology relative to what already exists” (Govindarajan
& Kopalle, 2006:13) and “involve methods and materials that are novel to incumbents”
(Hill & Rothaermel, 2003) are at the heart of Schumpeter’s (1942) theory of creative
destruction, which suggests that startup firms – unencumbered by aging and embedded
competencies – nimbly push technological change forward and ultimately gain the
“attacker’s” advantages (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Cooper & Schendel, 1976;
Foster, 1986; Henderson, 1993; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001).
At the same time, however, established firms often retain possession of
specialized downstream complementary assets (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Rothaermel,
2001; Taylor & Helfat, 2009), which leads to challenges for startup firms pursuing
innovations different from the existing industry conventions and recipes (Spender, 1989).
It is, hence, not surprising that empirical findings testing the relationship of radical
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innovation and performance outcomes for startup firms remain inconclusive at best (Li &
Atuahene-Gima, 2001). 39
In this paper, we consider startup firms located in an industry in which established
firms retain control of downstream complementary assets. In a first step, we examine if
pursuing radical product innovations in such a setting generates higher or lower market
valuations, a key performance indicator for startup firms (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009;
DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Stuart et al., 1999; Zott & Amit, 2008). We next take into
account the unique dependencies between startups and established firms and, in a second
step, examine under which conditions pursuing radical product innovation may be
associated with higher market valuations for startups.
Drawing on the literature on startup performance and inter-organizational
partnering (Baum et al., 2000a; Stinchcombe, 1965; Stuart et al., 1999; Tushman &
Anderson, 1986), we argue that pursuing radical ways of solving problems compound
legitimacy issues and resource constraints leading to lower market valuations for startups.
Considering the unique interdependencies between startups and established firms,
however, suggests that under distinct conditions, startups pursuing radical innovations
may mitigate these constraints. In particular, we examine the formation of
commercialization partnerships (Baum et al., 2000a; Stuart et al., 1999) and the maturity
of technologies in development (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008) by the startup, as well as
failure in R&D efforts by established firms (Cyert & March, 1963; Madsen & Desai,
2010) as important conditions mitigating legitimacy and resource constraints for startups
pursuing radical innovations.
39

Li and colleagues are not explicit about the radicalness of innovation but consider innovations new to the
firm and /or the market as product innovation in general.
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We test our hypotheses in the global biopharmaceutical industry by examining the
product innovation by New Biotechnology Firms (labeled startups in this paper). In the
1990s, hundreds of biotechnology entrants pursued the bio-pharmaceutical industry in the
hope of dramatically altering the industry landscape (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a;
Schweizer, 2005). We assembled a unique panel dataset that includes information on 144
startups with an IPO during the 1991-1999 and track them between 1991 and 2008. By
comparing the startups’ products in development to those of incumbent firms in the
industry, we are able to generate a unique time-variant measure for innovation
radicalness, which avoids any ex post classification of the radical nature of the startups’
technological solutions (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005).
Consistent with our arguments, we find that there is a severe penalty associated
with pursuing radical product innovation in an industry where established firms remain in
possession of important complementary assets. At the same time, however, this penalty is
substantially reversed for startups forming commercialization partnerships and for those
startups pursuing radical innovations in therapeutic areas where incumbent firms
experience failures in their own product development attempts. We find only limited
evidence that the downsides of pursuing radical innovations may be offset by the
maturity of the startup’s technological solutions. Our results account for unobserved
differences across firms and over time, and are robust to a number of alternative
econometric specifications and operationalization of key variables.
This study is a first attempt to systematically and longitudinally identify radical
product innovations for startup firms, while taking into account the unique dependencies
between startups and established firms. Previous studies have predominantly focused on
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established firms and their ability to cope with radical technological change per se (Hill
& Rothaermel, 2003; Rothaermel & Hill, 2005), but have less taken into account the
consequences for startups pursuing radical innovations when established firms retain
complementary assets.
We show that in environments where established firms retain complementary
assets, there are no clear attacker’s advantages (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Foster,
1986) and startups pursuing radical innovations are actually penalized in their market
value. This complements the literature on the liability of newness and smallness
(Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; Stinchcombe, 1965), which has identified that young
and nascent firms are facing a unique set of challenges threatening their survival. We
suggest and find that to fully comprehend the severity of challenges for startup firms, it is
important to differentiate how new and young firms are positioned in their innovation
attempts versus the established firms.
To our knowledge, our study is also the first to consider failure by incumbent
firms as an important environmental factor influencing the relationship between radical
product innovations and startup market valuations. While scholars previously considered
failure by other players in the industry as an important driver of vicarious learning
(Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Madsen & Desai, 2010), we demonstrate that in an
environment where established firms tend to “set” the rules for the industry (Abernathy &
Clark, 1985; Martin & Mitchell, 1998), benefits from failure by established firms are
accrued by startups pursuing more radical innovations. Methodologically, the paper
extends studies on innovation radicalness, which have started to define radicalness not as
an ex post, but as a dynamic construct through the comparison of current R&D initiatives
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by the startup versus the ones pursued by established industry players (Dahlin & Behrens,
2005).
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Swimming Against the Current - Pursuing Radical Innovations
Startup firms frequently challenge the ways in which incumbent firms solve
problems (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Schumpeter, 1942; Tushman & Anderson,
1986) and introduce radical technological innovations that differ substantially to what
already exists in the industry (Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006:13). At the same time,
however, startups that reject industry conventions and select technological solutions
outside the range of acceptability of the industry may be perceived as less reliable and
legitimate (Suchman, 1995). These challenges are particularly severe in industries where
established firms’ complementary assets are preserved as startups may depend on
established firms for developing their radical technological solutions. In such
environments, pursuing radical innovations is associated with substantial challenges,
which may adversely affect a startup’s market value.
First, startups with radical innovations face ambiguity as to whether their
technological solutions are actually feasible and legitimate technological alternatives for
the industry (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). Technological solutions at the initial stage of their
lifecycle are often a mix of poorly defined tacit “know-how” and cannot be easily
evaluated (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989:7). This is particular salient for radical product
innovations that lack comparable industry templates and cannot be easily juxtaposed to
existing product development attempts of established firms (Jensen & Szulanski, 2007).
Technological solutions that do not conform to the existing conventions and industry
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recipes set by established firms may not be considered feasible alternatives as they
violate existing cause-and-effect representations of how problems and solutions are
interrelated (Itami & Roehl, 1991; Lei et al., 1996; Spender, 1989). As a result, startups
which pursue radical innovations may be less visible and are not legitimate to their
environment,40 which we expect to result in a discount in their market value.
Second, and related to the first point, startups pursuing radical innovations face
challenges in securing the necessary assets, be they financial (Dushnitsky & Shaver,
2009), network related (Ahuja, Polidoro, & Mitchell, 2009; Baum et al., 2000a) or
organizational (Marx, Strumsky, & Fleming, 2009), to transform their preliminary ideas
into new products (Teece, 1986). When complementary assets are retained by
incumbents, startups may be unable to commercialize the technology on their own but
instead participate in the division of innovative labor and partner with established
industry players (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Rothaermel, 2001). However, these
established firms prefer partnering with new startups that pursue technological
innovations similar to their own R&D (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008) while “overlooking”
innovations with elements of knowledge novel to them (chapter 2). Absent access to
complementary resources from established firms, however, startups pursuing radical
product innovations face severe obstacles in developing and commercializing their
products. The problem is exacerbated as radical innovations often require substantial
investments to modify development tools and commercial channels and hence require
more resources in the first place (Maine & Garnsey, 2006; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, &
40

The observations apply to all stakeholders, who feel uncertain about the trustworthiness and
predictability of startups pursuing radical innovations, leading to a lack of legitimacy (Choi & Shepherd,
2005; Suchman, 1995).
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Lyman, 1990). All arguments taken together suggest that startups pursuing radical
product innovations face severe challenges, as the technological solutions of such startups
lack legitimacy and the startups themselves face difficulties in assembling all required
resources leading to adverse effects in the startup’s market value.
Hypothesis 1: In an industry where established firms retain control over
complementary assets, the more radical a startup’s innovation, the lower the
startup’s market value.
Given that pursuing radical innovations is associated with a lack of legitimacy and
resource constraints, it is important to determine when startups can mitigate these
challenges. The radicalness of innovation stems from startups pursuing innovations
different from those of established firms. Hence, it may be important to further examine
the relationship between startups and established industry firms. Next, we outline how
forming commercialization partnerships with external partners as well as the failure in
R&D attempts by established firms affect the startup’s legitimacy and resource
availability.

Formation of Commercialization Partnerships
Researchers have long argued that partnering is a key strategy for startups’
commercialization attempts (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009; Henderson, Orsenigo, & Pisano,
1999; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Startups pursuing radical innovations may benefit in
particular from the formation of such partnerships as they resolve issues of legitimacy
and resource constraints.
An important form of partnerships for startups is to engage with another party that
utilizes the startup’s technology with the intention of development and commercialization
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(henceforth, commercialization partnerships).41 It is well-known that startups enjoy direct
benefits when forming commercialization partnerships that positively affect market value
(DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Stuart et al., 1999). At the same time, commercialization
partnerships may “alter the system of constraints and dependencies confronting the
organizations” (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978:267), which is particularly salient for startups
pursuing radical innovations. First, finding partners to develop and commercialize
technological solutions is an important signal that validates the usefulness of the startup’s
radical innovations and hence provides legitimacy (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008; Spence,
1973). The formation of partnerships provides valuable information to outside
stakeholders and increases the perceived quality and reliability of the startup’s products
in development (Gulati, 1998). This is particularly useful for firms that lacked legitimacy
in the first place, as their innovations were perceived as “too” radical compared to the
incumbent industry players. In a similar vein, Stuart and colleagues (1999) demonstrated
endorsement effects in partnerships42 as firms with higher uncertainty43 benefited most
from forming partnerships with high reputation firms. We extend this argument and
consider the radicalness of the startup’s innovations as a key cause for legitimacy
constraints so that startups pursuing radical innovations benefit mostly when forming
commercialization partnerships.
Second, beyond the signaling value, the formation of commercialization
partnerships provides concrete resources to the startup firms. Given the elevated resource
needs of startups pursuing radical innovations (Maine & Garnsey, 2006), forming
41

An alternative type of partnership is that the startup sources-in knowledge or technologies to create
value.
42
The authors examine the prominence of partners rather than partnerships per se.
43
Uncertainty was captured by the age of the startups in this study.
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commercialization partnerships may allow them to share the risks in development and
commercialization and endow them with the necessary resources to develop and
commercialize their technologies. Moreover, engaging in commercialization partnerships
also gives firms better access to network resources (Gulati, 1998). We identified that
startups pursuing radical innovations often have difficulty finding new partners.
However, once such poorly embedded firms are able to conclude a partnership, they
become more embedded in the network, making it more likely that they are able to secure
additional resources through subsequent partnering (Ahuja et al., 2009). Taking all
arguments together, we expect startups pursuing radical product innovations to
disproportionally benefit from the formation commercialization partnerships.
Hypotheses 2: Forming commercialization partnerships positively moderates the
relationship between the radicalness of a startup’s innovation and that startup’s
market value.
While the formation of commercialization partnerships with external partners may
be driven by the startup firms themselves, environmental factors may also affect the
legitimacy of startups pursuing radical innovations (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001). We
next examine incumbent firms’ failures in product development as important events
shaping both legitimacy and resource availability for startups.

Failure in product development by established firms
Failure by another organization has been identified as an important mechanism
through which firms can learn to avoid similar mistakes (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002).
At the same time, failure by established industry firms may not only be associated with
learning (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Kim & Miner, 2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010)
78

but also improves the legitimacy of radical technological solutions that depart from
existing industry conventions.
Extant research indicates that incumbent firms pursue dominant designs which
serve as an initial orientation point and shape expectations for all other firms in the
industry (Klepper, 1997; Spender, 1989; Utterback, 1987). Failure of problem-solving
attempts by incumbent firms may trigger substantial shifts in the industry as to which
ways of solving problems are considered feasible.44 This benefits startups with
technological solutions pursuing radical innovations that lacked legitimacy in the first
place. First, failure in product innovation by incumbents serves as an impetus for all
industry players to re-evaluate their conventional technological solutions and challenges
their current logic as to how problems and solutions are interrelated (Greve, 1998; Jansen
et al., 2005; Lampel et al., 2009). This may positively alter legitimacy for startups
pursuing radical product innovation, especially as they provide alternative solutions to the
conventional ways of solving problems. Indeed, research on vicarious learning suggests
that other industry actors can benefit from failure as they learn what actions to avoid
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Kim & Miner, 2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010). We extend this
argument by highlighting that as firms avoid solutions that have failed, the pursuit of
alternative ways of solving problems may become more legitimate. The role of failure in
triggering an industry re-evaluation resonates with studies which have identified that
experiencing failure tend to increase search intensity (Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve,

44

For example, in our context, Pfizer discovered in Phase III that Torcetrapib, a drug targeting
cardiovascular diseases, had an imbalance of mortality and cardiovascular events. The drug was an
inhibitor of cholesterol ester transfer protein (CETP) for the treatment of atherosclerosis and many other
incumbent firms were pursuing projects using CETP. Subsequently, incumbent firms discarded cholesterol
ester transfer protein (CETP) and looked for new ways of solving the atherosclerosis challenge.
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2003b) and organizational risk-taking (Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 2011). Following
these arguments, we consider failure by established firms a key environmental factor,
leading industry players to consider a broader range of possible alternatives so that
startups that do not conform to conventional ways of solving problems are considered to
be more legitimate.
Second, given that failure leads incumbents to consider alternative paths to solve
problems, they may allocate more resources towards startups pursuing radical
innovations. Extant research shows that failure may change the pattern of resource
allocation by incumbent firms as external stakeholders put substantial pressure on
established firms to change direction (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Cyert & March,
1992:43; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Useem, 1996). The result is that failure may shift
resource allocation by incumbents to more likely consider partnerships with startups
pursuing technological solutions which were previously not considered by the established
firms (chapter 2). Put differently, failure by established firms may lead to an environment
in which resources more readily flow towards startups pursuing radical innovations.
Taking both arguments in tandem, we expect that failure by established firms in the
industry provides an important contingency for pursing radical innovations.
Hypotheses 3: Failure in product innovation by incumbent firms positively
moderates the relationship between the radicalness of a startup’s innovation and
the startup’s market value.
Innovation Maturity
While both commercialization partnerships and industry failures depend
substantially on other firms in the industry, startups may also mitigate legitimacy
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concerns and resource constraints by demonstrating that their radical innovations are
feasible industry solutions.
The more a startup’s technological solutions mature, i.e., move closer to
commercialization, the technologies become codified, thus increasing the amount of
information available about them. Moreover, more mature innovations have an existing
track record and may even have working prototypes and templates demonstrating their
effectiveness (Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989). Moving
technological solutions downstream towards commercialization is also associated with
achieving intermediate milestones, which, in our context (bio-pharmaceuticals), is
reflected in intermediate approvals by regulatory authorities.
The more information about the innovation becomes available, the easier it is for
outsiders to evaluate its technology. Working prototypes reduce uncertainty about the
technology’s replicability (Jensen & Szulanski, 2007) as they signal competence
(Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008), which reduces ambiguity about the technology’s potential
value. Put differently, the more mature the startup’s innovations, the more likely it is that
they can be successfully commercialized, which increases legitimacy with external
stakeholders. While these direct benefits of having more mature innovations are well
understood, it stands to reason that startups pursuing radical innovations benefit
particularly when they hold more mature innovations. Firms pursuing radical innovations
lacked existing industry prototypes and were not perceived as feasible industry solutions
in the first place. It also seems reasonable that startups pursuing radical innovations may
benefit most when their technological solutions become more legitimate industry
solutions as signaled by their maturity.
81

Having more mature technologies also indicates a transition for startups as they
become independent from established firms in commercializing their technologies.
Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt and Lyman (1990) explicitly argued that progress in product
innovation is important for startups to gain cash flow for financial independence. At the
same time, startups with more mature innovations may have more bargaining power over
the established firms when forming partnerships, which is beneficial to their resource
availability (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011). Hence, we expect that startups pursuing
radical product innovations benefit disproportionally from having more mature
innovations that have cleared substantial hurdles in the innovation process.
Hypotheses 4: The maturity of a startup’s innovation positively moderates the
relationship between the radicalness of a startup’s innovation and the startup’s
market value.
METHODS
Background - Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry
We chose the bio-pharmaceutical industry as a research setting in which to test
our hypotheses. It is an industry which has seen a continous influx of new startups trying
to devise new and innovative therapeutic solutions (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). We
captured innovation by these startups by their products in development as we could
readily compare products in development by incumbent and startup firms. We limited our
analysis to startups pursuing innovative new drug development, which are new chemical
molecules (small-molecule) or biological-based solutions (protein, monoclonal, gene
therapy, etc.), rather than startups pursuing re-formulations or generic drugs. Products in
the pharmaceutical industry become visible once firms move them into preclinical trials,
which begin when a firm has discovered a chemical compound or biological-based large
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molecule that is considered to be an appropriate candidate for development. Only 2.5% of
compounds identified in research (target identification, lead identification and lead
optimization) are considered for such development (Giovannetti & Morrison, 2000; Hess
& Rothaermel, 2011), and the development stages following (i.e., clinical trials) are the
most resource intensive steps in the innovation process (Rydzewski, 2008). A unique
characteristic of the industry in the 1990s was that firms went public very early in the
development process, a point at which the product may have only been in the preclinical
or early clinical stages (Burns, 2005). We were hence are able to capture the value of
such firms based on publicly available information despite the fact that those startups at
IPO generated minimal revenue and (with the exception of two startups) had substantial
negative income at IPO. Our data merged various sources, including SDC (Securities
Data Company), ReCap (Recombinant Capital), Pharmaprojects and Adis R&D Insights
and Compustat45.

Sample
We queried SDC to obtain a list of biopharmaceutical firms with an IPO in 1991
and 1999 active in drug development and observe the market value of these firms from
1991-2008. During the 1990s, new biotechnology firms usually became public at a very
early stage at which they had no foreseeable revenues. To be included in the sample, the
startup a) had to be founded after 1984, so we only capture firms in the late
biotechnology era (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004) so, in 1990, were at most 5 years old; b)
45

SDC provides detailed information on new issues of shares in the stock market. Pharmaprojects and Adis
R&D Insights are databases tracking new drug development in the pharmaceutical industry (Girotra et al.,
2010; Sosa, 2011). ReCap, a proprietary database tracking partnerships in the life science industry, is
considered to be one of the most comprehensive publicly available data sources (Schilling, 2009).
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had an IPO during 1991 and 1999 on an American stock market (usually NASDAQ); c)
did not have any approved product at IPO; and d) engaged in innovative new drug
development (i.e., had compounds visible in Pharmaprojects). Using these criteria, we
identified 144 startups for which we had both financial and product development data
available and tracked them up to the year 2008, leading to 1559 firm-year observations.
The sample included firms like Cephalon, MedImmune, which became multi-billion
dollar businesses.

Measures
Dependent Variable – Market Value:
We used the market capitalization of equity based on Compustat (in $M in every
year at year end) as dependent variable. Given the skewed nature of this variable, we took
the natural log of the Market Value as dependent variable. Measures of realized
performance, such as ROA, ROE, or Tobin’s q, are less appropriate as dependent
variables as the startup firms often have few tangible assets and limited revenues (as well
as mostly negative earnings) (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Lavie, 2007; Sanders & Boivie,
2004; Zott & Amit, 2008). Market Value V is calculated as: V = p * s, where p is the
price of the ﬁrm’s shares on the last day of the year, and s is the total number of shares
outstanding at that time. We log-transformed Market Value to achieve the desirable
statistical properties under the linearity, homoskedasticity, and independence assumptions
(Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009).
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Independent Variable –Innovation Radicalness:
To arrive at a measure for radical innovation, we compared products in
development (i.e., compounds) from startups to the ongoing drug development of major
established pharmaceutical firms. This entailed taking into consideration fine-grained
product development using Pharmaprojects and examining over 8000 R&D projects
pursued by incumbent and startup firms between 1991 and 2008.46
It is important to understand that biotechnology as a term is often associated with
all new firms that were founded following the biotechnology revolution in the early
1980s. Biotechnology in a narrow sense means the development of large protein-based
molecules as therapeutic solutions (e.g., recombinant proteins or monoclonal antibodies).
However, most of therapeutic solutions, even those developed by small biotechnology
firms, are still chemical-based small molecules. But not all chemistry based solutions are
similar as they differ as to which mechanisms in the human bodies they attempt to
address, a critical element of scientific and technological knowledge incorporated in
therapeutic solutions (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998).47 To examine radicalness, we considered
small (chemistry-based) and large (biology-based) molecules as well as naturally derived
molecules and examined how they differed from the drug development initiatives by
incumbent firms (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005; Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006) .
We started by identifying the therapeutic area of the drug in development (from
Pharmaprojects, 13 broad categories in total, including, for example, cancer or
46

Two researchers independently constructed the history based on the information from Pharmaprojects on
each drug. Missing data was complemented through a second database (ADIS Insights) and searches on the
web. When researchers did not find the same date, we used the earlier one found, if it was from a credible
news source.
47
For our sample of 144 sample firms, 35.5% of all drugs are biologic based, 61.5% are chemical based
(small molecule) and the remainder are derived from natural plants.
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dermatology). Next, we examined the underlying material of the solution and its
mechanism of action.48 The origin of material links very closely to the large vs. small
molecule distinction and includes different type of biological-based technologies (e.g., a
proteins, monoclonal antibody or viral vector) as well as chemical-based solutions and
natural products (derived from plants). The mechanism of action classifies the
pharmacological effect through which the drug may have an effect in the human body.49
Previous research has tended to distinguish only chemistry- and biology-based solutions,
but was not able to identify variety within the chemistry-based products, which still
represents the majority of all drugs candidates. Pharmaprojects contains over 2000
mechanisms, and we employed a consulting firm to assess which mechanisms could be
aggregated to reflect an important category of knowledge associate with drugs in
development. A pharmacology expert with 26 years in drug development and a
biotechnology graduate student did the classification separately (resulting in 340 unique
pharmacology codes in our sample).50
We then compared both elements, origin of material and mechanism of action of
the startups’ products in development with products in development of incumbent firms
that are active in the same therapeutic area for the same year.51 Put differently, we
48

We inferred the relevance of the mechanism of action and the origin of material through interviews with
scientists responsible for technological search at Merck and Johnson & Johnson and by examining the
search guidelines outlined by pharmaceutical firms. An example can be found at
http://www.merck.com/licensing/areas_of_interest.pdf.
49
For example, Cox (Cyclooxygenase)-2 inhibitors (one of our mechanism of action categories) prevents
the production of PHG (prostaglandin) which may cause inflammation.
50
We report our results based on the classification by the consulting firm after clarifying where some of
the mismatches between the student and the PhD expert originated (overall agreement between the two
classifications was 93%). Using the original code from Pharmaprojects leads to very similar results. The
conversion table from the pharmaceutical consultant can be downloaded under : http://bit.ly/12SHdto
51
We took the Top established international 50 firms active in drug development based on revenue in 1991
(these include firms like Merck & Co, Pfizer, Eli Lilly) to identify incumbent firms active in a therapeutic
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captured if, in a given therapeutic area (e.g., cancer), the startups used: a) the same
mechanism of action; and b) the same origin of material is deployed by established firms.
We assigned a value of one if one of the two elements was not used by an established
firm and a value of two if both elements were new to the firm. We then averaged all
scores (startup vs. Top 50 established firms) to arrive at an average measure of
technological radicalness, which is similar to the idea of Dahlin’s and Behrens’s (2005)
to measure radical innovation measure as average overlap to other industry players. A
technological radicalness score of zero indicates that the startup does nothing new (with
respect to mechanism and origin of material) as all established firm active in the
therapeutic area work on the same type of solution. Conversely, a radicalness score of 2
indicates that none of the established firms active in a therapeutic area had products in
development similar to the ones of the startup.52 Appendix 5 provides a simplified
example of the way in which Innovation Radicalness was calculated for a startup in a
given year.
Moderators:
Commercialization Partnerships: We counted the number of Commercialization
Partnerships a startup pursued in a given year using Recap (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004;
Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Recap indicates which firm in a partnership is the
technology provider, allowing us to explicitly distinguish

Commercialization

area. We, however, observed several horizontal mergers between these firms (e.g., Astra merging with
Zeneca). As an alternative, we extract the Top internal 100 pharmaceutical firms in 1991 and for each year,
take the Top 50 (remaining) firms up to 2008 as incumbents. The results are unchanged using 50 incumbent
firms in each year. The R&D budget of these large established R&D firms dwarfed those of our sample
firms; a single firm in the Top 10 R&D spenders (e.g., Merck & Co) invested more in R&D than all sample
firms in a given year in the 1990s.
52
The actual minimum and maximum values are 0.13 and 1.95 respectively.
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Partnerships, which we define as any partnerships in which an in-sourcing firm (usually
larger than the startup) deploys the startups technologies or compounds. These
commercialization partnerships can be at an early or late stage of the drug development
process and usually entail upfront payments and royalty fees for the startup firm (Burns,
2005).
Incumbent Failure: Failure is very common in innovation, which is why we
limited ourselves to a few substantial failure events within the industry. Extant research
indicates that late stage failure can have profound consequences for pharmaceutical firms
(Girotra et al., 2010). Failure hence is defined as product development attempts in which
the firm committed substantial resources but ultimately failed, which is at the stage of
Phase III large scale clinical trials.53 To arrive at an overall measure for Incumbent
Failure for the startup in a given year, we counted the number of failed product
development attempts in the year for the Top 50 bio-pharmaceutical (based on the
identification in 1991) in the therapeutic areas addressed by the startup. Using this
measure, we can generate a unique Failure Incumbent score for each startup in each year.
We demonstrate the calculation of this variable in Appendix 6.
To capture Innovation Maturity, we generated two measures. First, Late Stage
Projects is a count of products in development (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999) which have
reached proof of concept, which usually is either in Phase II or Phase III (late stage
clinical trials). Moving products in development down the value chain signals the
viability of the innovative solution as well as its approval by regulatory authorities which
must approve intermediate steps in the clinical trial process. While Late Stage Projects
53

We verify that the effect holds when including Phase II failure, which also has a high likelihood of
leading to a new product.
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are rather frequent, we observed only 65 actual drugs being approved for active startup
biotechnology firms with an IPO in 1991-1999. Still, as an alternative variable for
Innovation Maturity, we captured the approval of a drug in a given year as an indicator
variable. We limited ourselves to approvals in the US, Europe and Japan so that
Approved Drug is 1 if the startup received the regulatory approval for a drug in a given
year and 0 if no drugs were approved.
Controls
We controlled for various factors that may affect the firm’s market value. First,
we controlled for various financial measures, including a firm’s size Total Assets
(logged) and the firm’s availability of financial resources through the Current Ratio (both
measures taken from Compustat). Firm size has been associated with the liability of
smallness (Freeman et al., 1983) and a high Current Ratio signals the availability of
financial resources in the form of financial slack (Patzelt, Shepherd, Deeds, & Bradley,
2008), which may affect market value.
Second, we took into consideration that firms have a broad range of tools with
which to engage with other partners (Keil et al., 2008; van de Vrande et al., 2009). Extant
research has highlighted that partnering per se and not only commercialization
partnerships may affect startup performance (Baum et al., 2000a). We used ReCap to
count partnerships in which the startup sourced-in knowledge from other firms (i.e., was
the client of the transaction). The knowledge flow represented by the variable Sourcing
Partnerships is in the opposite direction compared to Commercialization Partnerships as
it is through them that a startup acquires and assembles new (mostly early stage)
technologies and knowledge.
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Acquisition is an indicator variable that is 1 if the startup acquired a company in a
given year and 0 otherwise. The information is taken from Recap. Moreover, we added
an indicator if the startup received an Equity investment (value 1 and 0 if no equity
investment) by another firm in a given year, which may affect the startup’s market value
(Lerner, Shane, & Tsai, 2003). Given that startups themselves are frequently acquired
(usually by larger incumbent firms) and this may affect startup market value in advance,
we added an indicator Year before Acquisition to the analysis, which takes 1 in the year
prior to the acquisition (when no more market values are available for the startup at year
end). The value is 0 in all other years. Following previous research, we also included firm
Age in our analysis, which has been used a proxy for a firm’s liability of newness
(Freeman et al., 1983; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; Stuart et al., 1999).
Finally, we captured other activities related to the new product development of
the startup directly, using Pharmaprojects. Similar to Late Stage Project, we also counted
the number of Early Stage Projects in a given year by a startup (in preclinical and Phase
I). While not a proxy for maturity, Early Stage Projects represent the future of the
development pipeline of the firm, which may affect market value. Given that market
performance may be sensitive to the ultimate failure in product innovation by the startups
themselves, we also added indicator variables for the startups’ own Development Failure
in Phase III (1 if the firm had a failure in a given year, 0 if not). To capture very early
stage R&D activities, we counted the number of Patent Applications of the startup in a
given year using data from the Derwent Innovation Index.
Finally, in a similar vein to the Failure Incumbent variable, we counted the
number of successful drugs by incumbent firms (Success Incumbents) in the therapeutic
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areas in which the startup is active. We considered the final approval of a drug as an
event of success and hence counted the number of drugs approved by the Top 50
incumbent firms. Appendix 6 shows a simplified example of how the Success Incumbents
variable is generated. Again, Success Incumbents varies over time and for each startup, as
it is dependent on the therapeutic areas in which the startup is active.
Empirical specification
The dependent variable (log Market Value) is a continuous and normally
distributed variable, making an OLS regression approach appropriate. We had an
unbalanced panel during the years 1991 and 2008. To control for unobserved firm-level
and year-level heterogeneity, we included firm and year fixed effects (estimations are
done using STATA xtreg procedure with FE option). This means that the variation
explained will be within each firm. We clustered the standard error on the level of the
startups for robust estimates. All variables used in interactions are mean centered. As the
dependent variable is captured at year end, we did not lag our independent variables (see
robustness tests).
RESULTS
Table 8 shows the summary statistics and correlation table. Examining the
correlations, we did not find evidence that multicollinearity might be a cause of concern.
The mean VIF for the final models is below 2.44 and individual VIFs for independent
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and moderation variables are below 4,54 all well below the recommended cutoff levels
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003)55.

54

Age as control has the highest VIF with 6.8 – taken age out of the model does not change the results.
We further examined multicollinearity through the collin command in STATA. Neither tolerance nor
conditioning index raised any concerns.
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Table 8: Chapter 3 - Summary Statistics & Correlation Table
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1 Market Value (log)

1.00

2 Total Assets (MM)

0.59

1.00

3 Financial Slack

0.02

-0.04

4 Year before Acq. (0,1)

0.12

0.16

-0.02 1.00

5 Development Failure (0,1)

0.00

0.02

-0.02 0.00

1.00

6 Approved Drug (0,1)

0.19

0.12

-0.03 -0.01

0.01

1.00

7 Startup Age

0.13

0.22

-0.16 -0.02

0.04

0.05

1.00

8 Patent Applications (log)

0.26

0.16

-0.02 0.01

0.06

0.05

0.00 1.00

9 Late Stage Projects

0.28

0.18

-0.06 0.05

0.10

0.07

0.24 0.23 1.00

10 Early Stage Projects

0.23

0.19

-0.07 0.08

0.08

0.04

0.00 0.22 0.28

11 Equity Investment (0,1)

0.04

-0.03

-0.05 0.05

0.00 -0.01 -0.13 0.02 -0.01

0.07 1.00

-0.03

0.04

-0.07 0.02

0.02

0.03 0.08 1.00

13 Sourcing Partnerships

0.27

0.33

-0.05 0.10 -0.01

0.01 -0.03 0.10 0.07

0.28 0.07 0.04 1.00

14 Commercializ. Partnership

0.21

0.13

-0.10 0.09

0.00

0.05 -0.06 0.09 0.14

0.27 0.36 0.09 0.26 1.00

15 Failure (Incumbents)

0.18

0.09

-0.04 0.12

0.09

0.06

0.07 0.12 0.26

0.41 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.16

1.00

16 Approved (Incumbents)

0.11

0.05

-0.06 0.06

0.06

0.05 -0.06 0.16 0.23

0.46 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.19

0.51

17 Innovation Radicalness

-0.15

-0.18

12 Acquisition (0,1)

16

17

1.00

0.02

0.08 0.01 0.06

1.00

1.00

0.13 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.19 -0.07 -0.18

0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.06

0.00 1.00

mean

5.19 156.50

8.87 0.16

0.03

0.04

8.21

2.1 1.61

4.60 0.17 0.08 0.74 0.96

4.86

5.83 1.14

sd

1.47 360.34

10.62 0.48

0.17

0.18

5.11 1.90 1.57

3.76 0.38 0.26 1.23 1.45

4.33

4.77 0.36

1.00 0.00 0.00

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

0.00

0.00 0.13

min

-0.14

0.94

0.13 0.00

0.00

0.00

max

10.75 7018.5 140.29 5.00

1.00

1.00 22.00 7.44 7.00 17.00 1.00 1.00 8.00 9.00 19.00 20.00 1.95

n=1559
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Table 9: Chapter 3 - Results – OLS - DV Market Value (Log)
(M1)

(M2)

(M3)

(M4)

Firm and Year Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Total Assets (MM)

0.900***
(0.133)
0.007
(0.006)
0.064
(0.056)
-0.290+
(0.155)
0.383***
(0.109)
-0.024
(0.021)
0.079
(0.077)
0.094*
(0.037)
-0.002
(0.011)
0.102
(0.072)
-0.445***
(0.105)
0.038
(0.024)
0.065**
(0.024)
0.006
(0.010)
0.006
(0.009)

0.857***
(0.136)
0.006
(0.006)
0.066
(0.057)
-0.297+
(0.154)
0.370***
(0.109)
-0.039+
(0.020)
0.065
(0.066)
0.094*
(0.038)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.109
(0.071)
-0.446***
(0.105)
0.039
(0.024)
0.065**
(0.023)
0.006
(0.010)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.533*
(0.238)

0.887***
(0.138)
0.006
(0.006)
0.061
(0.057)
-0.265+
(0.155)
0.390***
(0.108)
-0.042*
(0.020)
0.069
(0.071)
0.095*
(0.037)
-0.004
(0.011)
0.094
(0.072)
-0.450***
(0.105)
0.037
(0.024)
0.072**
(0.022)
0.006
(0.010)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.675**
(0.250)
0.201**
(0.061)

0.867***
(0.135)
0.006
(0.006)
0.070
(0.056)
-0.287+
(0.150)
0.392***
(0.107)
-0.044*
(0.021)
0.070
(0.071)
0.099*
(0.038)
-0.002
(0.011)
0.103
(0.071)
-0.436***
(0.104)
0.037
(0.023)
0.064**
(0.023)
0.008
(0.010)
0.005
(0.009)
-0.715**
(0.243)

Financial Slack
Year before Acquisition (0,1)
Development Failure (0,1)
Approved Drug (0,1)
Startup Age
Patent Applications
Late Stage Projects
Early Stage Projects
Equity Investment (0,1)
Acquisition (0,1)
Sourcing Partnerships
Commercialization
Partnerships
Failure (Incumbents)
Approved (Incumbents)
Innovation Radicalness
Innovation Radicalness X
Commerc. Partnerships
Innov. Radicalness X
Failure (Incumbent)
Innov. Radicalness X
Late Stage Projects
Innov. Radicalness X
Approved Drug
Constant

0.048**
(0.017)

Log Likelihood

4.279***
(0.282)
-1851.75

4.499***
(0.271)
-1844.00

4.542***
(0.269)
-1837.55

4.574***
(0.274)
-1839.72

Observations

1559

1559

1559

1559

Number of Firms

144

144

144

144

0.33

0.35

0.36

0.36

2

R

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 9 (continued): Chapter 3 - Results – OLS - DV Market Value (Log)
(M5)

(M6)

(M7)

Firm and Year Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Total Assets (MM)

0.873***
(0.139)
0.006
(0.006)
0.071
(0.057)
-0.276+
(0.149)
0.368***
(0.105)
-0.043*
(0.020)
0.070
(0.071)
0.107**
(0.039)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.098
(0.070)
-0.434***
(0.103)
0.035
(0.024)
0.066**
(0.023)
0.006
(0.010)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.765**
(0.262)

0.864***
(0.137)
0.006
(0.006)
0.060
(0.057)
-0.296+
(0.154)
0.536***
(0.154)
-0.040+
(0.020)
0.069
(0.067)
0.092*
(0.037)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.110
(0.070)
-0.447***
(0.104)
0.039
(0.024)
0.066**
(0.023)
0.006
(0.010)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.546*
(0.237)

0.899***
(0.139)
0.006
(0.006)
0.059
(0.056)
-0.259+
(0.152)
0.562***
(0.150)
-0.047*
(0.020)
0.067
(0.067)
0.098**
(0.037)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.090
(0.072)
-0.442***
(0.103)
0.037
(0.024)
0.071**
(0.022)
0.007
(0.010)
0.005
(0.009)
-0.869***
(0.253)
0.184**
(0.060)
0.042**
(0.016)

Log Likelihood

4.567***
(0.274)
-1839.20

0.781+
(0.412)
4.514***
(0.271)
-1841.38

0.780+
(0.410)
4.619***
(0.274)
-1831.84

Observations

1559

1559

1559

Number of Firms

144

144

144

0.35

0.36

0.37

Financial Slack
Year before Acquisition (0,1)
Development Failure (0,1)
Approved Drug (0,1)
Startup Age
Patent Applications
Late Stage Projects
Early Stage Projects
Equity Investment (0,1)
Acquisition (0,1)
Sourcing Partnerships
Commercialization
Partnerships
Failure (Incumbents)
Approved (Incumbents)
Innovation Radicalness
Innovation Radicalness X
Commerc. Partnerships
Innov. Radicalness X
Failure (Incumbent)
Innov. Radicalness X
Late Stage Projects
Innov. Radicalness X
Approved Drug
Constant

2

R

0.131
(0.080)

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 9 shows the regression results. Model 1 only includes the control variables.
Consistent with prior literature, we find a positive direct effect from Commercialization
Partnerships, which have been identified as an important driver for startup performance.
Clearly, market value is also a function of firm size (Total Assets). The number of Late
Stage Projects also drives market value but we see no effect from the number of Early
Stage Projects. While market value is positively affected by the Approval of a drug by
the startup, we also observed that Acquisitions by the startup tend to lower market value.
This is consistent with the ideas that acquirers quite often pay a premium for acquisitions
and that small firms undertake acquisitions when they have performed poorly and need to
team up with another firm (Anand & Delios, 2002). Age has a negative (albeit not
significant) effect, which is very different from prior studies (Stuart et al., 1999).
However, we note that the negative age effect is fully driven by the year 2008 (the year of
the financial crisis – see robustness tests). Finally, Failures in drug development by the
startup at least marginally show a negative effect on market value.
In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that Innovation Radicalness has a negative effect
on Market Value. This prediction is supported as demonstrated in Model 2. The more
radical the startup’s product innovations, the lower the startup’s market value. This
confirms that pursuing radical innovations is associated with market value penalties. In
the next models, we examine the moderation effects with Innovation Radicalness. In
Hypothesis 2 we predicted that the negative effect of Innovation Radicalness would be
reversed if firm engage in Commercialization Partnerships. We test the effect, entering
the interaction in Model 3. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find a positive interaction
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effect, indicating that the penalty of pursuing highly disruptive technological solutions is
reversed once firms are pursuing partnerships to develop and commercialize their radical
innovations. We demonstrate the effect of this interaction graphically in Figure 12, which
shows that the effect of innovation radicalness for startups forming partnerships is far less
steep. Only at very high values for Commercialization Partnerships, however, is the
market value penalty actually reversed.
Figure 12: Chapter 3 - Moderation Radical Innovation and Commercialization Partnerships

In Model 4, we add the interaction Innovation Radicalness and Failure
(Incumbents) to test Hypothesis 3. In line with our expectations, we find a positive
moderation, indicating that startups pursuing more radical innovations benefit the more
incumbent firms have failed in own product development attempts. The interaction is
plotted graphically in Figure 13. It indicates that startups with low radicalness in
innovation have an advantage at low failure rates of established firms whereas startups
with high innovation radicalness receive higher valuations (or are not penalized) when
incumbent firms have experienced more failures, supporting Hypothesis 3.
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Figure 13: Chapter 3 - Moderation Radical Innovation and Failure Established Firms

Finally, we examine Hypothesis 4, which predicted that the penalty of pursuing
radical innovations may be reversed once startups are able to move their product
innovations close to commercialization (Innovation Maturity). We test the Late Stage
Projects (Model 5) as well as the Approved Drugs (Model 6) as potential moderator. We
observe marginal support for our prediction as the Approved Drugs interaction is only
marginally significant - so we cannot reject the Null-Hypothesis that Innovation Maturity
has no effect on the relationship between Radical Innovation and startup Market Value.
Hypothesis 4, hence, does not receive support. Model 7 shows the full model with all
interactions and demonstrates that results remain robust in the full model for Hypothesis
1, 2 and 3, while the non-effect (or only marginal effect) for Hypothesis 4 remains.
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Table 10: Chapter 3 - Robustness Tests – OLS - DV Market Value (Log)
(R1) Q1
Firm & year Fixed Effects
Approved Drug (0,1)
Sourcing Partnerships
Commercialization Partnerships
Failure (Incumbents)
Approved (Incumbents)
Innovation Radicalness
Innovation Radicalness X
Commercialization Partnerships
Innov. Radicalness X
Failure (Incumbent)
Innov. Radicalness X
Approved Drug
Innov. Radicalness X Sourcing Partner.

(R2) MV/AT

Y
0.440**
(0.156)
0.023
(0.024)
0.072**
(0.023)
0.005
(0.009)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.977***
(0.256)
0.178**
(0.061)
0.044**
(0.016)
0.720+
(0.426)

Y
1.194***
(0.344)
-0.031
(0.053)
0.051
(0.049)
0.024
(0.020)
0.021
(0.021)
-1.427**
(0.458)
0.328*
(0.127)
0.132**
(0.040)
1.450
(0.933)

(R3)

(R4)

Y
0.390***
(0.108)
0.037
(0.024)
0.072**
(0.022)
0.006
(0.010)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.677**
(0.243)
0.201**
(0.062)

Y
0.398***
(0.108)

0.004
(0.010)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.598*
(0.246)

0.004
(0.071)

Commercialization Partner (Top 50)

0.097***
(0.029)
0.233*
(0.093)
0.035
(0.094)
0.132
(0.270)

Innovation Radicalness X
Commercialization Partner (Top 50)
Sourcing Partner (Top 50)
Innov. Radicalness X
Sourcing Partner (Top 50)
Commercialization Partner (0,1)
Failure PII/III (Inc.)
Innovation Radicalness X
Commercialization Partner (0,1)
Innov. Radicalness X Failure PII/III
(Inc.)
Innov. Radicalness X Approved (Inc.)
Innov. Radicalness X
Development Failure
Log Likelihood
Observations (144 firms)
R2

-1777.93
1559

-3144.90
1559

-1837.55
1559

-1846.18
1559

0.38

0.21

0.36

0.35

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 , not shown but included in the models: Total Assets (MM), Financial Slack,
Year before Acquisition, Development Failure, Startup Age, Patent Applications, Early Stage Projects, Equity
Investment, Acquisition and the constant
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Table 10 (continued): Chapter 3 - Robustness Tests – OLS - DV Market Value (Log)

Firm & year Fixed Effects
Approved Drug (0,1)
Sourcing Partnerships

(R5)

(R6)

(R7)

Y
0.407***
(0.105)
0.033
(0.024)

Y
0.389***
(0.107)
0.036
(0.023)
0.064**
(0.023)
0.008
(0.010)
0.005
(0.009)
-0.655**
(0.249)

Y
0.535***
(0.153)
0.039
(0.024)
0.065**
(0.023)
0.006
(0.010)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.539*
(0.237)

Commercialization Partnerships
Failure (Incumbents)
Approved (Incumbents)
Innovation Radicalness

0.003
(0.009)
-0.915**
(0.273)

Innovation Radicalness X
Commercialization Partnerships
Innov. Radicalness X
Failure (Incumbent)
Innov. Radicalness X
Approved Drug
Innov. Radicalness X Sourcing Partner.

0.057***
(0.016)
0.710+
(0.403)

Commercialization Partner (Top 50)
Innovation Radicalness X
Commercialization Partner (Top 50)
Sourcing Partner (Top 50)
Innov. Radicalness X
Sourcing Partner (Top 50)
Commercialization Partner (0,1)
Failure PII/III (Inc.)
Innovation Radicalness X
Commercialization Partner (0,1)
Innov. Radicalness X Failure PII/III
(Inc.)
Innov. Radicalness X Approved (Inc.)
Innov. Radicalness X
Development Failure
Log Likelihood
Observations (144 firms)
R2

0.200***
(0.055)
0.004
(0.006)
0.426**
(0.135)
0.022*
(0.010)
-0.020
(0.022)

-1799.34
1539

-1839.15
1559

-0.247
(0.456)
-1841.18
1559

0.36

0.36

0.35

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 , not shown but included in the models: Total Assets (MM), Financial Slack,
Year before Acquisition, Development Failure, Startup Age, Patent Applications, Early Stage Projects, Equity
Investment, Acquisition and the constant
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Robustness Test
We conducted several additional checks to establish the robustness of the findings
(Table 10 and Table 11). First, we used different operationalizations of the dependent
variable. Model R1 used the market value a quarter following a focal year to establish a
clear lag structure. Model R2 used a weighted dependent variable, in which market value
is divided by total assets. Both models confirmed the results reported in our main results.
Next, we examined the alternative explanation for Hypothesis 2, i.e., partnering
per se that may allow startups with high Innovation Radicalness to generate more value.
While model R3 shows the positive interaction with Commercialization Partnerships, we
did not find similar effects for Insourcing Partnerships. It suggests that is indeed the
usage and validation of the startup’s technology and knowledge by other firms that is
responsible for the effect. Given that we included all commercialization partnerships, we
next limited the partnerships to the Top 50 incumbent firms. The results in model R4
confirm the pattern that Commercialization Partnerships positively moderate the
Innovation Radicalness and Market Value relationship (albeit with lower levels of
significance). Using the non-Top 50 firms Commercialization partnerships (results
available from the authors) does not lead to a different finding, suggesting that
Commercialization Partnerships with the Top 50 established firms as well as other firms
providing the resources to commercialize the technologies have the positive moderation
effect.
In model R5, we tested the alternative explanation that the effect from established
firms drug development may only be driven by rare events in the drug development in the
industry (Lampel et al., 2009). We hence compared the effect of drug development
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Failure by incumbents with success (Approved (Incumbents)). The results demonstrate
that the positive moderation is attributed to Failure of incumbents. Interestingly the
Approved Drugs (Incumbents) measure is negative but not significant, which suggests
that failure and success by established players may very differently affect startup’s
market values when pursuing radical innovations.
In Model R6, we tested another alternative explanation and compared Approved
Drugs and Development Failure by the startups as potential moderators. We find that
Approved Drugs are marginally significant but the Failure Drug interaction is negative
and not significant.
In model R7, we operationalized key independent variables differently. Namely,
Incumbent Failure was proxied by using both Phase III and Phase II failures by the Top
50 incumbent firms. Results remained robust but were slightly weaker with respect to
significance. It is hence clear, that the moderation effect is predominantly driven by
substantial failure (Phase III) and rare events in the industry (Lampel et al., 2009). Once
we consider only earlier stage discontinuation as failure (e.g. Phase I failure), we indeed
do not find the moderation effect to hold (results available from the authors). In model R7
we operationalized Commercialization Partnerships as an indicator rather than a count
variable leading to strong support for our results.
In alternative robustness tests (Table 11), we examined shorter time windows by
looking at a maximum of 10 observations per startup after their IPO (Model R8), again
supporting our main results. We also ran all models excluding the year 2008 (the year of
the financial crisis and stock market crash), confirming the main results reported (Model
R9). The negative effect of age disappears without the 2008 observations.
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Table 11: Chapter 3 - Robustness Tests 2 – OLS - DV Market Value (Log)
(R8)

(R9)

(R10)

Firm Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Year Effects

Y

Y

Y

Total Assets

0.888***
(0.164)
0.006
(0.006)
0.059
(0.055)
-0.268+
(0.153)
0.539***
(0.140)
0.004
(0.020)
0.049
(0.045)
0.095*
(0.037)
-0.007
(0.011)
0.087
(0.068)
-0.427***
(0.105)
0.043+
(0.023)
0.075**
(0.024)
0.001
(0.009)
0.012
(0.008)
-0.901***
(0.258)
0.184**
(0.063)
0.046**
(0.016)
0.640+
(0.358)
4.573***
(0.275)
-1661.86

19.105***
(1.680)
-0.005
(0.003)

Log Likelihood

0.754*
(0.356)
0.007
(0.006)
0.079
(0.061)
-0.289+
(0.153)
0.297**
(0.109)
-0.044
(0.040)
0.047
(0.045)
0.107*
(0.046)
-0.012
(0.015)
0.105
(0.066)
-0.474***
(0.117)
0.051*
(0.023)
0.062*
(0.025)
0.006
(0.010)
0.016+
(0.009)
-0.919**
(0.290)
0.181*
(0.073)
0.052*
(0.021)
0.286
(0.348)
4.664***
(0.263)
-1374.36

Observations

1254

1486

144

R2

0.36

0.36

0.73

Financial Slack
Year before Acquisition
Development Failure
Approved Drug
Startup Age
Patent Applications
Late Stage Projects
Early Stage Projects
Equity Investment (0,1)
Acquisition (0,1)
Sourcing Partnerships
Commercialization
Partnerships
Failure (Incumbents)
Approved (Incumbents)
Innovation Radicalness
Innovation Radicalness X
Comm. Partnerships
Innov. Radicalness X
Failure (Incumbent)
Innov. Radicalness X
Approved Drug
Constant

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

103

0.060**
(0.020)
0.006
(0.029)
0.099
(0.060)
-0.001
(0.022)
0.201
(0.143)
0.954***
(0.173)
0.069+
(0.039)
0.050
(0.032)
-0.074**
(0.026)
0.012
(0.019)
-0.415*
(0.208)
0.052
(0.080)
0.153**
(0.046)
2.936***
(0.307)
-115.54

Table 11 (continued): Chapter 3 - Robustness Tests 2 – OLS - DV Market Value (Log)

Firm Fixed Effects

(R11)
Origin of
Material
Y

(R12)
Origin of
Material
Y

(R13)
Mechanism
of Action
Y

(R14)
Mechanism
of Action
Y

Year Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Total Assets

0.878***
(0.130)
0.006
(0.006)
0.063
(0.056)
-0.310*
(0.152)
0.378***
(0.108)
-0.039+
(0.021)
0.050
(0.047)
0.104**
(0.039)
-0.004
(0.011)
0.112
(0.071)
-0.450***
(0.103)
0.035
(0.024)
0.063**
(0.023)
0.003
(0.009)
0.007
(0.008)
-0.923*
(0.365)

0.881***
(0.136)
0.007
(0.006)
0.067
(0.056)
-0.288+
(0.155)
0.378***
(0.109)
-0.027
(0.020)
0.051
(0.051)
0.093*
(0.037)
-0.001
(0.011)
0.104
(0.072)
-0.445***
(0.105)
0.039
(0.024)
0.066**
(0.024)
0.004
(0.009)
0.005
(0.008)
-0.387
(0.313)

Log Likelihood

4.838***
(0.335)
-1841.30

0.894***
(0.133)
0.006
(0.006)
0.063
(0.055)
-0.300+
(0.152)
0.161
(0.167)
-0.045*
(0.021)
0.052
(0.056)
0.102**
(0.038)
-0.004
(0.011)
0.099
(0.074)
-0.440***
(0.101)
0.038
(0.024)
-0.002
(0.036)
-0.014
(0.013)
0.008
(0.008)
-1.340***
(0.390)
0.175*
(0.082)
0.049*
(0.023)
0.801
(0.509)
5.099***
(0.355)
-1834.59

4.554***
(0.381)
-1851.04

0.917***
(0.134)
0.007
(0.006)
0.055
(0.056)
-0.248
(0.154)
-0.433
(0.361)
-0.031
(0.020)
0.050
(0.049)
0.102**
(0.038)
-0.001
(0.011)
0.095
(0.070)
-0.452***
(0.105)
0.032
(0.024)
-0.151*
(0.076)
-0.034
(0.027)
0.003
(0.008)
-0.789*
(0.363)
0.286**
(0.100)
0.053+
(0.031)
1.237*
(0.575)
4.993***
(0.406)
-1842.94

Observations

1559

1559

1559

1559

R2

0.35

0.36

0.35

0.36

Financial Slack
Year before Acquisition
Development Failure
Approved Drug
Startup Age
Patent Applications
Late Stage Projects
Early Stage Projects
Equity Investment (0,1)
Acquisition (0,1)
Sourcing Partnerships
Commercialization
Partnerships
Failure (Incumbents)
Approved (Incumbents)
Innovation Radicalness
Innovation Radicalness X
Comm. Partnerships
Innov. Radicalness X
Failure (Incumbent)
Innov. Radicalness X
Approved Drug
Constant

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Model R10 shows the results of using the first available year and market value of
the startup as dependent variables. We have 144 IPOs resulting in 144 observations of the
market value in year one of the IPO. While results differ from the panel results, we find
evidence that the interaction of Failure (Incumbents) and Radical Innovation holds in the
first year. However, we do not find the interaction with Commercialization Partnerships
and Radical Innovation to be statistically significant. One reason could be that at IPO,
firms are just starting their development and Commercialization Partnerships start at a
later stage. We also note that using only 144 observations Radical Innovation while
negative just fails to be marginally significant (p<0.13), when only testing its direct
effect.
Finally, while we consider it beneficial to consider mechanism of action and
origin of material together in defining radicalness, we also tested defining radicalness by
either the mechanism of action or the origin of material separately. 56 The results are
shown in model R11 through R14. Mode R11 and R13 show that both operationalization
of radicalness have a negative effect on market value but only the origin of material is
significant. However, when examining the moderations (R12 and R13), we observe that
both operationalization show quite similar effects.
In unreported results, we also operationalized Innovation Radicalness using a 4
year history of drugs in development by the incumbent firms and not only the current
year. Defining Innovation Radicalness this way does not change the results but rules out
that we consider a technology as radical, which was discarded by incumbents years ago.

56

The two alternative variables are correlated at 0.44.
105

DISCUSSION
Pursuing radical innovation, i.e., innovation which substantially differs from that
of established industry players, has been suggested to lead to the “attacker’s” advantage,
which has been demonstrated in many settings (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995;
Foster, 1986). However, pursuing radical innovations may also lead to severe challenges
stemming from both legitimacy and resources constraints, in particular, when incumbents
retain critical downstream complementary assets. The performance outcomes for startups
pursuing radical innovations in such settings are the focus of this paper.
Startups operating in such an environment face a dilemma. On the one hand,
startups have the ability to push technological change forward and pursue technological
innovations, with elements of knowledge untested by established industry players. On the
other hand, pursuing such radical innovations may adversely affect their ability to be
visible and to attract resources from established firms. Indeed, we find a severe
performance penalty in the form of lower market valuations for startups pursuing radical
product innovations in the bio-pharmaceutical industry, an industry where established
firms retain control of critical downstream complementary assets (Rothaermel, 2001).
The study hence expands our understanding of the strategic balances of how being
different or the same compared to other industry players may affect firm performance
(Deephouse, 1999).
In a second step, our study more fully takes into account the unique dependencies
between startup and established firms (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) to identify the
conditions under which pursuing radical innovations may allow startup firms to benefit.
Motivated by previous research, we take into account partnering as a fundamentally
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important commercialization strategy for startup firms (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009). While
prior studies have outlined the importance of partnering for startup firms per se (e.g.
Baum et al., 2000a), we demonstrate that benefits from such partnerships are particularly
accrued by firms pursuing radical product innovations, as they disproportionally benefit
from the legitimacy and resources accessed through such partnerships. Interestingly, the
results found in a US setting are opposite to findings in emerging markets, in which a
product innovation strategy had weaker performance when combined with strategic
partnering in product development (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001). We hence extend our
overall understanding on startups cooperative commercialization strategies (Aggarwal &
Hsu, 2009) and their role when developing and commercializing radical innovations.
To our knowledge, our study is also the first to consider failure by incumbent
firms as an important environmental factor influencing the relationship between radical
product innovations and startup performance. While scholars previously considered
failure by other players in the industry as a source of vicarious learning (Argote & MironSpektor, 2011; Madsen & Desai, 2010), we demonstrate that benefits from failure may be
accrued by those startups that pursue more radical solutions. We hence extend prior
research that has outlined the fundamental role of failure by other firms in organizational
learning (Kim et al., 2009; Kim & Miner, 2007), but has not explicitly taken into account
how established firm failure affects startup firms. The mechanism outlined in this paper
builds upon organizational learning, as we posit that failure by established firms
challenges the industry conventions as to what technological solutions are considered
feasible and alters which solutions are ultimately considered to be legitimate or
illegitimate.
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Finally, the paper reveals the importance of using a dynamic lens on radical
innovation, which changes over time as both startups and established firms modify their
product development portfolio. We hence extend the literature on what constitutes radical
innovation (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005) and provide an alternative way through which it
can be measured in the bio-pharmaceutical space.
The study has a number of limitations, which should provide ample opportunities
for future research. First, it was conducted in the context of a single industry and single
country and the generalizability of our findings and their boundary conditions would need
to be validated through explorations in other empirical contexts. In both Europe and Asia,
biotechnology firms proliferated in the 1990s as well, and including them in the analysis
may reveal further insights into the relationship between radical innovations and startup
market performance. We opted to include only startups from one jurisdiction to ensure
that our results are not sensitive to the regulatory, accounting and reporting rules, which
may be idiosyncratic to domestic stock markets. The study could also be replicated in
other industry settings in which established firms maintain complementary assets. In the
telecommunication industry, for example, wireless telephony was certainly a source of
radical innovation but the established firms have survived retaining ownership of key
complementary assets (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). Another extension of the study would
be to examine distinct radical innovations which also have the potential to be disruptive,
i.e., requiring a change in the incumbent’s business model (Burgelman, 1985;
Christensen, 2006; Christensen & Raynor, 2003). For example, while chemical-based
solutions and many biologic-based solutions (e.g., Monoclonal Antibodies) in the biopharmaceutical space sustain the existing business model of incumbent firms
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(Rothaermel, 2001) (i.e., prescribed as a long term treatment often administered at home
resulting in yearly treatment costs for patients and insurers), newer technologies like gene
therapy are considered more disruptive (one-off treatment administered by the physicians
(e.g. Wilson, 2012)). Hence, the traditional revenue model based on regular prescriptions
is not applicable. Given that we do not capture disruptiveness in our study, it would be
interesting to further examine the performance implications for startups that engage in the
pursuit of such disruptive technologies.
Second, we are unable to draw inferences regarding final commercialization
outcomes such as product sales or firms’ market share in our analysis as product
approvals are rare in the bio-pharmaceutical industry and many of the firms never reach
final product sales on the market. Hence, we observed radicalness based on intermediate
stages by comparing product development initiatives of startups and incumbent firms. At
the same time, using product in development captures startup activity at a more advanced
stage of the startups development as it can take up to ten years until research is translated
into a commercialized product. In a similar vein, we so far have not considered if
capturing radicalness at the product development stage differs from patent-based
measures, which are common when examining innovations by startups (e.g. Sørensen &
Stuart, 2000). Examining analysts’ reports, however, suggests that the market valuation
of listed startup firms predominantly depends on the products in development (the
pipeline) and not on the volume of patents generated by the startups. For example,
radicalness in patenting per se may not drive market value as the time to develop and
commercialize an invention is very long in the industry. This is reflected by the fact that
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only late stage products in development (and not early stage products or patents) have an
actual effect on the market value of the startups in the panel model.
Finally, while we identify the positive moderation from incumbent failure for
startups pursuing radical innovations, we do not directly observe the theorized
mechanism. While some studies show that established firm failure may open such firms
up to novel types of technological solutions (chapter 2), scholars using qualitative
methods could build on our findings to shed light on how startups pursuing radical
innovations indeed benefit from incumbent firm failure and the role of legitimacy and
resource availability driving this effect.
CONCLUSION
The study explores how pursuing radical innovations shapes market values and
hence performance expectations for young startup firms. It departs from the typical
emphasis on the advantages of startups “attacking” established firms and considers a
setting in which established firms maintain control of critical downstream complementary
assets. By examining product innovation of the startup relative to established firms, we
show that pursuing radical innovations may have adverse performance implications in the
form

of market

valuations.

We also

demonstrate the contingent

roles

of

commercialization partnerships and failures of established firms in shaping the
relationship of radical product innovation and market value. The findings argue for
considering closely the dependencies of startups and established firms to understand
when startups pursuing radical innovation can create value.
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CHAPTER 4: NO STRINGS ATTACHED:
EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOOSELY COUPLED RESEARCH
PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE
(A research repaper based on this chapter is developed mutually with Felipe Monteiro and Denise Dunlap.)

Faced with a rapidly changing technological environment, firms are increasingly
required to combine knowledge from a range of disciplines which no single firm is likely
to possess (Steensma & Corley, 2000). As a result, inter-firm research partnerships (i.e.,
partnerships to discover new innovative solutions) have grown substantially in both
number and importance in the last decade (Hagedoorn, 2002; Kale & Singh, 2009;
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). The intent behind these exploration types of partnerships
(Koza & Lewin, 1998) is to accelerate the yield from research assets by reducing
innovation cycle times and gaining access to valuable new elements of knowledge
(Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & Reichstein, 2012; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003).
While research partnerships in general have been increasing, in this paper, we
focus on those partnerships in which there is a low level of mutual commitment and
interdependence between partners, as exemplified by research contracts or licensing
agreements These types of research partnerships, which we call loosely coupled (Orton
& Weick, 1990; Steensma & Corley, 2000; Thompson, 1967), often involve one firm
paying to have access to specific knowledge from another firm and to reuse such
knowledge created by the research partner (Murray & O’Mahony, 2007). Despite their
importance and prevalence, loosely coupled partnerships are in sharp contrast with tightly
coupled partnerships (Steensma & Corley, 2000), which rely on the reciprocal exchange
of knowledge (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), high levels of commitment among the
111

partners and the generation of partnership-specific assets (e.g., joint product development
agreements or equity joint ventures) (Sampson, 2007).
Previous studies have consistently shown the benefits of tightly coupled
partnerships based on the fact that innovation more often than not requires the reciprocal
exchange and recombination of knowledge from the cooperating parts (Dyer & Singh,
1998; Mowery et al., 1996). In a related vein, it has also been suggested that simply
“handing off” research from one partner to another may not be enough to allow the insourcing firm to innovate (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).57 Given that loosely
coupled research partnerships (e.g., licensing deals and research contracts) typically lack
those strong reciprocal interdependencies and do not rely on mutual knowledge
exchange, it should not be entirely surprising that existing empirical evidence indicates a
weak relationship between loosely coupled research partnerships and a firm’s ability to
develop innovations new to their industry (Fey & Birkinshaw, 2005; Keil et al., 2008;
Luo, 2008; Mowery et al., 1996).
It is striking, then, that loosely coupled partnerships are increasingly prevalent in
many industries, as exemplified by the widespread use and rapid growth of research
contracts and licensing deals at very early stages of the innovation cycle in the
pharmaceutical industry (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007).
Intrigued by the mismatch between previous findings pointing to the limited potential of
loosely coupled partnerships to generate innovations on the one hand, and their
prevalence in many industries on the other, we examine in this paper whether, why and
57

This argument is also consistent with the findings in the network literature which show that despite the
importance of weak ties for the identification of new ideas (Granovetter, 1985), strong ties are essential to
the transformation of those ideas into actual innovations (Hansen, 1999)
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when loosely coupled research partnerships may increase a firm’s innovative
performance.58
It is important to note that our main goal is not to challenge the findings of
previous studies that showed the benefits of tightly coupled partnerships. Instead, the
crux of our paper is to focus exclusively on loosely coupled partnerships and reveal the
conditions under which they are more likely to spur the in-sourcing firm’s innovation
performance. Researchers have already suggested that the benefits of loosely coupled
partnerships may stem from the in-sourcing firm’s ability to add knowledge variety
while, at the same time, allowing it to remain flexible in a rapidly changing technological
environment (Danneels, 2003; Leone & Reichstein, 2012; Steensma & Corley, 2000).
Yet innovation often requires firms to not only access a variety of diverse knowledge
provided by external partners but also to experiment and recombine knowledge in novel
ways (Levitt & March, 1988), and the length of innovation cycle requires the continued
allocation of organizational resources, be they financial or managerial, towards research
projects (Adner & Levinthal, 2008; Cyert & March, 1963).
Therefore, while loosely coupled partnerships add variety to the in-sourcing
firm’s knowledge base and this, per se, is important to innovation, their lack of a
reciprocal knowledge exchange may not induce the experimentation necessary to allow
that firm to fully benefit from the in-sourced knowledge. Moreover, while loosely
coupled partnerships are a flexible mode of in-sourcing external knowledge, resources
gained from them are also withdrawn more easily; therefore, ultimately, they may lack
58

As we will detail in the methods section below, our operationalization of innovative performance is the
introduction of solutions which are new to the market. This measure is in line with Teece’s (1986) view
that the innovator should be the firm that is first to introduce a solution to the market.
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the continued resources necessary to positively affect the in-sourcing firm’s innovative
performance (Luo, 2008; Steensma & Corley, 2000). It is hence the purpose of this paper
to go beyond the mere direct effect of loosely coupled partnerships on innovation
performance by examining the conditions under which such partnerships are more likely
to be fully leveraged to benefit the in-sourcing firm.
We argue that the innovation benefits accruing from research partnerships depend
on both the external knowledge being in-sourced and the in-sourcing firm’s internal
context. More precisely, we suggest that, as a baseline model, loosely coupled
partnerships are beneficial to a firm’s innovative peformance. We argue, however, that
those innovation benefits are more likely to transpire when certain internal firm factors
are present. Namely, we hypothesize that the in-sourcing firm’s experimental orientation
(i.e., a firm’s propensity to experiment internally with projects with elements of
knowledge novel to the firm) (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001) and its availability of
financial and managerial resources

(Cyert & March, 1963) positively moderate the

impact of loosely coupled partnerships on the in-sourcing firm’s innovative performance.
We test our hypothesis in the global pharmaceutical industry, using a panel
dataset covering the world’s largest (Top 50) global pharmaceutical firms between 1998
and 2007 and spanning 454 firm-year observations. In the pharmaceutical industry, the
discovery of new solutions is pivotal for firm success (Roberts, 1999) and both types of
research partnerships (i.e., tightly and loosely coupled) are widespread. We assess the
effect of those loosely coupled research on innovative performance by examining the
number of new products in development a focal firm is able to add to its innovation
pipeline (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011).
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As we discuss in detail below, our results suggest only a weak direct effect of
loosely coupled partnerships on a firm’s innovative peformance. More interestingly,
though, we also show if the in-sourcing has an experimental orientation, it can work as a
catalyst for using and experimenting with external knowledge accessed through the
loosely coupled partnerships. In a similar vein, we show the importance of having the
managerial and financial resources to fully benefit from loosely coupled partnerships.
Our results account for unobserved heterogeneity across firms and over time, and are
robust to a number of alternative econometric specifications and operationalization of key
variables.
Taken together, our results indicate that while the mere existence of loosely
coupled partnerships may not be enough for a firm to become more innovative, under
certain conditions, those same loosely coupled partnerships are able to lead to the
innovation outcomes (in our case, new product candidates representing solutions new to
the in-sourcing firm’s industry) typically only attributed, in previous studies, to tightly
coupled partnerships (Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). The paper hence
contributes to the growing literature on the role of loosely coupled partnerships and
emphasizes their role in innovation attempts that goes beyond the exploitation of existing
knowledge. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical background and
hypotheses are presented in the next section. A section on our methods follows. We
subsequently present regression results, various robustness checks and post-hoc analyses.
Contributions and implications are discussed in the concluding section.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Accessing knowledge through research partnerships
Firms can access external knowledge through research partnerships in various
ways. A common distinction that we adopt in this paper is based on the level of
interorganizational dependence and the level of joint commitment among research
partners (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Koza & Lewin, 1998). Tightly coupled partnerships are
characterized by strong interdependencies in which firms rely on the reciprocal exchange
of knowledge (Ahuja, 2000; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati & Singh, 1998). This is
exemplified by joint ventures, wherein partners commit resources and equity to form a
completely new organizational entity, or by research alliances in which partners share
scientific personnel, engineers and management or share resources for joint research
(Kale & Singh, 2009; Mowery et al., 1996). Conversely, loosely coupled partnerships
represent forms of accessing knowledge that predominantly rely on the sequential
interdependence among the partners (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Luo, 2008). As much as in
extreme cases, loosely coupled partnerships may be limited to an exchange of knowledge
for money as exemplified by a pure in-licensing contract, where one firm will use the
knowledge of another firm with limited further interaction (Anand & Khanna, 2000;
Murray & O’Mahony, 2007), in most cases, the loosely coupled partnership involve an
on-going relationship between research partners. Other examples include research
contracts through which firms define their research needs ex ante (Mowery et al., 1996).59
The defining characteristic of those research partnerships is the lack of mutual

59

Although firms may engage in other formal transactions to gain access to external knowledge (e.g.,
corporate venture capital investments), tightly and loosely coupled research partnerships represent the vast
majority of knowledge-access transactions (Dushnitsky & Lavie, 2010)
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collaboration and of a bi-directional exchange of knowledge. In a loosely coupled
partnership, one partner can be clearly identified as the firm receiving knowledge (i.e.,
the in-sourcing firm) from the other partner, which typically obtains some sort of
financial compensation.

Loosely coupled partnerships and innovative performance
Loosely coupled research partnerships are believed to add variety to a firm’s
knowledge repertoire, which is conducive to innovation. Yet, surprisingly little research
has empirically investigated the impact of this type of research partnership on the insourcing firm’s innovative performance.
We posit that loose coupling has desirable benefits for an in-sourcing partner to
the extent that they provide immediate access to specialized knowledge from external
partners. Engaging in loosely coupled research partnerships allows firms to effectively
divide work in research to leverage the specialization of research partners (Arora &
Gambardella, 1994a). Mowery et al. (1996), for example, confirm that loosely coupled
partnerships are an important way for firms to benefit from specialization of external
partners. Engaging in such partnerships adds variety to a firm’s repertoire of knowledge,
which is important to finding new innovative solutions (Laursen et al., 2010). They also
provide a firm with flexibility in their research projects as those partnerships are quickly
initiated and require lower set-up costs (i.e., loosely coupled partnerships tend to not
generate costly and partner-specific resources and routines) (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh,
2002). This allows firms to move quickly once new technologies emerge and to abandon
those rendered obsolete (Luo, 2008; Steensma & Corley, 2000). Consequently, many
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researchers have considered loosely coupled partnerships as valuable options in
environments characterized by high technological uncertainty and change, where, for
every successful innovation, many failures are likely to occur (Folta, 1998). Recently,
researchers have started to examine in more detail the role of loosely coupled
partnerships (e.g., by examining licensing contracts) on innovative performance and have
found that licensing-in technologies accelerate the introduction of new inventions (Leone
& Reichstein, 2012) and allow firms to subsequently search for and add more knowledge
variety (Laursen et al., 2010). Given that firms require a large pool of potential solutions
at their disposal and the flexibility to react to emerging technological trends, we suggest
that loosely coupled research partnerships should positively affect a firm’s innovative
performance. More formally, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1: Loosely coupled research partnerships increase the in-sourcing
firm’s innovative performance.
High level of experimentation, financial and organizational resources: the fertile
ground for loosely coupled partnerships to flourish
If, on one hand, loosely coupled partnerships provide a flexible way for the insourcing firm to add specialized knowledge to its repertoire, on the other, the nature of
those partnerships may make their innovation benefits contingent on the presence of
certain firm level characteristics. Namely, we argue that firms accessing external
knowledge through loosely coupled partnerships may accumulate sufficient distinct
elements of highly specialized knowledge, yet may still not experience an increase in
their innovative performance unless they are able to recombine this knowledge in novel
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ways through experimentation and support the partnerships through both financial and
managerial resources. More specifically, in the following sections, we examine how
accessing knowledge through loosely coupled partnerships interacts with the in-sourcing
firm’s ability to recombine knowledge in novel ways (its “experimental orientation”), and
how the availability of managerial resources and financial slack plays a critical role in
allowing the in-sourcing firm to fully benefit from its loosely coupled partnerships.

Experimental Orientation: Firms differ in their willingness to take risks and experiment
with new elements of knowledge. We suggest that a firm’s high experimental orientation
(i.e., a firm’s willingness to pioneer novel solutions) (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001;
Miller, 1983) may serve as a catalyst for experimenting with knowledge accessed through
loosely coupled research partnerships.
In contrast to tightly coupled partnerships, loosely coupled research partnerships
have a clear delineation between sender and receiver, so the flow of knowledge is
unilateral. While firms may add specialized new knowledge, the unilateral structure
inhibits experimentation, which is best achieved through an iterative and reciprocal
exchange of knowledge (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Galunic & Rodan, 1998).
Innovation requires firms to challenge their existing paradigms, which results in firms
redefining their heuristics as to how solutions and problems are interconnected (Lei et al.,
1996). This is best achieved through repeated communication and joint management with
a partner (Dyer & Singh, 1998), which are seldom present in loosely coupled research
partnerships. The problem is exacerbated as the in-sourcing party in loosely coupled
research partnerships may need to define the content of the knowledge exchange ex ante.
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Given that potential ways of recombining and using knowledge are only revealed over
time, loosely coupled partnerships may lack the experimentation necessary to develop
with truly new solutions.
Previous research has shown that some firms are more willing than others to
experiment and take risks in strategic actions related to market entry or product
innovation (Miller, 1983; Roberts, 1999). With respect to innovation, researchers have
suggested that firms may either take a more incremental approach to innovation or
become a pioneer in offering new solutions as they challenge current industry
assumptions (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001). Following this idea, an experimental
orientation reflects a firm’s willingness to engage in projects where expected returns are
not foreseeable (Miller, 1983).60 This includes but is not limited to top managers’
preferences to engage in risky projects but also is reflected in a firm’s incentive and
reward structures (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994).61 An experimental orientation is not
static but develops over time as firms adjust their communication channels, control
systems and culture to the level of experimentation that they consider appropriate to
current challenges (Tushman & Anderson, 1986).
Extant research highlights the technological benefits of experimenting with new
knowledge. Ahuja and Lampert (2001), for example, identify that firms that generate
knowledge without relying on prior elements of knowledge (pioneering technologies) are
better positioned to generate innovative solutions. Following these arguments, we believe
60

The notion that some firms may be more experimental than others is related to the seminal work of
March (1991). March highlighted that some firms more than others emphasize experimental learning by
trying out new ways of solving problems.
61
Experimental orientation through risk taking may be considered as part of a firm’s overall
entrepreneurial orientation, which entails other dimensions such as proactiveness or competitive
aggressiveness (Dess, Lumpkin, & Covin, 1997).
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firms with a strong experimental orientation are more likely to benefit from their loosely
coupled research partnerships since they are skilled at not only handling greater
knowledge variety but, at the same time, are able to induce the experimentation required
to effectively use this variety for innovation to occur.
First, although the exchange of knowledge between the partners is predominantly
unidirectional, firms with a stronger experimental orientation will be better equipped to
subsequently draw upon new external knowledge and recombine it in novel ways. Having
an experimental orientation hence facilitates firms in complementing their internal
knowledge with external knowledge (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006) accessed through
loosely coupled research partnerships. In such cases, knowledge recombination occurs
independently of the reciprocal and frequent interactions among research partners.
Second, firms with a strong experimental orientation may also provide incentive
structures to draw upon knowledge which is not immediately related to the scientists’
current projects and activities. This is more likely to encourage scientists to leverage a
broader variety of knowledge (Itami & Roehl, 1991), which again would make loosely
coupled partnerships more effective. We suggest that firms with an experimental
orientation may accrue stronger benefits from loosely coupled partnerships. More
formally, we propose:
Hypothesis 2: The in-sourcing firm’s level of experimental orientation positively
moderates the effect of loosely coupled research partnerships on the in-sourcing
firm’s innovative performance.
Organizational resources: Generally, firms can only sponsor a limited number of
unique problems and solutions simultaneously (Cyert & March, 1963). This requires that
they make tradeoffs in allocating resources, be they financial or managerial, among
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multiple options (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Voss, Sirdeshmukh, &
Voss, 2008). As a result, loosely coupled partnerships are most effective when
organizational resources are available.
Extant research indicates that organizational resources impose important
boundary conditions (Penrose, 1959) that affect a firm’s ability to absorb and use external
knowledge (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001; Ocasio, 1997). These constraints are
particularly salient for loosely coupled partnerships. Unlike tightly coupled research
partnerships that quite often have a greater number of dedicated scientific and managerial
personnel, loosely coupled research partnerships are characterized by lower levels of such
commitment (Zollo et al., 2002). They are also often endowed with fewer overall
organizational resources in the first place, which is evidenced by lower governance and
administration costs (Contractor, 1990). It is hence likely that such partnerships will lack
dedicated managerial personnel who could act as “champions” to promote and defend the
partnership and its associated knowledge when, for example, making budget decisions.
Moreover, resources committed to such projects rely less on building partner-specific
assets to support the innovation process in the long run (Steensma & Corley, 2000),
which limits the commitment associated with such partnerships. The result is that
organizational resources can be more easily withdrawn from loosely coupled
partnerships, in particular in the presence of alternative paths to develop new innovative
products (Adner & Levinthal, 2008; Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt,
2008).
We focus on two types of organizational resources: managerial, exemplified by
managerial attention (Cyert & March, 1963; Ocasio, 1997; Penrose, 1959) and financial
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resources, exemplified by liquid resources beyond what is needed to operate the firm in
the short term, i.e., financial slack (Singh, 1986; Voss et al., 2008).
Both types of resources can act as catalysts, making loosely coupled partnerships
more effective. Innovation is not a one-off event, but a long process that requires firms to
continuously commit managerial resources to their research activities and provide access
to decision-making across the organization (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996). Managerial
resources such as managerial attention are not scale-free (Levinthal & Wu, 2010),
meaning that firms can usually only attend to a few unique innovation problems. Extant
research, for example, indicates that fast-growing firms in one period tend to experience
slower growth in ensuing periods due to a lack of managerial resources (Penrose, 1959).
In a similar vein, scope-increasing activities are likely to absorb managerial attention,
leaving only limited managerial resources available for loosely coupled partnerships.
Conversely, in the presence of limited growth and few alternatives to which
resources must be allocated, loosely coupled partnerships are more likely to receive the
managerial attention necessary to convert their knowledge into new innovative products.
In our empirical setting (pharmaceuticals), firms build large pipelines of product
candidates to innovate. Following the idea of managerial resource constraints, an increase
in the pipeline of products in development is likely to absorb mangerial resources.
However, when growth is limited, managerial resources are more likely to be available so
that loosely coupled partnerships will be more effective.
Financial resources are also likely to act as a catalyst for loosely coupled
partnerships. Cyert and March (1963:189) highlight that financial slack provides a
fundamental role in the innovation process as it “provides a source of funds for
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innovations that would not be approved in the face of scarcity.”62 Financial slack
indirectly supports the innovation process by influencing the decision context in which
resource allocations for innovative projects are undertaken (Greve, 2003a; Nohria &
Gulati, 1996). Namely, financial slack relaxes the internal monitoring and controls that
are critical in a firm’s decision-making environment (Bourgeois III, 1981). The idea is
that slack provides a “cushion” in the event of failure, leading firms to monitor
performance less strictly (Cyert & March, 1963:43). Researchers have suggested that
slack is necessary to adapt to a changing technological landscape, so that existing
resources can complement new innovation activities (Rothaermel, 2001). In a similar
vein, researchers have identified that the extent of investible resources, i.e., resources
available for firms to invest, imposes an important boundary condition for subsequent
firm acquisition activities (Kaul, 2012).
We suggest that the innovation benefits of loosely coupled research partnerships
are more likely to materialize in the presence of financial slack in the in-sourcing firm.
Financial slack can provide the in-sourcing firm with the ability to resist short-term
performance pressures, thus enabling it to continue to commit the necessary financial
resources required from its loosely coupled research partnerships (Greve, 2003a). Prior
research further indicates that slack encourages experimentation (Cyert & March, 1963),
which we identified as being particularly important for loosely coupled partnerships. In
the event that additional resources are required by other projects, financial slack can serve
as a buffer. Thus, loosely coupled partnerships face lower risks that resources will be
62

Although slack may have many different forms (Voss et al., 2008), researchers have predominantly
focused on financial slack in the form of financial reserves as an important resource influencing innovation
(Nohria & Gulati, 1996).
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withdrawn or re-allocated elsewhere. It follows then that the existence of financial slack
allows the in-sourcing firm to more fully leverage the knowledge accessed through
loosely coupled research partnerships. Considering these two arguments (the availability
of managerial resources and financial slack), we propose that:
Hypothesis 3: The in-sourcing firm’s level of managerial resources positively
moderates the effect of loosely coupled research partnerships on the in-sourcing
firm’s innovative performance.
Hypothesis 4: The in-sourcing firm’s level of financial slack positively moderates
the effect of loosely coupled research partnerships on the in-sourcing firm’s
innovative performance.
METHODS
Setting: Global pharmaceutical industry
We tested our hypothesis in the global pharmaceutical industry and examined
innovative performance in terms of new drug development in a given firm’s year. New
drug development takes, on average, 7 to 11 years from original discovery to launch
(Powell et al., 1996), and is a highly regulated process with clearly defined steps. We
focused on the early stage of drug development, which begins with the discovery of the
chemical compound (small molecule) or biologically based large molecules. Only 2.5%
of all drug compounds become lead candidates to enter the preclinical stage, where they
are tested with animals (Giovannetti & Morrison, 2000; Hess & Rothaermel, 2011). This
innovation cycle allowed us to clearly distinguish between discovery (everything prior to
preclinical trials) and development (preclinical and beyond).
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Sample
We compiled a unique database, merging data from ReCap,63 Pharmaprojects,
Adis R&D Insights and Compustat to track firms’ efforts to access external knowledge
and drugs in development from a sample of established biotechnology and
pharmaceutical firms. Pharmaprojects and Adis R&D Insights are databases tracking new
drug development in the pharmaceutical industry and have been used in prior research
studies (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; Hess & Rothaermel, 2011).
Our sample was based on a comprehensive list of publicly traded firms in the
pharmaceutical industry. We opted to use 1997 as a starting point (1 year before our 10
year study period) and queried the Top 50 research active firms based on compounds in
development in Pharmaprojects.64 Limiting the sample to the leading firms ensured that
we observed a large portion of loosely coupled partnerships in the industry and at the
same time, facilitated the data collection process across multiple databases. This
approach is consistent with prior research examining established firms management of
technological change (Anand et al., 2010; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Rothaermel, 2001).
To be included in our sample, a firm had to have at least one compound launched as a
new molecular entity (or biologic) drug in Pharmaprojects before. We did not capture
those firms predominantly focused on formulation technologies or generics. Our study
was interested in the effect of external research agreements and all Top 50 Biopharmaceutical engaged at least in one loosely coupled inter-organizational agreement in
63

Recombinant Capital (ReCap), a proprietary database tracking the life science industry, is considered to
be one of the most comprehensive publicly available data sources for the industry (Schilling, 2009).
64
This includes firms that do not belong to the bio-pharmaceutical industry per SIC code but are
considered to be among the Top 50 pharmaceutical firms worldwide according to Pharmaceutical
Executive. We identified 4 horizontal mergers (e.g., Astra AB and Zeneca forming AstraZeneca) for which
we combined the data of the two merging firms. To keep a sample of 50 we added 4 firms, until rank 54.
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ReCap. For each firm, we constructed a detailed history of divisions and subsidiaries
using the Directory of Corporate Affiliations, LexisNexis and corporate websites to
ensure that we allocated each drug and collaboration to the right firm at the right time.
The total sample consisted of 50 firms, which span 454 observations from 1998 to 2007.
Measures
Dependent Variable - Innovative performance:
New product development starts as a process of discovering new knowledge and
the transformation of such knowledge in a final product (Madhavan & Grover, 1998).
Given the length of the innovation cycle, we opted to examine an intermediate output of
the product development process as a proxy for innovative performance. Namely, we
examined new products in development as a dependent variable. New products in
development represent a key stage in the innovation process as they reveal a firm’s ability
to recombine various types of knowledge and have been used in prior research to measure
a firm’s innovativeness (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Shan,
Walker, & Kogut, 1994). Given that the ultimate goal of firms through loosely coupled
partnerships is to find a potential product candidate, we considered this intermediate
output as appropriate to capture if firms can ultimately benefit from loosely coupled
partnerships.65 Using Pharmaprojects, we counted the annual number of new products in
preclinical trials (Innovative performance) that were introduced by the firm in a given
year. We used the new chemical entity flag provided by Pharmaprojects to identify
innovations new to an industry (i.e., the molecule or biologic that represents a new
65

Counting the number of patents used as in prior studies may be misleading as firms through loosely
coupled partnerships may actually access rights to use certain patents but not necessarily need to increase
their patenting output themselves. Important insights gained from loosely coupled partnerships like
validating biological targets and new mechanism of actions in the human body cannot be patented
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solution to address a therapeutic need).66 For each preclinical compound, we manually
checked the date in Pharmaprojects to identify when the firm first put this compound in
preclinical development. We used a second database (Adis R&D Insights) to verify or
complement missing data for when a drug entered preclinical testing. We used the earliest
reported date in cases when the databases differed. On average, firms introduce 5.4 new
molecular entities (including chemical and biologics) into preclinical development each
year.
Independent Variables
Loosely coupled research partnerships: We used ReCap to capture loosely
coupled research partnerships. We only counted agreements that were signed at the
earliest research stage. These agreements are flagged in Recap as “discovery” based on
when the partnership was signed. At the discovery stage, firms have usually not yet found
an actual compound to be used for further testing and quite often only have an idea of
what mechanism in the body the potential discovery should target (Rydzewski, 2008). To
ensure that we only captured agreements in which the research partners had the intention
to generate new knowledge, we excluded any partnership that addressed reformulations
of existing drugs or new combinations of existing substances. 67 We only considered
partnerships for which we knew that knowledge or technology flows in the direction of
the incumbent pharmaceutical firm. Recap indicates which firm in a partnership is the
technology provider and which one is the client, allowing us to explicitly distinguish,
which firm is the in-sourcing partner.

66
67

We also counted biological drugs as new to the industry but excluded biosimilars and generic drugs.
Results are robust keeping these agreements.
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Following extant work on partnerships (Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 2000), we
acknowledged that the effect of accessing external knowledge may not be instantaneous.
Instead, loosely coupled research partnerships agreements may generate innovation
benefits over time that can be captured only by tracking their effect over multiple years.
The idea is that the stock of research agreements, even after the year they are announced,
may contribute towards innovative performance. We used a four year stock of innovative
partnerships, reflective of the project time common for early stage research initiatives
(Rydzewski, 2008).68 We followed common conventions when studying the effect of
interorganizational agreements on performance (Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 2000) and tested
both a depreciated and undepreciated stock of partnerships.69 We reported the
undepreciated four year stock in the results, which are almost identical to using a
depreciated measure. More importantly, we operationalized Loosely Coupled Research
Partnerships as the number of research agreements, which we could unambiguously
classify as signed during the discovery stage in the last four years wherein the in-sourcing
firm enters a research partnership in order to access knowledge from a partner in
exchange for money. We defined loosely coupled partnerships in our sample as either inlicensing (Recap code L)70 and research contracts (Recap code R) with the in-sourcing
firm financing and paying royalties for research and technologies of a partner. 71 We

68

Results are robust using 4 and 5 years respectively.
Depreciation of the stock of bilateral partnerships reflects that recent sourcing activities might have a
stronger effect than research agreements announced at an earlier point in time.
70
85% of all the research agreements had a licensing component.
71
Some of those research partnerships were classified as “pure licensing,” quite often involving a one-off
purchase of knowledge (e.g., patent) by the in-sourcing firm. We believe these are extreme cases of a
loosely coupled partnership (almost like an arm’s length transaction) in which the classification as a
“partnership” may be questioned. Therefore, as we report in our robustness checks, we ran our models
excluding all those extremely loosely coupled partnerships. Our results remained qualitatively the same.
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identified 770 such agreements initiated by the 50 sample firms between 1994 and
2006.72 The baseline relationship between loosely coupled research partnerships and new
compounds in development (H1) is shown in Figure 14, which situates the variable in the
empirical context.
Figure 14: Chapter 4 – Baseline Model (H1) and Empirical Context

Moderators
Experimental Orientation: Following the literature on entrepreneurial orientation,
we captured a firm’s overall experimental orientation via their propensity to engage in
risky innovative projects (Dess et al., 1997). This is similar to Bierly and Chakrabarti
(1996), who differentiated between experimental vs. non experimental innovation in
approved drugs. Firms in research have the option to develop drugs using elements of
knowledge already implemented in prior innovation attempts by the firm. Two important
elements of knowledge used in drug development are the mechanism of action and the
origin of material, both of which are available from Pharmaprojects.
The origin of material gives a broad distinction if the drug development project is
based on chemistry (small molecule), biology (e.g., a protein or viral vector) or if the
compound is derived from a natural product. The mechanism of action classifies the
pharmacological effect through which the drug may have an effect on the human body.
72

Given the lag structure, we started our analysis in 1998 using partnership stock from 1994-1997.
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For example, Cox-2 inhibitors (one of our mechanism of action categories) prevent the
production of PHG (prostaglandin) from arachidonic acid, which causes inflammation.73
We consider the origin of material, mechanism of action and indication as pockets of
specialized knowledge which are embedded in a technology (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998),
and then examined if projects initiated by the firm in the last four years are based on
knowledge were novel (experimental) to the firm.
We counted all compounds in development of each focal firm as reported by
Pharmaprojects. For each drug in development within the year’s t-1 to t-4, we determined
if the project was or was not experimental. For example, if a firm had 10 drugs reported
in development during a three-year timeframe and 3 of them deployed either a new
mechanism of action or origin of material to solve a given therapeutic problem, its level
of Experimental Orientation would be 0.3. Higher values of this measure indicate a
higher propensity to experiment with novel knowledge to the firm.
Financial slack: We proxied Financial slack by the current ratio of the firm in a
given year, which is the ratio of its current assets divided by its current liabilities
(Bourgeois III, 1981; Greve, 2003a; Singh, 1986). Firms with a low current ratio are
resource-constrained as they have less free financial resources at hand.
Managerial resources: The availability of managerial resources such as
managerial attention is difficult to observe as, unlike financial resources, they are not
found on a firm’s balance sheet. However, a good proxy for the availability of managerial
resources (or the lack thereof) is the firm’s ongoing product development activities: all
73

We employed a consulting firm to assess which mechanism of action codes can be further aggregated. A
pharmacology expert with 26 years in drug development and patented compounds and a biotechnology
graduate student did the classification separately (resulting in 240 unique pharmacology codes in our
sample).
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else being equal, the more products in development, the less managerial resources are
available to other projects. This resonates with a resource-based perspective in which
firm growth in a previous period limits the growth of firms in subsequent years (Penrose,
1959). We constructed a variable called pipeline growth, which captured how the pipeline
has gown or declined from year t-2 to t-1. We argue that a growing pipeline signals
scarce managerial resources as the in-sourcing firm has many alternative development
paths to pursue. Conversely, a decline in the pipeline is a good proxy for the availability
of more managerial resources. We reverse coded the variable Managerial Resources as
pipeline decline to indicate the availability of managerial resources.
Controls
We first controlled for the effect of other in-sourcing activities. We controlled for
the effect of Tightly Coupled Research Partnerships, defined as the number of research
agreements in which a firm engaged in the last three years wherein parties mutually
shared knowledge and other resources. These arrangements are captured in Recap
through the addition of distinct agreement types: CoL (Collaboration Agreement) and
JVs (joint ventures).74 We also added an indicator variable Acquisition to control for
firms that engaged in a research-oriented acquisition in the prior year. Finally, we added
Exploitation as the number of alliances formed to develop and commercialize existing
compounds in the previous four years (these partnerships in-source “ready to use”
compounds and are hence at a later stage of development).

74

All results are robust when excluding joint ventures. We checked news articles associated with
approximately 10% of all partnerships (available from Recap) it and found that the Recap classification was
very much in line with the actual announcements.
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Second, we controlled for various financial and performance measures that affect
new product development. We included the variable return on assets (RoA), which
captures the firm’s performance. Other financial controls included Total Assets as a proxy
for the firm’s size and R&D intensity (R&D divided by Total Sales), which proxies the
emphasis firms places on research in general. Finally, we captured internal research by
adding the number of Patents (logged) a firm applied for in a given year as an important
input for product development (Murray, 2002).
Empirical Specification
All variables were lagged by one year; for example, we predicted new products in
development in year t by the financial controls from year t-1. The variables spanning
multiple years (e.g., loosely coupled partnerships and experimentation) include the years
t-4to t-1. Our dependent variable takes only positive integer values, so it is recommended
to use a count model. The negative binomial model is appropriate as it relaxes the
assumption of having a mean equal to the standard deviation. We reported both a fixed
effect and random effect negative binomial model but the Hausman (1978) test indicated
that a fixed effect model would be more appropriate. The fixed effect model controls for
time invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity. Given that firm fixed effects may not be
robust in this estimation (Allison & Waterman, 2002), we also report a random effects
model and a fixed-effects Poisson quasi maximum likelihood estimator, which is robust
when using firm fixed effects (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009).
RESULTS
Table 12 depicts the descriptive statistics and the bivariate correlation matrix. The
summary statistics indicated that our sample firms are large incumbent players in the
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industry (US$ 12 billion in assets on average). The firms were quite active with external
partners with an average four year stock of 5.2 loosely coupled research partnerships.
Table 12 shows that loosely and tightly coupled partnerships are both correlated with
firm size (Total Assets).75

75

Multicollinearity is not a concern as the mean VIF for the final models was below 2.4 and individual
VIFs were below 4.6, all well below the recommended cut-off levels. We centered all variables before
interacting them (Cohen et al., 2003).
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Table 12: Chapter 4 - Correlation & Summary Statistics

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Innovative Performance
Exploitation
Acquisition
R&D Intensity
Tightly Coupled Partnerships
Patents (log)
RoA
Total Assets (BNs)
Managerial Resources
Financial Slack
Experimental Orientation
Loosely Coupled Partnerships
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum Value
Maximum Value

1
2
3
4
5
1.00
0.56 1.00
0.17 0.24 1.00
-0.11 -0.13 0.01 1.00
0.62 0.68 0.29 -0.03 1.00
0.52 0.50 0.16 -0.20 0.46
0.31 0.26 0.08 -0.54 0.28
0.63 0.58 0.26 -0.13 0.70
0.01 0.01 -0.17 -0.19 -0.05
-0.34 -0.29 -0.16 0.38 -0.31
-0.25 -0.25 -0.10 0.11 -0.22
0.58 0.59 0.22 -0.06 0.65
5.41 5.75 0.45 0.21 5.02
6.99 5.71 0.50 0.30 6.03
0
0 0.00 0.00 0.00
47
35 1.00 2.79 38.00

n=454
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6

7

1.00
0.32 1.00
0.54 0.20
-0.01 0.03
-0.36 -0.31
-0.20 -0.24
0.51 0.31
4.35 0.15
1.20 0.11
0.00 -0.10
6.89 0.41

8

9

10

11

12

1.00
-0.04 1.00
-0.35 -0.02 1.00
-0.27 -0.08 0.06 1.00
0.59 0.03 -0.28 -0.24 1.00
12.73 2.42 2.60 0.51 5.22
18.05 0.37 1.38 0.18 6.69
0.23 0.00 0.68 0.00
0
123.68 3.00 6.12 1.00
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Table 13: Chapter 4 – Results - Negative Binomial - DV: New product development
(1)
FE

(2)
FE

(3)
RE

(4)
FE

Firm Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Exploitation (4y)

-0.017+
(0.010)

-0.018+
(0.010)

-0.015+
(0.009)

-0.016
(0.010)

Acquisition (4y)

-0.014
(0.017)

-0.010
(0.017)

-0.007
(0.015)

-0.011
(0.017)

R&D Intensity (t-1)

-0.365
(0.270)

-0.365
(0.269)

-0.082
(0.233)

-0.378
(0.271)

Tightly Coupled
Partnerships (4y)

0.034***
(0.009)

0.033***
(0.009)

0.036***
(0.008)

0.027**
(0.009)

Patents (4y)

0.195*
(0.098)

0.196*
(0.099)

0.373***
(0.065)

0.194*
(0.098)

RoA (t-1)

0.259
(0.571)

0.213
(0.574)

0.497
(0.541)

0.219
(0.576)

Total Assets (t-1)

-0.388
(2.571)

-0.867
(2.645)

-0.094
(2.431)

0.040
(2.656)

Experimental
Orientation (4y)

0.523+
(0.299)

0.565+
(0.304)

0.179
(0.290)

0.512+
(0.299)

Managerial Resources (t-1)

-0.034
(0.116)

-0.029
(0.117)

0.080
(0.116)

-0.042
(0.116)

Financial Slack (t-1)

-0.087+
(0.048)

-0.085+
(0.048)

-0.085*
(0.043)

-0.080+
(0.047)

0.006
(0.007)

0.014*
(0.007)

0.002
(0.008)

Loosely Coupled
Partnerships (4y)
Loosely Coupled X
Experimental Orientation

0.118**
(0.042)

Loosely Coupled X
Managerial Resources
Loosely Coupled X
Financial Slack
Constant

0.751
(0.626)

0.717
(0.627)

-0.518
(0.418)

0.762
(0.621)

Log Likelihood

-823.23

-822.88

-1042.15

-819.04

N

454

454

454

454

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table 13 (continued): Chapter 4 – Results - Negative Binomial - DV: New product development
(5)
FE

(6)
FE

(7)
FE

(8)
RE

Firm Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Exploitation (4y)

-0.021*
(0.010)

-0.013
(0.010)

-0.013
(0.010)

-0.009
(0.009)

Acquisition (4y)

-0.014
(0.017)

-0.019
(0.017)

-0.022
(0.017)

-0.018
(0.015)

R&D Intensity (t-1)

-0.437
(0.272)

-0.309
(0.270)

-0.398
(0.275)

-0.188
(0.237)

Tightly Coupled
Partnerships (4y)

0.037***
(0.009)

0.030***
(0.009)

0.028**
(0.009)

0.029***
(0.009)

Patents (4y)

0.204*
(0.099)

0.195*
(0.097)

0.200*
(0.097)

0.337***
(0.063)

RoA (t-1)

0.153
(0.571)

0.304
(0.569)

0.255
(0.568)

0.560
(0.530)

Total Assets (t-1)

-0.203
(2.566)

-0.298
(2.621)

0.887
(2.548)

2.181
(2.350)

Experimental
Orientation (4y)

0.553+
(0.302)

0.561+
(0.305)

0.486
(0.299)

0.057
(0.283)

Managerial Resources (t-1)

-0.102
(0.110)

-0.022
(0.117)

-0.105
(0.110)

-0.041
(0.110)

Financial Slack (t-1)

-0.077
(0.047)

-0.072
(0.048)

-0.061
(0.047)

-0.063
(0.042)

Loosely Coupled
Partnerships (4y)

0.005
(0.007)

0.009
(0.007)

0.004
(0.007)

0.011
(0.007)

0.119**
(0.042)

0.135***
(0.037)

0.033*
(0.013)

0.033**
(0.013)

0.024**
(0.009)

0.024**
(0.009)

0.024**
(0.008)

Loosely Coupled X
Experimental Orientation
Loosely Coupled X
Managerial Resources

0.032*
(0.013)

Loosely Coupled X
Financial Slack
Constant

0.760
(0.627)

0.751
(0.615)

0.843
(0.612)

-0.135
(0.401)

Log Likelihood

-819.53

-819.39

-812.28

-1027.65

454

454

454

N

454
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

137

Table 13 depicts the results for all hypotheses. Model 1 only shows the control
variables. Tightly Coupled Partnerships and Patents are strong predictors for new
products in development. In Models 2 and 3, we added the stock of loosely coupled
research partnerships. We only found a significant positive effect using a random effects
model (Model 3) while in the fixed effects model (Model 2), the coefficient, while
positive, did not reach acceptable statistical significance levels. Overall, these results
provide only weak support for Hypothesis 1.
In Model 4, we added the first interaction: experimental orientation with loosely
coupled partnerships. The results support Hypothesis 2. The interaction effect is best
demonstrated graphically, which we show in Figure 15. At high levels (75th percentile) of
Experimental Orientation, firms benefit much more from loosely coupled partnerships
than at lower levels (25th percentile).
Figure 15: Chapter 4 - Moderation Loosely Coupled Partnersh. and Experiment. Orientation
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In Model 5, we entered the interaction of Loosely Coupled Partnerships and
Managerial Resources (proxied by percentage decline in the number of drug
development projects the firm has to attend to). As expected, the interaction was positive,
indicating that the decline in the pipeline may free up managerial resources, thus allowing
firms to benefit from Loosely Coupled Partnerships. The result is shown graphically in
Figure 16 plotting Managerial Resources at 25th, 50th and 75th percentile.
Figure 16: Chapter 4 - Moderation Loosely Coupled Partnerships and Managerial Resources

Finally, Model 6 shows the interaction of loosely coupled partnerships and
Financial Slack (current ratio). The results confirmed Hypothesis 4: the availability of
financial resources allows firms to more effectively benefit from Loosely Coupled
Research Partnerships. We demonstrate the effect graphically, plotting Financial Slack
at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile (Figure 17).
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Figure 17: Chapter 4 - Moderation Loosely Coupled Partnerships and Financial Slack

To further examine the interaction effect, we reported marginal effects in Table
14 and compared marginal effects when the values of the three moderators are at the 25th
percentile, the median and at the 75th percentile76. Testing the difference among
coefficients of the 25th and 75th percentile derived from STATA’s margins command, we
found that the effect of loosely coupled partnerships is significantly stronger at higher
levels of all moderators.
Table 14: Chapter 4 – Marginal Effects
STATA – Margins: Effects of Loosely Coupled
Partnerships at different levels of moderators y
When y is at the25th percentile
When y is at the median
th

When y is at the75 percentile
th

Changes in the marginal effect (from 25 to 75
percentile)

76

y=Experimental
Orientation

y=Managerial
Resources

y=Financial Slack

0.008 (0.007)

0.005 (0.006)

0.007 (0.006)

0.023** (0.008)

0.009 (0.006)

0.023* (0.009)

0.038** (0.011)

0.017* (0.007)

0.046** (0.017)

0.03** chi2= 9.05

0.12* chi2= 6.00

0.39** chi2= 6.94

th

Very similar results are obtained by using mean and a standard deviation above the mean values.
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Model 7 shows the full model with all interactions, which remain supported;
results are also similar in a random effects model in Model 8. Overall, these results
confirmed our contention that firm context in the form of experimental orientation,
financial slack and managerial resources substantially positively affect a firm’s ability to
convert loosely coupled research partnerships into innovations.
Robustness Tests
We conducted several robustness tests (Table 15). First, we used a fixed-effects
Poisson quasi maximum likelihood model as the negative binomial fixed effect model has
been criticized as not providing true fixed effects (Allison & Waterman, 2002). Results
are in line with our other specifications. We further used alternative operationalization to
proxy financial slack and managerial resources. For financial slack, we used working
capital over sales as alternative (Bourgeois III, 1981; Singh, 1986) and found results
similar to those reported for Hypothesis 3 (Model 11). For Managerial Resources. we
used the number of Therapeutic Areas (Model 12) and number of Modes (acquisition,
tight, loose partnering ) pursued by the in-sourcing firm in t-1 to proxy a constraint on
managerial resources (Model 13). As Models 12 and 13 indicate, our results show a
sensitivity of loosely coupled partnerships to a lack of managerial resources. In order to
demonstrate that the moderations are particularly important for loosely coupled
partnerships, we ran the same analysis interacting Tightly Coupled Partnerships (Model
14) and found no significant effect except for Experimental Orientation, which is
marginally significant. Finally, we examined whether our results would be robust if we
excluded the most extreme cases of loosely coupled partnerships (i.e., pure licensing
agreements). Our results were robust (Model 15).
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Table 15: Chapter 4 - Robustness Tests - Negative Binomial FE
DV: New products in
development

Firm and Year Fixed Effects
Exploitation (4y)
Acquisition (4y)
Tightly Coupled
Partnerships (4y)
Patents (4y)
Experimental
Orientation (4y)
Managerial Resources (t-1)
Financial Slack (t-1)
Loosely Coupled
Partnerships (4y)
Loosely Coupled X
Experimental Orientation
Loosely Coupled X
Managerial Resources
Loosely Coupled X
Financial Slack
Therapeutic Areas (t-1)

(M9)
QML
Poisson
FE
Y

(M10)
FE
Loosely
Coup. >0
Y

(M11)
Financial
Slack:
WC/Sales
Y

-0.013+
(0.007)
-0.023
(0.015)
0.027***
(0.006)
0.175
(0.133)
0.649*
(0.299)
-0.138
(0.103)
-0.014
(0.050)
0.003
(0.006)
0.087*
(0.041)
0.037***
(0.007)
0.022**
(0.008)

-0.016
(0.010)
-0.026
(0.017)
0.030***
(0.009)
0.176
(0.107)
0.691*
(0.342)
0.010
(0.134)
-0.043
(0.052)
0.004
(0.008)
0.096*
(0.045)
0.024+
(0.014)
0.021*
(0.009)

-0.016
(0.010)
-0.015
(0.017)
0.031***
(0.009)
0.151
(0.103)
0.502+
(0.303)
-0.098
(0.116)
0.103
(0.082)
0.018+
(0.009)

0.980
(0.685)

1.009
(0.669)

-704.49
375

-831.73
454

0.031*
(0.016)

Loosely Coupled X
Therapeutic Areas
Alternative Modes (t-1)
Loosely Coupled X
Alternative Modes
Tightly Coupled X
Experimental Orientation
Tightly Coupled X
Managerial Resources
Tightly Coupled X
Financial Slack
Constant
Log Likelihood

-858.11

N

454

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, Not shown but included in the models: Total Assets, Return on
Assets and R&D Intensity
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Table 15 (continued): Chapter 4 - Robustness Tests - Negative Binomial FE
DV: New products in
development

Firm and Year Fixed Effects
Exploitation (4y)
Acquisition (4y)
Tightly Coupled
Partnerships (4y)
Patents (4y)
Experimental
Orientation (4y)
Managerial Resources (t-1)
Financial Slack (t-1)
Loosely Coupled
Partnerships (4y)
Loosely Coupled X
Experimental Orientation
Loosely Coupled X
Managerial Resources
Loosely Coupled X
Financial Slack
Therapeutic Areas (t-1)
Loosely Coupled X
Therapeutic Areas
Alternative Modes (t-1)
Loosely Coupled X
Alternative Modes
Tightly Coupled X
Experimental Orientation
Tightly Coupled X
Managerial Resources
Tightly Coupled X
Financial Slack
Constant
Log Likelihood
N

(M12)
Managerial
Resources
Alt. 1
Y

(M13)
Managerial
Resources
Alt 2
Y

(M14)
Tightly
Coupled
Interac.
Y

(M15)
Loosely C.
(no pure
licensing)
Y

-0.017+
(0.009)
-0.017
(0.017)
0.033***
(0.009)
0.185+
(0.098)
0.597+
(0.306)
0.038
(0.127)
-0.067
(0.048)
0.047**
(0.018)

-0.016
(0.010)
-0.018
(0.018)
0.031***
(0.009)
0.170+
(0.099)
0.602*
(0.302)
0.032
(0.120)
-0.080+
(0.047)
0.038**
(0.014)

-0.009
(0.011)
-0.011
(0.019)
0.028*
(0.013)
0.206*
(0.101)
0.564+
(0.305)
0.001
(0.121)
-0.079+
(0.048)
0.007
(0.007)

-0.013
(0.010)
-0.029+
(0.017)
0.032***
(0.009)
0.195*
(0.097)
0.424
(0.299)
-0.084
(0.109)
-0.072
(0.047)
0.001
(0.007)
0.170*
(0.075)
0.053*
(0.023)
0.034*
(0.014)

0.035+
(0.021)
-0.005*
(0.002)
0.153*
(0.063)
-0.020**
(0.007)

0.636
(0.613)

0.752
(0.631)

0.094+
(0.055)
-0.008
(0.018)
0.014
(0.009)
0.617
(0.640)

-819.47
454

-817.79
454

-819.73
454

0.890
(0.613)
-815.23
454

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, Not shown but included in the models: Total Assets, Return on
Assets and R&D Intensity
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Endogeneity
An important concern in our study is that the decision to engage in loosely
coupled partnerships may be endogenous. To address this issue, we further examined the
data to determine if some firms systematically do not engage in loosely coupled
partnerships. In our sample, all firms engaged in at least 1 loosely coupled partnership
between 1994 and 2006 (the timeframe in which the independent variable is measured).
Hence, there was no evidence that some firms avoid loosely coupled partnerships
altogether. This said, in order to further address endogeneity concerns, we conducted the
following robustness tests.
First, we limited our sample to firm years in which we observed a stock of loosely
coupled partnerships (Model 10). This reduced our sample to 377 firm-year observations.
We then replicated our analysis; the results found similar support compared to the full
sample.
Second, we examined if the identified relationships hold only for specific types of
firms. We split the sample by the size of firms and examined differences between larger
and smaller incumbents in our sample. The results (available upon request) are very much
in line with the results for the full sample. These robustness tests, along with using firm
fixed effects, gave us increased confidence that our results were not driven by the
selection of loosely coupled partnerships by specific types of firms.
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DISCUSSION
Determining how future goods and services are discovered, developed and
commercialized represents a fundamental question in strategy and innovation
management research (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001). Our study attempts to illuminate
how firms manage this process when they opt to access external knowledge via loosely
coupled partnerships. The study lies at the heart of two core organizational processes:
interorganizational partnerships and new product development, both of which have a
profound impact on a firm’s ability to build value-creating strategies.
We find that accessing external knowledge via loosely coupled partnerships
matters for innovative performance, but the innovation benefits of such partnerships
reach their full potential only in specific firm contexts. Namely, we identify the insourcing firm’s experimental orientation, its availability of financial slack and managerial
resources as three key moderators that allow it to reap the innovation benefits of loosely
coupled research partnerships.
Our study makes three main contributions. First, we highlight that scholars may
need to distinguish between tightly and loosely coupled research partnerships when
examining their effect on innovative performance in general. In the pharmaceutical space,
previous studies (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011; Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003) have found
surprisingly little evidence of a direct relationship between in-sourcing external
knowledge through partnering and generating new product development candidates,
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which may stem from collapsing both tight and loose research partnerships into one
single category.77
Second, we reveal that although the effect of loosely coupled research
partnerships on the in-sourcing firm’s innovative performance does not seem to be
statistically strong, when we look at its interaction with the firm’s experimental
orientation as well as with its availability of financial and managerial resources, the
results are strong and robust to several different specifications. While extant research has
tended to focus on the benefits of tightly coupled partnerships, we unveil in this paper the
conditions under which another category of partnerships (i.e., loosely coupled) may
provide a focal in-sourcing firm with significant innovation benefits. Previous studies
have already suggested that loosely coupled partnerships may be ideal in settings of rapid
environmental change as they allow firms to effectively exploit the division of labor and
gain access to specialized knowledge. Our results highlight that all these potential
advantages of loosely coupled partnerships are much more likely to be manifested in
terms of innovation benefits in the presence of a strong experimental orientation,
financial slack and managerial resources in the in-sourcing firm.
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on financial slack. While the direct
effect of slack on innovation continues to be subject to debate (Nohria & Gulati, 1996),
our study reveals that financial slack may be an important contingency for firms to
benefit from loosely coupled partnerships.
In its current form, this study has several limitations. First, the pharmaceutical
industry is very distinctive as there is a clear delineation between discovery and
77

For example, Rothaermel and Hess (2011) find no direct effect from upstream (i.e., discovery)
partnerships on new product development in a similar context.
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development. For instance, once in development, a compound usually undergoes only
marginal alterations. This may not be true for other industries. A second concern is that
the dependent variable (i.e., new preclinical compounds in development) only captures
new product announcements that are disclosed by the firm. Although the pharmaceutical
industry is regulated in the clinical trials, this does not guarantee that each compound is
disclosed early in the preclinical trials. We tried to mitigate this risk by completing
Pharmaprojects information with ADIS Insights to have two separate databases to
identify when a compound was first visible. If some firms tend to underreport more than
others, we hope to have remedied this by using fixed effects.
Given the firm-level analysis of our study, future research may examine how the
firm-level factors (experimentation, financial slack and managerial resources) indeed
influence individual loosely coupled research partnerships at the project level. Moreover,
the analysis could be extended to partnership agreements beyond the discovery stage and
closer to commercialization.
Overall, our paper demonstrates that loosely coupled partnerships can also be
important vehicles to allow firms to devise solutions new to an industry. This should be
an important reminder for managers and researchers alike that firms may achieve
innovations through multiple paths and distinct external knowledge sourcing strategies.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We’re at a tipping point. We’ve come to the point where internal discovery can no longer
sustain companies of our size. And I’ll say that across the field. We have to get better at
leveraging the external environment but in a very serious way. … I do believe that
there’s disruptive innovation out there and we just have to learn to be externally focused
instead of contemplating our own (Merck Senior Executive – World Wide Licensing,
2011)
Contributions
This dissertation makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to
understanding the unique relationships of established and startup firms in environments
characterized by rapid technological change. An overview of the hypothesized
relationships and the dissertation results is shown in Table 16. Next, I discuss the most
important findings of the dissertation followed by an exposition on some of the
dissertation’s most important limitations and potential avenues for future research.
All essays of this dissertation have in common that they address challenges
associated with exploration, i.e., the conscious effort to move away from current
organizational routines and knowledge bases (Katila & Ahuja, 2002:1184; March, 1991)
in innovation and problem solving. Chapter 1 observes exploration directly in the form of
the technological opportunities pursued by established firms. While on one hand,
established firms pursue external partnerships to access exploratory knowledge from
startups (see the introductory quote of this chapter), I find that established firms may
“overlook” highly novel and early stage technological opportunities in partnership
formation. As such, forming exploratory type partnerships may be challenging for firms..
Similarly, in chapter 3, I observe exploration of startup firms relative to the established
industry players. I find that pursuing radical innovations (innovations which differ from
those of established firms) is associated with severe market value penalties for startups.
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This suggests substantial difficulties for startup firms to position themselves in a very
exploratory position versus established industry players. Finally, chapter 4 highlights the
challenges of established firms to effectively use external knowledge sourced into the
firms through loosely coupled partnerships with the intention to explore and innovate.
Table 16: Summary of hypotheses and empirical results
Ch. Hyp. Dependent Variable

Independent Variable

2

1

Partnership Formation

Novelty Partnering Opportunity

2

2

Partnership Formation

2

3a

Partnership Formation

2

3b Partnership Formation

2

4a

2

4b Partnership Formation

3

1

Market Value Startup

Distance to Commercialization of
Opportunity
Interaction: Novelty Partnering
Opportunity x
Prior Failures
Novelty Partnering Opportunity x
Prior Successes
Distance to Commercialization x
Prior Failures
Distance to Commercialization x
Prior Successes
Radicalness of Innovation

3

2

Market Value Startup

3

3

Market Value Startup

3

4

Market Value Startup

4

1

New Products in Development

4

2

New Products in Development

4

3

New Products in Development

4

4

New Products in Development

Partnership Formation

Hyp. Supported?
Effect
Yes
-

Yes

+

Yes

-

No

-

Partially

+

Yes

-

Yes

Radicalness of Innovation x
Formation of Commercialization
Partnerships
Radicalness of Innovation x
Failure Incumbent Firms
Interaction: Radicalness of Innovation x
Maturity of Innovation
Loosely Coupled Partnerships

+

Yes

+

Yes

+

No

+

No

Interaction: Loosely Coupled
Partnerships x
Experimentation
Interaction: Loosely Coupled
Partnerships x
Financial Slack
Interaction: Loosely Coupled
Partnerships x
Managerial Resources

+

Yes

+

Yes

+

Yes

This illustrates that merely adding and accessing external knowledge may not be
enough for firms to innovate, as the exploration of new knowledge may require both
adding new knowledge and recombining knowledge in new ways (Fleming & Sorenson,
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2004). Overall, the dissertation outlines various severe challenges related to exploration,
even in environments where a division of innovative labor between established and
startup firms has emerged (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a)
Importantly, all dissertation essays contribute to our understanding about the
conditions under which challenges related to exploration hold or do not hold. To that end
I extend studies examining a firm’s organizational context and, in particular, internal
R&D as boundary conditions to recognize and use external knowledge (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990; Jansen et al., 2005; Lewin, Massini, & Peeters, 2011; Volberda, Foss, &
Lyles, 2010). For example, chapters 2 reveals how all experience is not created equal and
that prior failures and successes in R&D differently shape “spatial” and “temporal”
myopia in the formation of partnerships. I find that while prior failures lead firms to
become more open to novel ways of solving problems, they, at the same time, push firms
to seek partnering opportunities which promise immediate payoffs. These findings
resolve existing tensions in the literature as to whether prior failures lead to a
problemistic type search, which is often characterized as local and reactive (Cyert &
March, 1963; Staw et al., 1981) or if failures can lead to search which is more
experimental and risk-seeking (Greve, 2011; Madsen & Desai, 2010). In a related vein, I
find that startups pursuing radical innovations may benefit from failures of established
firms (chapter 3), which supports the idea that failures make novel types of solutions
more attractive and trigger a reallocation of resources towards such initiatives.
Quite differently, I find that prior successes may enable firms to take a long term
perspective, allowing them to consider partnering opportunities with more distant payoffs
(chapter 2). This resonates with Cyert and March’s (1992:189) suggestion that “success
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tends to breed slack” which acts as a buffer for “risky” decisions, ultimately allowing
firms to be more lenient in allocating resources to early stage partnering opportunities.
On the other hand, it challenges ideas that success may ultimately harm subsequent
innovation attempts as it traps organizations into existing knowledge bases and routines
(Audia et al., 2000). In chapter 4, I observe financial slack as a proxy for success and
reveal that slack may be an important condition to effectively utilizing knowledge gained
from loosely coupled partnerships. All these findings argue for the value of integrating
perspectives on myopia and local search with studies examining experiences of failures
and successes as well as organizational slack (Greve, 2011; Laursen, 2012).
All three essays also contribute to the understanding of partnerships between
startups and established firms. While the formation of partnerships is studied as an
outcome in chapter 2, chapters 3 and 4 consider partnerships as important inputs to create
value for firms. For example, chapter 4 illuminates the unique properties of loosely
coupled partnerships, which represent an exchange of knowledge absent strong
collaboration and organizational support (Steensma & Corley, 2000). I find that benefits
from such partnerships do not necessarily stem from the sourcing relationship per se, but
are closely linked to the in-sourcing firm’s experimental orientation to pursue risky
projects and the availability of financial and managerial resources. Finally, chapter 3
demonstrates that partnering can be an important moderator, shaping the legitimacy and
resources available for startup firms. I identify that, beyond direct benefits, partnerships
seem to be particularly important for startups pursuing radical innovations. Interestingly,
this essay also reveals that even in the absence of partnerships, the relationship between
startups and established firms remains important. Namely, failures in established firms’
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R&D attempts may benefit those startups that pursue product innovations which depart
from the industry’s existing recipes for problem-solving. Table 17 provides a summary of
key insights from each chapter of this dissertation and outlines the key arguments made.
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Table 17: Dissertation Highlights
Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Outcome
Studied
Innovation
Process

Established Firm’s Partnership Formation

Startup’s Market Value

Established firms selecting among a range of
partnering opportunities from startups.

Startup firms' pursuit of product innovations relative to industry
incumbents.

Established Firm’s New Products in
Development
Innovation benefits accrued from
loosely coupled research partnerships.

Exploration
Challenge

Established firms face challenges in pursuing
partnering opportunities with novel technological
solutions and with payoffs in the distant future.

Startup firms face challenges when pursuing radical
innovations, i.e., innovations which differ from those sought by
established placers.

Theorized
Mechanisms

Firms prefer established means-end relation-ships
in problem-solving (spatial myopia) and prefer
exploiting existing commercialization routines
(temporal myopia).

Pursuing radical innovations leads to a lack of legitimacy and
resources for startups, adversely affecting market valuations.

Identified
Boundary
Conditions

Prior Failure and Success shape myopic
tendencies:

Legitimacy and resources provided through:

Spatial Myopia: Prior Failures challenges existing
means-end relations, while prior successes may
reinforce them.
Temporal Myopia: Prior Failures reinforce
temporal myopia, while prior successes allow
firms to more readily consider partnering
opportunities at an early stage of development.

Main
Contributions

Formation of commercialization partnerships (validate
technology and provide resources to commercialize)
Established firms failures in R&D: Relative legitimacy of
radical solutions increases. Resource re-allocation of established
firms signals resource availability for startups with radical
innovations
Maturing innovations: Increases viability of radical innovations.
Possible resource independence from established firms.

"Temporal" and "spatial" myopia salient in the
formation of partnerships between established
firms and startups.

In an environment wherein established firms retain
complementary assets, pursuing radical innovations is
associated with market value penalties.

Prior failures and successes have a different effect
on the two types of myopia. Failures open firms to
partnering opportunities with novel elements of
knowledge. Prior successes open firms to
solutions that are distant from commercialization.

Forming commercialization partnerships and failure in R&D
initiatives by established firms provide both legitimacy and
resources to startups pursuing radical innovation, hence
mitigating market value penalties.
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Engaging with external partners through
loosely coupled partnerships may add to
the firm's variety of knowledge but such
knowledge may not be effectively used
to boost innovative performance.
Innovation not only requires elements of
external knowledge, but also
experimentation and supporting
resources, which loosely coupled
partnerships lack.
Necessary to look within the firm to
observe when firms benefit from
external knowledge sourced-in through
loosely coupled partnerships:
Experimental Orientation: Induces
recombination and experimentation
Abundant Managerial and Financial
Resources: Support innovation
initiatives, which lack managerial and
financial resources in the first place.
Innovation benefits may not stem from
sourcing external knowledge per se.
Benefits contingent on the in-sourcing
firm’s experimental orientation to
pursue risky projects and the availability
of financial and managerial resources.

The dissertation also makes important methodical contributions. Focusing on
innovation associated with compounds in development in all essays allows me to capture
information in the innovation process that cannot be derived from patent-based studies.
For example, I am able to unambiguously identify if a technology (i.e., a compound) was
available for partnering or not (chapter 2) while, for patents, it is often not clear which
patents are already licensed to other parties and hence not available. Patents also do not
allow us to capture the “time to commercialization” dimension of exploration, which is
important to understanding organizational decision-making (chapter 2 and chapter 3).
Compounds can be unambiguously characterized as being very early or late in the
innovation process, which is not possible through the mere observation of patents.
Moreover, compounds are at the nexus of research and commercialization and hence
represent an important area in which managerial decisions (e.g., the allocation of
resources) are made. It is here where challenges to exploration may materialize as
managers need to make compensatory tradeoffs among various investment alternatives
(Adner & Levinthal, 2008; Klingebiel & Rammer, 2013). A final methodological
contribution lies in the idea of expanding our toolset to measure radical innovations
(chapter 3), which follows the fact that prior studies have examined radical innovations,
not as an ex post, but as a dynamic measure defined through the overlap in innovation
activities by startups and established firms (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005).
Limitations & Extensions
This dissertation is not without limitations, which should provide ample
opportunities for future research. I will focus on the two most important ones as I
addressed limitations separately in each dissertation chapter.
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First, I have analyzed a single industry, which poses concerns as results may not
be generalizable. In particular, I have purposefully chosen an industry in which
established firms are known to remain in possession of complementary assets. I have not,
however, contrasted my observations to an industry in which this may not be the case.
Second, the dissertation currently solely considers partnering as an important
strategic tool deployed by established firms and startup firms in their innovation
activities. However, firms possess a broad variety of tools to tap into external knowledge,
including acquisitions or CVC investments (Keil et al., 2008; Nicholls-Nixon & Woo,
2003), which in this dissertation only serve as controls. The dissertation hence only
captures a subset of actions at the disposal of firms. The inclusion of alternative modes
like acquisitions would, hence, provide an interesting area for future research.
My goal when generating my dissertation data was to build the most
comprehensive dataset linking both external activities (from ReCap) and product
development (from Pharmaprojects). Linking external agreements and product
development data allows me to more readily compare internal R&D (in product
development) as well as external R&D. Hence, I have the unique opportunity to study
internal and external R&D not only by counting activities but by explicating the direction
firms take (exploration and exploitation).
This dataset will cover a variety of external agreements including alliances,
licensing, equity investments and acquisitions, which allows me to a) gain a better
understanding what types of technological solutions are actually sourced by established
firm or available by startups and b) track the outcomes related to the external R&D
activities of both startups and established firms. As an example, I could compare what
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type of compounds is sourced through acquisitions and which ones through partnerships.
At the same time, I could track the outcomes related to the in-sourced technologies
(compounds) and examine how they progress through the development stages.
Increasingly, the direction of the sourcing relationship between established and
startup firms is also reversed as more and more established firms not only are opening up
to external knowledge but also opening up to smaller firms using their external
knowledge (Rivette & Kline, 2000). As an example, Merck and Pfizer both have initiated
dedicated organizational units responsible for identifying internal and unused
technological opportunities to either spin-off or sell to other firms. Understanding what
technologies are selected by established firms, which are let go and identifying the
partners which attract such assets expands our current understanding of the division of
labor between established and startup firms. At the same time, studying such
relationships, in which knowledge flows from the established to the startup firm, may
expand our understanding of organizational search as well as exploration and
exploitation.
Another extension of this dissertation is to examine in greater detail how firms
source external knowledge and how this knowledge ultimately is productively used. This
dissertation illuminated the importance of understanding the organizational context into
which external knowledge is added for the purpose of innovation. Despite incumbents’
investing in the new technology, subsequent innovation and commercialization attempts
may not materialize, as demonstrated in chapter 4. A rich set of literature highlights that
beyond investments into new technologies per se, capabilities, routines, managerial
cognition and resource dependencies need to be accounted for to understand firm’s
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actions in environments characterized by rapid technological change (Christensen &
Bower, 1996; Gilbert, 2005; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Data from
this dissertation allows me to take a closer look at what happens within organizations
with external knowledge. One extension would be to note that not all technological
change is the same as some changes have the potential to disrupt the way incumbents
firms would need to conduct their business (Burgelman, 1985; Christensen, 2006;
Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). For example, in 1990s, gene
therapy emerged as a revolutionary therapeutic approach based on genetic engineering to
treat diseases (Sosa, 2011). A gene therapy treatment is not taken in the form of a pill at
home but in the hospital, administered by a doctor via small intramuscular injections.
Most importantly, gene therapy treatments tend to be one-off, which means that the
current revenue model based on regular prescriptions would not be applicable (Wilson,
2012). It is hence interesting to observe how such technologies are effectively used once
technological knowledge is added into the firm. Accordingly, I have started a project with
Professor Kapoor to investigate if the impact of upstream R&D investments on
incumbents’ downstream commercialization is shaped by whether the emerging
technology is sustaining (i.e., is consistent with) or disruptive to the incumbent’s business
model (Burgelman, 1985; Christensen, 2006; Christensen & Raynor, 2003). We hope to
explicate how the different modes of adaptive responses (partnering, acquisitions, internal
R&D) may differently impact commercialization attempts across sustaining and
disruptive technologies.
Another extension is to shift attention from exploration activities to exploitation.
Throughout the dissertation, I claim the need for exploration, in particular when focusing
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on the established firms (chapter 2 and chapter 4). However, examining the young
startups’ industry players (chapter 3) reveals that it may be equally important to
understand how such startups can more readily exploit their technologies and transition
towards more predictable types of organizations. While I have attempted to keep startups
theoretically distinct from established firms within an industry, over time, startups may
themselves become established industry players as they have commercial success (i.e., a
product on the market). For example, in the late 1990’s, Amgen, Genentech and Chiron
were considered to be established firms with billions of revenues but were startups in the
mid-1980s. Recently, companies I have treated as startups in the 1990s (e.g., Gilead
Sciences or Vertex Pharmaceuticals) made the transition to becoming important industry
players. An extension of this dissertation would be to examine what these firms did to
become more “exploitative.” Given the findings of this dissertation, my expectation is
that partnerships with established firms to build commercialization competencies played
a fundamental role in this transition for these startup firms. Examining this phenomenon
would be also highly interesting from the perspective of the established firms, which on
the one hand gain access to technologies from the startups but, at the same time, may give
rise to their next competitor.
Conclusion
Overall, understanding how established and startup firms innovate is
fundamentally important. I believe there is still a great deal to learn about how firms
explore new ways of solving problems, search beyond their boundaries for new external
technological solutions, and use partnering as an important tool to innovate and adapt to
technological change. The current changes in the pharmaceutical industry (e.g., a breakup
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of Abbott and the potential breakup of Pfizer (Herper, 2011)), combined with the
explosion in scientific knowledge, suggest that environmental turbulence will increase in
the next years, making the industry a highly interesting setting in which to study
innovation and the role of partnerships between established and startup firms.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Chapter 1 - Examples of Partnerships in Recap
Example:
Recap
Joint
Collaborations

Supporting Press Release:
Asklepios Bio and Bayer (Value Chain Activity - Research):
Triangle-based Asklepios Biopharmaceutical Inc., a private development-stage
biotechnology company and California-based Bayer HealthCare, LLC, Biological
Products Division have entered into an early-stage research and collaboration
agreement to evaluate gene therapy for the treatment of hemophilia B. Pending positive
results of a feasibility study, this collaboration could lead to a joint development and
commercialization agreement between Bayer Biological Products Division and
Asklepios for the novel gene therapy treatment for hemophilia B
(www.bayerbiologicals.com).
KAI Pharmaceuticals and Daiichi Sankyo (Value Chain Activity - Phase 2):
Sankyo has entered into an agreement with USA-based KAI Pharmaceuticals for the
joint development and commercialization of KAI-9803. The partnerships will have an
initial focus on cardiovascular disease. The novel delta protein kinase C inhibitor is a
first-in-class agent and is currently in a Phase I clinical trial to assess safety.

Partnerships
with less
reciprocity
among the
partners

Valentis and Wyeth (Value Chain Activity - Research):
Valentis, Inc. announced that it has granted a non-exclusive license of the Company's
GeneSwitch(TM) gene regulation technology to Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, the
pharmaceutical division of American Home Products Corporation. The
GeneSwitch(TM) system allows researchers to control the level and duration of
selected genes in transgenic animals and cell cultures, aiding in the identification and
characterization of a gene's function.
Acacia Biosciences and Bristol-Myers-Squibb (Value Chain Activity - Research):
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and Acacia Biosciences, Inc., today announced an
agreement in which Bristol-Myers Squibb will license the use of Acacia's proprietary
Genome Reporter Matrix(TM) (GRM) to profile
pharmaceutical compounds.
Pherin Pharmaceuticals and Organon (Value Chain Activity - Phase I):
Pherin Pharmaceuticals has signed an agreement with Organon, an Akzo Nobel
subsidiary, for the development and marketing of drugs based on Pherin's compound
PH80 which mimic pheromones.
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Appendix 2: Chapter 2 - Measure Novelty Example (simplified)
Startup: ZymoGenetics 2000:
2 available compounds for
partnering
Compound 1: Atacicept
Broad Therapy: Immunological
Mechanism: B-cell activating
factor inhibitor
Origin of Material:
Biological-Protein, recombinant
Compound 2: denenicokin
Broad Therapy: Cancer
Mechanism: Interleukin 21
agonist
Origin of Material:
Biological-Protein, recombinant

Established Firm:
Merck & Co (1997-2000)
Merck Experience in
Immunological:
Mechanism of Action: New
to Merck (1)
Origin of Material: New to
Merck (1)
Merck Experience in Cancer:
Origin of Material: New to
Merck (1)
Origin of Material: Known to
Merck (0)

Novelty score

2

Average
Novelty Score
(StartupEstablished
Firm Year
Level)
(2+1)/2=1.5

1

Appendix 3: Chapter 2 – Measure Success, Failure

Partnering Opportunity:
Startup: ZymoGenetics in year t-1
Compound: Atacicept

Established Firm: Merck & Co

Broad Therapy: Immunological

Moderator: Prior Successes: Count Number of
Approved Drugs by Merck in Co. in broad Therapy Area
Immunological between t-4 to t-1

Broad Therapy: Immunological

Moderator: Prior Failures: Count Number of Failed
Drugs (PII/PIII) by Merck in Co. in Therapy Area
Immunological between t-4 to t-1
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Appendix 4: Chapter 2 – Inteff – z-statistics

Moderation Novelty and Prior Failures
(+ supported):

Moderation Novelty and Prior Successes
(- not supported):

Moderation Distance to
Commercialization and Prior Failures
(- some support)

Moderation Distance to Commercialization
and Prior Successes
(+ supported)
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Appendix 5: Chapter 3 - Measure - Innovation Radicalness (Simplified Example)
Startup in year 2001:
Cancer Compound 1:
OoM: Chemical
MoA:
Phosphodiesterase
(PDE)
inhibitor
Cancer Compound 2:
OoM:
Biological-Viral
Vector
MoA: Protein synthesis
inhibitor

Pfizer -2001 (active
in cancer)
Score: 0 (OoM and
MoA both also in
development by
Pfizer in Cancer)

Merck- 2001
(active in cancer)
0

Independent Variable

Score 2 (neither OoM
nor MoA pursued by
Pfizer in Cancer)

2

Average: 4/2=2

Average: 0/2=0

Innovation Radicalness
startup level (average):
(0+2)/2 = 1

OoM-Origin of Material, MoA-Mechanism of Action
Appendix 6: Chapter 3 - Measure - Failure & Success Incumbents
Startup active in year
2001 in:
Therapy Area 1: Cancer

Pfizer -2001

Merck- 2001

Number of Failures (Phase
III discontinuation): 1

Number of
Failures: 2

Number of Successes
(Drug Approved): 1
Therapy
Area
Cardiovascular

2:

Moderating
Variables/Controls
Failure Incumbents
(Pfizer: 1+0, Merck:
2+0): 3

Number of
Successes: 1

Number of
Failures: 0

Number of
Failures: 0

Number of
Successes: 1

Number of
Successes: 1
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Success Incumbents
(Pfizer: 1+1, Merck:
1+1): 4
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